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 Prudential hedonism is a school of thought in the philosophy of welfare that says 
that only pleasure is good for us in itself and only pain is bad for us in itself. This 
dissertation concerns an especially austere form of prudential hedonism: basic prudential 
hedonism (BPH). BPH claims that all pleasure is good for us in itself, and all pain is bad 
for us in itself, without exception; that all pleasures feel fundamentally alike, as do all 
pains; and that the amount of welfare in a person’s life can (in principle) be calculated just 
by adding up the amount of pleasure it contains and subtracting the amount of pain. The 
dissertation presents a positive argument for the claim that pleasures and pains are 
defined by common phenomenal properties, defends BPH against a battery of objections, 
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This dissertation defends a version of prudential hedonism. In all its forms, 
prudential hedonism says that only pleasure is intrinsically good for us and only pain is 
intrinsically bad for us.1 Different versions of the view are distinguished by what they 
take pleasure and pain to be, and which pleasures and pains are said to count. But in every 
case, prudential hedonism makes the radical claim that nothing other than pleasure and 
pain—not love, friendship, autonomy, knowledge, achievement, failure, ignorance, 
helplessness, betrayal, or the satisfaction or frustration of desires—makes any difference, 
in itself, to the quality of a life for the person living it. 
 This claim has faced a number of influential criticisms. As a result, many 
philosophers regard prudential hedonism as untenable, and it is often described as 
unpopular. Yet it has always struck me as the most plausible approach in the philosophy 
of welfare. I began my research in this area with an inchoate sense that prudential 
hedonism was correct; this dissertation represents my effort to turn that basic impulse 
into something philosophically respectable. 
 Prudential hedonism, as I understand it, is not a single theory, but rather a family 
of theories, united by the radical claim stated above. Particular versions of prudential 
hedonism, when fully articulated, will specify what pleasure and pain are, which 
pleasures and pains count for and against welfare in themselves, and how pleasures and 
 
1 Whether “pleasure” and “pain” are the right terms to use to characterize prudential hedonism, or 
any other hedonistic theory, is disputed. See §1.1.2. 
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pains together determine the amount of welfare in a person’s life. In principle, the number 
of such theories is vast, with each taking on some distinct metaphysical or evaluative 
commitment, and each allowing for different avenues of response to critics. Therefore, for 
practical reasons, I will not be attempting a defense of prudential hedonism per se. 
Instead I will defend a single theory, which I call “basic prudential hedonism” 
(BPH). I believe that this theory presents the impulse behind prudential hedonism in its 
most primitive form. It is also an appropriate target for every canonical objection to 
prudential hedonism that I know of, in the sense that if any of those criticisms is well-
founded, then BPH is almost certainly false. In this context, that is a virtue. By seeing what 
can be said on behalf of BPH, we can discover where prudential hedonism is more resilient 
against the canonical objections than commonly thought; by seeing where (if anywhere) 
it is indefensible, we will learn what sorts of concessions prudential hedonism will have 
to make be a viable approach in the philosophy of welfare. 
BPH says roughly this: all and only pleasure, broadly construed, is intrinsically 
good for you; all and only pain, broadly construed, is intrinsically bad for you; and how 
good your life is for you can (in principle) be calculated by adding up all of your pleasures 
and subtracting all of your pains. More precisely, we can understand it as consisting of 
the following theses, each of which contains a set of thematically linked claims. The first 
two theses are descriptive; they express BPH’s central non-evaluative claims about 
pleasure and pain. The third thesis is evaluative; it expresses BPH’s central claims about 





Basic Prudential Hedonism (BPH): 
 
Phenomenological Thesis: All pleasures are mental states that feel the same way in 
some respect, and it is this common feeling that makes them count as pleasures; 
the same is true of pains. 
 
Calculation Thesis: All hedonic states have magnitudes that are 
(a) Determined solely by their intensities and durations. 
(b) Quantifiable (in principle, using cardinal numbers). 
(c) Commensurable with all others of their type (pleasures magnitudes 
with one another and pain magnitudes with one another).2 
 
Evaluative Thesis: The amount of welfare in a life (or life-segment) L, for its subject 
S, is determined by, and equal to, the sum of the magnitudes of all of S's pleasures 
during L minus the sum of the magnitudes of all of S's pains during L. 
 
I am partial to this theory. I believe that if any positive (i.e. non-skeptical) theory of welfare 
is correct, it is this one. But I do not believe this can be shown beyond reasonable doubt. 
At various points, my case for BPH will depend on assumptions that I cannot fully defend 
here. I will try to be candid about what these assumptions are and where they come into 
play. 
 My defense of BPH is organized around two aims, one relatively modest, the other 
more ambitious. The relatively modest aim is to show that BPH is no less plausible than 
other theories of welfare. As far as this part of the dissertation is concerned, I would be 
satisfied if I could fight BPH’s competitors, hedonist and non-hedonist alike, to a draw. 
The more ambitious aim is to show that BPH has a distinct advantage over its major 
 
2 Notably, the calculation thesis does not claim that pleasure magnitudes are commensurable 
with pain magnitudes (though it does not deny this either). I omit this claim because I think that 
it would be superfluous. All that BPH needs is the claim, contained in the evaluative thesis, that 
amounts of intrinsic prudential goodness are commensurable with amounts of intrinsic 
prudential badness. On this point see Klocksiem (2010). 
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competitors: its simplicity. But simplicity, as I understand it, can be no more than a 
tiebreaker in theory selection, so achieving the ambitious aim requires achieving the 
modest aim first. The idea is this: simpler theories are preferable, all else being 
epistemically equal; if I meet the modest aim, then I will have shown all else is indeed 
epistemically equal. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to lay the terminological, conceptual, and epistemic 
foundations for the work to follow. In §1.1, I will clarify my use of some key terms. In §1.2, 
I will make some remarks about the fundamental appeal of BPH before briefly 
introducing the reader to its major competitors in the philosophy of welfare, including 
some alternative formulations of prudential hedonism. Finally, in §1.3 I will briefly sketch 
my plan for meeting this work’s modest and ambitious aims. 
1.1 Terminology 
1.1.1 Evaluative Terminology 
This dissertation is a work in value theory. Accordingly, I will use the term “value” 
many times. When I use that term without qualification, I intend for it to cover both 
positive and negative value. In my parlance, to say that something is valuable is just to 
say that it is not evaluatively neutral. Something is valuable just in case it is good to some 
extent, bad to some extent, or both. I will use the phrases “positive value” and “negative 
value” for things that are (to some extent) good or bad, respectively. 
Basic prudential hedonism is a positive theory of prudential value. Prudential 
value is the kind of value something has when it is good or bad for a person. In other 
words, it is the kind of value something has if it makes a contribution, positive or negative, 
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to an individual’s welfare or well-being (I use the latter two terms interchangeably). In 
still other words, it is the kind of value something has when it is in a person’s self-interest 
to have or avoid that thing. And in still other words, prudential value is the kind of value 
something has when it makes life better or worse for the one who has it. Positive theories 
of prudential value say that there are in fact things in the world with positive and/or 
negative prudential value. I will also refer to these as positive theories of welfare. 
Like other kinds of value, prudential value can be intrinsic or extrinsic. Something 
has intrinsic value just in case it is valuable in itself, apart from anything else that it is 
related to. Something has extrinsic value just in case its value depends on its relations to 
other things. There are two main kinds of extrinsic value. The first is what I will call 
“attitude-dependent value”. This is the kind of value something has when its value 
depends on its being the object of an attitude, such as a desire. The second, more important 
kind is instrumental value. This is the kind of value something has when, and because, it 
is conducive to getting things with intrinsic value. 
Things with intrinsic prudential value are the fundamental building blocks of 
personal welfare. Everything that is good or bad for a person has this kind of value by 
being either intrinsically prudentially valuable, instrumentally prudentially valuable, or 
both. To illustrate: in this dissertation, I claim that pleasure has positive intrinsic 
prudential value; by extension, I claim that anything that brings a person pleasure has 
positive instrumental prudential value for that person. I find pleasure in lying down on 
my couch, so my couch has positive instrumental prudential value for me. 
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BPH is a type of hedonism. The qualifier “prudential” is required because the term 
“hedonism” is used for at least three different kinds of theory, all of which account for 
some area of philosophical interest entirely in terms of hedonic states. There is 
psychological hedonism, which says that all motivation can be explained in terms of 
hedonic states (for discussion see Sober 2013: pp. 131-140). There is ethical hedonism, 
which says that only hedonic states have intrinsic moral value (for example Lafleur 1956). 
And finally, there is prudential hedonism, also known as welfare hedonism, which says 
that only hedonic states have intrinsic prudential value. The present work is an 
exploration and defense of a form of prudential hedonism. It is not directly concerned 
with psychological or ethical hedonism. 
1.1.2 Hedonic Terminology 
As I have said, “hedonism” is a term for a type of theory that accounts for 
something philosophically interesting entirely in terms of hedonic states. To have a clear 
idea of what this means, we must have some idea of what hedonic states are. But it is 
challenging to give any definition of hedonic states without making some disputed 
assumption. A similar difficulty occurs at the level of terminology, as it becomes difficult 
to find terms for referring to hedonic states that fit well with ordinary usage and do not 
appear to unduly privilege some controversial conception of them. 
With that in mind, I will begin with this very general characterization. A hedonic 
state is a type of mental state that essentially involves some phenomenology, or qualia. 
This is to say that every time a person is in a hedonic state, they must be feeling something; 
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there must be something that it is like for them to be in that particular token state.3 
Moreover, every hedonic state has a valence, positive or negative. We commonly say of 
the positive hedonic states that they feel good and of the negative ones that they feel bad. 
If you have ever felt happy, sad, pleased, hurt, uncomfortable, giddy, or depressed, you 
have experienced a hedonic state. 
I use “pleasure” for all positive hedonic states and “pain” for all negative ones, a 
practice I believe has a reasonably firm foundation in common usage. However, various 
philosophers who write on the value of hedonic states find that these terms have unduly 
narrow connotations. There is some merit to this. The word “pleasure”, in many contexts, 
calls to mind a restricted class of bodily pleasures—from food, sex, and the like—while 
pain, in common parlance and when discussed by philosophers and scientists, often refers 
to what we might call sensory pain: feelings that are experienced as having a more or less 
specific bodily locations, and that can be described with terms like burning, stinging, 
stabbing, aching, and throbbing. 
I join the likes of Bentham (1988), Mill (2001), and Sidgwick (1981) in saying that 
while bodily pleasures and sensory pains are indeed cases of positive and negative 
hedonic states, there are also non-bodily pleasures and non-sensory pains.4 There is the 
 
3 Even this assumption may be controversial, as it is incompatible with the attitudinal hedonism of 
Fred Feldman (2006), according to which hedonic states are propositional attitudes that do not 
necessarily have any felt quality. I will discuss aspects of Feldman’s view in chapters 2-4. 
4 In defining the notion of utility, Bentham (1988: pp.14-15) writes: 
 
By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, 
advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this the present case comes to the same thing) 
or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, 
or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered. 
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pleasure of finding something funny, for instance, and the pain of grief. But the more 
restrictive connotations that “pleasure” and “pain” often carry has led some philosophers 
to look for more suitable terms. Hence Mill (2001) uses “happiness” alongside “pleasure”; 
Crisp (2006) uses “enjoyment” and “suffering”; Schroeder (2004) uses “pleasure” and 
“displeasure”; Mayerfeld (1992) uses “happiness” and “suffering”; and Rachels (2004) 
prefers “unpleasure” as the antonym of “pleasure”. 
 Nonetheless, I maintain that “pleasure” and “pain” are the best options, as each of 
the foregoing alternatives has some disqualifying disadvantage. 
The main alternatives on the negative side are “suffering”, “displeasure”, and 
“unpleasure”. “Suffering” is suitably broad, and neutral in itself as to the precise nature 
of the states it refers to. Unfortunately, “suffering” lacks grammatical versatility. “Pain” 
can take the form of a count noun, mass noun, adjective (“painful”), adverb (“painfully”), 
and verb (as in the phrase “it pains me”) without leaving the realm of ordinary speech. 
“Suffering”, by contrast, generally appears only as a verb (to suffer) or a gerund (as in the 
phrase “suffering is bad”). Adopting “suffering” as our general term for negative hedonic 
states threatens to require the use of phrases like “suffering-inducing” (compare 
 
 
Mill (2001: p. 8) refers to the “pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the 
moral sentiments” alongside “those of mere sensation”. Sidgwick (1981, meanwhile, says various 
things indicating that he does not confine pleasure and pain to the physical realm. For example, in 
giving his account of what pleasure is, he writes: “when I reflect on the notion of pleasure—using 
the term in the comprehensive sense I have adopted, to include the most refined and subtle 
intellectual and emotional gratifications, no less than the coarser and more definite sensual 
enjoyments…”. As for pain, he says that it “must be reckoned as the negative quantity of pleasure” 
(p. 124); given that pleasure can be intellectual, emotional, and sensual, it stands to reason that its 
“negative quantity” could be any of those things as well. 
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“painful”), “experience of suffering” (compare “painful experience”), and perhaps 
reference to individual “sufferings”. I prefer to avoid this kind of linguistic awkwardness. 
“Displeasure”, meanwhile, seems suitable only in cases of relatively mild negative 
feeling. To describe, say, severe torture as “extremely displeasing” seems less like a literal 
truth and more like a bit of deliberately comic understatement (compare “extremely 
painful”). Moreover, both “displeasure” and “unpleasure”, as terms, suggest that they 
state the refer to is supposed to be the opposite of pleasure. But I wish to remain agnostic 
on this point. As far my defense of BPH is concerned, positive and negative hedonic states 
need only be opposed to one another at the evaluative level; it need not be the case that 
they are opposites at the descriptive level. 
There is also the option of just using the phrases “positive hedonic state” and 
“negative hedonic state”. My objection to these is purely aesthetic: I find them too 
cumbersome to use as frequently as I would need to use them in this dissertation. 
Admittedly, using “pleasure” and “pain” has its own disadvantages. Aside from 
being out of step with narrower usage elsewhere, it commits us to saying that experiences 
such as having a bad taste in your mouth, being tickled too much, and feeling bored are 
literally painful. But by now it should be clear that there is no terminology which will 
keep us from ever having to say anything that sounds clumsy or otherwise slightly odd. 
Ultimately, the terminological differences between myself and other philosophers 
should not be very important. Those who believe a different set of terms is more faithful 
to the underlying facts may simply regard “pleasure” and “pain” as technical terms in 
what follows. So long as I am clear about what I mean by “pleasure”, “pain”, and related 
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terms, it will be possible to translate every statement in this dissertation that includes one 
or more of those words into the preferred terminology of any of the philosophers 
mentioned above. For example, a philosopher who believes that “displeasure” is the 
proper umbrella term for negative hedonic states may simply replace all my uses of “pain” 
with “displeasure”, and be confident that no loss of meaning will result. 
1.2 BPH and Its Competitors 
1.2.1 The Fundamental Appeal of Basic Prudential Hedonism 
I turn now to the topic of what makes basic prudential hedonism an appealing 
view. What follows here is not an argument for BPH. Rather, it is a short exploration of 
what might draw someone to it in the first place. 
It is common for works on the philosophy of well-being to begin by discussing 
some form of prudential hedonism. Typically, this is done to show how prudential 
hedonism is mistaken, in order to motivate whatever theory of well-being the author 
ultimately wants to defend.5  Still, the fact that hedonism is such a common starting place 
for explorations of prudential value is striking. It suggests that, for all its unpopularity, 
something about this approach is compelling. This owes, I suspect, to the character of 
pleasurable and painful experiences. There is something about the way pleasure feels that 
makes us think that it’s good for us, and something about the way that pain feels that 
 
5 Examples include Griffin (1986: pp. 7-9), Kagan (1994: pp. 310-311), Hurka (2011: pp. 65-73), and 
Fletcher (2016: pp. 14-24). Despite its already poor reputation, philosophers still sometimes publish 
articles devoted entirely to criticizing hedonism. See for example Sobel (2002) and Dorsey (2011). 
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makes us think that it is bad for us. Evaluative language attaches to the experiences so 
naturally that it seems redundant to say that pleasure feels good and pain feels bad.6  
Furthermore, prudential hedonism fits with the commonsense idea that we are at 
least sometimes motivated to pursue things that are good for us. Virtually everyone 
generally seeks pleasure and avoids pain. And when we do forego pleasure or choose to 
endure pain, it is almost always in the service of something else that we value. This 
something else is often more pleasure and/or less pain in the future. 
Granted, this does not show that pleasure and pain have intrinsic prudential value. 
And even if it did, one need not be a prudential hedonist to believe that pleasure and pain 
are good and bad for us in themselves, respectively. One could claim that hedonic states 
have intrinsic prudential value and other things do too. As we will see in §1.2.2 below, 
there are philosophers who hold views like this. Among the things other than pleasure 
that philosophers of welfare have proposed are intrinsically good for us are friendship, 
achievement, autonomy, knowledge (of an important or at least non-trivial sort), and 
moral virtue. 
But notice that, for most people under normal circumstances, these very things 
tend to bring us pleasure, help us avoid pain, or both. Not all the time, of course; gaining 
and preserving them can involve foregoing pleasure and enduring considerable suffering. 
But spending time with friends and accomplishing significant things are among life’s 
great sources of joy. And getting to experience them with any consistency typically 
 




requires some measure of kindness, honesty, patience, courage, and the like, as well some 
non-trivial knowledge and some freedom to choose one’s own course of life. There is also 
the fact of how painful it is (for most people, under normal circumstances) to go without 
such things. We seek close relationships with others, and try to do worthwhile things with 
our lives, in no small part to avoid the suffering we would experience if we did not. This 
is one reason why the less pleasant feelings involved in these pursuits are often regarded 
as “worth it”, so to speak. 
Prudential hedonism takes these observations and fashions an entire theory out of 
them. It claims that the prudential value of any given thing that is not a hedonic state can 
be accounted for entirely in terms of the conduciveness of that thing to pleasures, pains, 
and/or absences thereof. In other words, it says that something like friendship is good for 
us not in itself, but because it makes our lives more pleasurable and/or less painful than 
they would be otherwise. 
Now, a prudential hedonist need not say that all pleasures are good for us, or all 
pains bad for us. They may claim that only a subset of pleasures are good or pains bad. 
But BPH does affirm the intrinsic prudential goodness of all pleasures and the badness of 
all pains, without exception. Hence BPH proposes that the fundamental facts about 
welfare can be just this simple: the good feelings that we generally seek are in fact what’s 
intrinsically good for us, the bad feelings we generally avoid are in fact what’s intrinsically 
bad for us, and that’s all there is to it. Further, it proposes that how good or bad something 
is for you is just a matter of adding up the amount of pleasure it brings you and 
subtracting the amount of pain it brings you. 
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All in all, then, BPH paints a recognizable picture of a life that is good for its subject 
under normal material and psychological circumstances. It assigns intrinsic prudential 
value to things that it is prima facie plausible to think have an impact on our welfare, 
thereby vindicating the commonsense idea that it is generally to a person’s benefit to have 
mutually rewarding relationships, success at worthwhile activities, strong moral 
character, and freedom from sickness, injury, and subjugation by others. And it does so 
with what appears to be relatively few theoretical trappings. 
Implicit in BPH is a challenge: why make your theory of welfare any more 
complicated than this? Philosophers have answered that challenge in many ways. Hence 
this dissertation. 
1.2.2 Non-Hedonist Competitors 
Following Parfit’s (1984: pp. 493-502) influential discussion, the standard 
taxonomy of theories of welfare has consisted of three categories: hedonism, desire 
theories, and objective list theories. I will not depart from this standard. In §1.2.3. I will 
describe the main non-BPH variants of prudential hedonism. Here, I will give a brief 
summary of the desire and objective list approaches. 
 Desire theories of welfare hold that only the satisfactions and frustrations of 
desires have intrinsic prudential value. These are not to be confused with feelings of 
satisfaction or frustration. A desire is satisfied when the desired state of affairs occurs, and 
frustrated when the desired state of affairs does not occur. Every desire theory that I know 
of holds that only the satisfactions or frustrations of a person’s own desires can have 
intrinsic prudential value for that person. There is, however, a great deal of variation 
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among extant desire theories on other matters, such as which desires count, and whether 
the desires that fundamentally matter are actual or hypothetical. 
Actualist desire theories allow only the satisfactions and frustrations of a subject’s 
actual desires to count. Among actualist theories, there are restricted and unrestricted 
views. 
Unrestricted desire theories say that all of a person’s desire-satisfactions and 
desire-frustrations have intrinsic prudential value (Murphy 1999, Lukas 2010). So, take 
any desire of mine, be it as mundane as a desire for pleasure or as eccentric as a desire 
about the exact number of hairs on another person’s head; unrestricted desire theories 
hold that if this desire is satisfied, my welfare goes up, and if it is frustrated, my welfare 
goes down. 
Some unrestricted actualist desire theories fall prey to a paradox. The best-known 
exposition of this comes from Bradley (2007), though he credits Feldman (2006: pp. 16-17) 
with being the first to notice it. The problem is that if we accept certain common 
assumptions about desires, and do not place any restrictions on which satisfactions and 
frustrations of desires can have intrinsic prudential value, we can create a logically 
possible situation in which a person’s life contains an overall positive and negative 
amount of welfare simultaneously. 
Here’s an example of a case that produces the paradox. Suppose we can assign 
numerical strengths to desires. Further suppose that if I have a desire of strength X, then 
satisfying that desire is intrinsically positively valuable for me to degree X, and frustrating 
that desire is intrinsically negatively valuable for me to degree X. Now, imagine a person 
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who has exactly two desires: a desire of strength 1 not to feel pain, and a desire of strength 
2 that their life contain an overall negative amount of welfare. If this person starts at a 
welfare level of 0, and then feels some pain, their desire not to feel pain will be frustrated, 
and their welfare will sink to -1. But then having a negative welfare level will satisfy their 
other desire, bringing them to a welfare level of +1. This frustrates their desire to have a 
negative welfare level, which brings them back down to -1. And so on.7 
This and other problems with unrestricted actualism provide some motivation for 
moving to a restricted actualist theory.8 Restricted actualist views say that only a subset 
of a person’s actual desire-satisfactions and desire-frustrations have intrinsic prudential 
value. For instance, one might say that only intrinsic desires—desires directed at things 
for their own sake, rather than merely as a means to something else—are fundamentally 
relevant. Most restricted views go further than this: for example, Griffin (1986) argues that 
only one’s properly informed actual intrinsic desires count; Heathwood (2006) suggests 
that only actual intrinsic desires about one’s present state of consciousness count; and 
Heathwood (2019) argues that only the actual intrinsic desires that count as “genuine 
attractions”, as opposed to mere behavioral dispositions, count.9 
 
7 Skow (2009) argues that if desire-satisfaction and -frustration comes in degrees, rather than being 
all-or-nothing, then a desire theory can be developed that avoids the paradox. I think he is 
mistaken. Even if desire-satisfactions and -frustrations come in degrees, it is still conceptually 
possible to desire that your life be overall bad for you while being otherwise indifferent to how 
bad it is. Such a desire would be fully satisfied when your welfare is below zero to any extent, and 
fully frustrated when your welfare is above zero to any extent, thereby producing the paradox. 
8 The Bradley/Feldman paradox notwithstanding, the most prominent objection to unrestricted 
actualism is that some desires are just too trivial for their satisfactions or frustrations to have 
intrinsic prudential value. Lukas (2010) defends unrestricted actualism against this objection. 
9 The restriction to informed desires (e.g. Griffin 1986) avoids the paradox on the plausible 
assumption that the desire that one’s life go poorly would not be an informed one. The restriction 
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Ideal desire theories, meanwhile, assign intrinsic prudential only to the 
satisfactions and frustrations of the desires that a person would have under certain ideal 
conditions. Though he speaks in terms of objective interests and what is non-morally good 
for a person, rather than using the language of welfare or prudential value, we might 
understand Railton (1986a: pp. 176-184) as presenting a view of this type. He proposes 
that what is good for a person (call him J) is to get what an ideally informed and rational 
version of that person (call him J+) would want for the actual person to have. Here is an 
illustration: J is very thirsty, and has the choice to drink either water or wine. He wants to 
drink the wine, and for some odd reason, has no desire to drink the water. But 
unbeknownst to him, he has suddenly developed an allergy to alcohol, and so the wine 
will make him sick. J+, however, is ideally informed, and therefore knows about J’s 
allergy. Hence J+ wants J to want to drink the water. As a result, though drinking the wine 
would satisfy one of J’s actual desires, drinking the water is what would actually be good 
for him. 
Like BPH, desire theories can paint a recognizable picture of a life that is good for 
its subject under normal material and psychological circumstances. There is a close 
intuitive connection between well-being and getting what you want (and avoiding what 
you don’t want). Moreover, most of us want to be morally good people, and to have 
friendship, achievement, autonomy, and at least some kinds of knowledge in our lives. So 
 
to intrinsic desires about present states of consciousness (e.g. Heathwood 2006) avoids it on the 




just as having these things is associated with getting more pleasure and less pain, they are 
also associated with having more desires satisfied and fewer frustrated. And it is 
reasonable to think that on a restricted desire theory like those cited above, desires for 
friendship, achievement, autonomy, and at least some kinds of knowledge would be 
among those whose satisfactions and frustrations have intrinsic prudential value (in other 
words, these desires would not be filtered out by the theory’s restrictions). Hence desire 
theorists can also vindicate the commonsense idea that it is generally to a person’s benefit 
to have mutually rewarding relationships, success at worthwhile activities, strong moral 
character, and freedom from sickness, injury, and subjugation by others. 
Another major motivation for desire theory as an approach in the philosophy of 
welfare is that it allows for a close connection between one’s welfare and one’s particular 
psychology. The less restrictive the desire theory, and the more closely tied it is actual 
desires, the less it dictates to each person what they must do for their life to be good for 
them. Even Railton, whose theory abstracts away from actual desires the most of any 
considered here, holds that “what is intrinsically valuable for a person must have a 
connection with what he would find in some degree compelling or attractive, at least if he 
were rational and aware”, adding that “it would be an intolerably alienated conception of 
someone's good to imagine that it might fail in any such way to engage him” (1986b: p. 
9).10 
 
10 I defend BPH against the claim that there is a necessary connection between intrinsic value and 
what a person would find compelling or attractive at §3.3.3. 
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 However, in the progression from unrestricted actualism to restricted actualism to 
ideal desire theory, we can trace an increasing resistance to the notion that what is good 
for a person must be in some way sensitive to individual idiosyncrasies. This brings us, 
finally, to a type of view that dispenses with any such requirement: objective list theory.11 
 Objective list theories of welfare posit multiple attitude-independent sources of 
intrinsic prudential value. In other words, they provide a list of things that are good for 
you whether you, or any hypothetical version of you, has any positive attitude toward 
them or not.12 For example, Fletcher (2013) proposes that the list of objective prudential 
goods consists of pleasure, friendship, achievement, happiness, self-respect, and virtue, 
while Hooker (2015) argues that the list consists of pleasure, friendship, significant 
achievement, important knowledge, and autonomy. (Notice that objective list theorists 
can, and often do, assign positive intrinsic prudential value to pleasure.) We may also 
classify the perfectionist approach to welfare as a kind of objective list theory. 
Perfectionists, such as Hurka (1993) and Kraut (2007), locate intrinsic prudential value in 
 
11 Objective list theories need not hold that what has intrinsic prudential value for a person is 
unconnected to their attitudes. They may say that some items on the list are partly constituted by 
certain attitudes; for instance, they could say that friendship is partly constituted by attitudes that 
friends hold toward one another. But they need not say any such thing. And in all cases, objective 
list theorists hold that the items on the list have intrinsic prudential value regardless of your 
attitude toward them. So even if friendship, for instance, is partly constituted by certain attitudes, 
you need not have any attitude toward friendship itself in order for it to be intrinsically good for 
you. 
12 For reasons that are unclear to me, objective list theorists do not seem much interested in negative 
prudential value. Gert (2005: pp. 90-99) is an exception; he himself notes that “[i]n most discussions 
of goods and evils, goods receive most of the attention. Indeed, sometimes evils are completely 
ignored, almost as if they did not exist” (p. 90). 
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the development and expression of distinctively human capacities, such as the pursuit of 
knowledge and the exercise of moral virtue. 
 Like prudential hedonists and desire theorists, objective list theorists can paint a 
recognizable picture of a life that is good for its subject under normal material and 
psychological circumstances. For this, they need only be judicious in what they put on 
their lists. And if they assign positive and negative intrinsic value to pleasure and pain 
(respectively), then they can avail themselves of many of the observations I appealed to 
on behalf of prudential hedonism above. Hence they can easily vindicate the 
commonsense idea that it is generally to a person’s benefit to have mutually rewarding 
relationships, success at worthwhile activities, strong moral character, and freedom from 
sickness, injury, and subjugation by others. 
 The taxonomy I have given in this section is certainly not exhaustive, but it gives 
us a good enough sense of the terrain in the philosophy of welfare. Ultimately, the finer 
points of these competing views are less important than the general properties that 
distinguish them from BPH. It is with reference to these properties that I will discuss the 
simplicity of BPH in chapter 4. 
1.2.3 Hedonist Competitors 
I know of only one philosopher who explicitly endorses basic prudential hedonism 
(albeit not under that name): Tännsjö (1998). The view is sometimes attributed to Bentham 
(1989), but I’m not sure this is right. Bentham clearly accepted the evaluative thesis, and 
may have accepted the phenomenological thesis. But in his account of how to calculate 
the goodness of a pleasure for an individual, Bentham cited not only the intensity and 
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duration of the pleasure as factors, but also its “certainty or uncertainty” and its “nearness 
or remoteness” (p. 29). I do not know whether Bentham meant for these to figure into the 
intrinsic goodness of the pleasure of the individual or not. In any case, neither Bentham 
nor Tännsjö defend their versions of hedonism at great length. Other than this 
dissertation, I have not personally encountered any extended defenses of BPH in the 
literature. 
Every other form of prudential hedonism can be understood as deviating from 
BPH by replacing one of its three theses with something more complicated. This is what 
makes BPH “basic”, and a natural starting point for assessing the strengths of hedonism 
as an approach in the philosophy of welfare. When I say that other kinds of hedonism are 
more complicated than BPH, I mean roughly that they must make a greater number of 
fundamental claims. I will be more precise about this in chapter 4. For now, I will have to 
trust that the reader shares my general sense of when a theory must make an additional 
fundamental claim. 
 First, consider BPH’s phenomenological thesis. This thesis holds that all pleasures 
feel alike in some particular way, as do all pains, and that it is these phenomenological 
similarities that define pleasure and pain as categories. Some forms of hedonism 
complicate this by adopting an attitudinal theory of hedonic states instead. Attitudinal 
theories say that each token hedonic state involves both a state of affairs (such as a feeling) 
and an attitude toward that state of affairs (such as a desire that it occur or not occur). 
 Feldman (2006: pp. 55-60), a contemporary prudential hedonist, holds an 
attitudinal view of hedonic states. According to Feldman, pleasures and pains are 
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propositional attitudes: to have pleasure is to have the propositional attitude of being 
pleased that some proposition is true, and to have pain is to have the propositional 
attitude of being pained that some proposition is true. Hence where BPH says that token 
pleasures and pains are individual mental states, an attitudinal view like Feldman’s holds 
that token pleasures and pains necessarily involve pairs of states, consisting of attitudes 
and the states of affairs toward which those attitudes are held. In this respect, attitudinal 
versions of hedonism must be more complicated than BPH. 
 Then there are the prudential hedonists who accept the phenomenological thesis, 
but would replace the evaluative thesis with something more complicated. On my reading 
of him, Mill (2001: pp. 7-11) is one of these. Mill says that there are distinctions of quality 
among pleasures, such that the pleasures that appeal to the “higher faculties” of human 
beings—pleasures of the intellect, imagination, and moral character—have greater 
intrinsic value than the base pleasures of which humans and animals alike are capable. 
He appears to intend this distinction as being one purely of value, not of quantity; the 
higher pleasures are not literally more pleasurable for us, but they are nonetheless 
intrinsically better for us.13 This means that to determine the amount of welfare in a life, 
we need to do more than add up all the pleasure magnitudes and subtract all the pain 
magnitudes, as the evaluative thesis claims. To get the right evaluative result, Mill would 
 
13 Passages indicating that Mill (2001: p.9, p. 10) thinks of the quality distinction as evaluative rather 
than as purely descriptive include his remark that “[i]t is quite compatible with the principle of 
utility to recognize the fact that some kinds of pleasures are more desirable and more valuable than 
others”, and his observation later in the discussion of higher pleasures that “[m]en often, from 
infirmity of character, make their election for the nearer good, though they know it to be less 
valuable” (emphases mine). 
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have us perform a more complex calculation of value that accounts for quality distinctions 
among pleasures. 
 Another contemporary prudential hedonist, Crisp (2006: pp. 112-116), adopts 
Millian quality distinctions at the descriptive level. We can interpret him as accepting the 
phenomenological and evaluative theses, but rejecting the calculation thesis. For Crisp, as 
for Mill, there are higher and lower pleasures, and the higher pleasures are more valuable. 
But, Crisp says, they are more valuable precisely because they are more pleasurable (Crisp 
would say “enjoyable”). Therefore, in determining the magnitude of a pleasure, we must 
account for its intensity, duration, and quality. And disparities in quality can be such that 
no amount of a lower pleasure could ever be as pleasurable as any amount of a higher 
one: to take Crisp’s example, it may be that no amount of pleasure one gets from drinking 
lemonade could ever exceed the amount of pleasure one gets from reading Pride and 
Prejudice, even keeping the durations of the pleasures constant.14 
 Finally, Bramble (2016: pp. 98-101) also rejects the evaluative thesis, on the 
grounds that “purely repeated” pleasures do not contribute to a person’s total lifetime 
welfare. On Bramble’s view, if a person feels two separate pleasures of the same kind—
two pleasurable bites of the same dessert, say—the second can only add to the person’s 
welfare if it somehow feels pleasurable in a different way than the first. This implies that 
the amount of welfare in a life is not determined by adding up all the pleasures and 
subtracting all the pains; we would also need to subtract the magnitudes of the pleasures 
 
14 Unlike Mill, Crisp allows for quality distinctions among pleasures to vary from one person to 
another. A higher pleasure for you might be a lower pleasure for me. 
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that did not “introduce anything qualitatively new in terms of pleasurableness” to the 
subject’s life (p. 98). 
Bramble adopts this view for much the same reason that both Mill and Crisp 
posited quality distinctions among pleasures: to avoid the implication that a life of 
nothing but base bodily pleasures could be as high in welfare, or higher, than a life with 
pleasures that are more varied and refined.15 The evaluative thesis ensures that BPH 
cannot avoid this implication. 
1.3 The Plan 
 Chapters 2 and 3 are devoted to the relatively modest goal of the dissertation: 
showing that basic prudential hedonism is at least as defensible as other major positive 
theories of welfare, i.e. that we do not have adequate reason to reject BPH in favor of any 
of the theories outlined above. Chapter 4 is devoted to the more ambitious goal, which is 
to show that we have rationally ought to accept BPH over those other views. Throughout, 
I take for granted that skeptical positions in the relevant areas—the philosophies of 
hedonic states and welfare—are false. In other words, I assume that pleasure and pain 
exist; that some things really are intrinsically good or bad for us; and that we can, and do, 
know about these things. The structure of these chapters is as follows. 
 
15 Bramble (2016: p. 98) asserts that “[a] life of purely bodily pleasures, unlike one involving some 
of the pleasures of love, learning, aesthetic appreciation, etc., can involve very little qualitative 
diversity in pleasures. Its pleasures quickly become ‘just more of the same’”. 
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 In chapter 2, I discuss descriptive objections to BPH, i.e. objections relying on only 
non-evaluative premises. These objections attack BPH’s descriptive theses, which are the 
phenomenological thesis and the calculation thesis: 
Phenomenological Thesis: All pleasures are mental states that feel the same way in 
some respect, and it is this common feeling that makes them count as pleasures; 
the same is true of pains. 
 
Calculation Thesis: All hedonic states have magnitudes that are 
(a) Determined solely by their intensities and durations. 
(b) Quantifiable (in principle, using cardinal numbers). 
(c) Commensurable with all others of their type (pleasures magnitudes 
with one another and pain magnitudes with one another). 
 
My defense against descriptive objections consists of four parts. 
First, I provide some relevant background in competing theories of hedonic states. 
Here I introduce two views of pleasure and pain that are compatible with BPH: the 
separate experience view, on which pleasure and pain are each single feelings that could, 
in principle, be felt in isolation from anything else; and the hedonic tone view, on which 
pleasure and pain occur when qualia take on a certain distinctive phenomenal property 
that cannot be felt on its own. I also discuss attitudinal views of pleasure and pain, which 
reject the phenomenological thesis. These views have it that each instance of a hedonic 
state necessarily involves an attitude (such as a desire) directed at some state of affairs 
(such as an occurrent feeling). 
Second, I present a positive case for the phenomenological thesis, in which I 
contend that this thesis best explains our ability to recognize when we are in token states 
of pleasure or pain. I argue that if we accept the phenomenological thesis, we can account 
for this ability easily, whereas no non-phenomenological approach is able to account for 
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it in a plausible manner. I grant that there are alternative phenomenological theories of 
hedonic states that reject BPH’s phenomenological thesis, and that these can account for 
the explanandum in question. I reject these on the grounds that they are more complicated 
without have any distinct advantages.  
Third, I respond to general arguments against the descriptive theses; that is, 
arguments that target the theses directly, rather than a separate-experience or hedonic 
tone view that is consistent with them. I show that these arguments rely on appeals to 
phenomenal introspection, and therefore on the assumption that this faculty is suitably 
reliable. I then consider and reject some rationales for accepting this assumption. 
Fourth, I argue that although we should embrace the phenomenological thesis, we 
should remain agnostic between separate-experience and hedonic tone theories of 
pleasure and pain. Here I consider some arguments against each of these views, and show 
that none gives us adequate reason to favor one approach over the other. 
In chapter 3, I respond to evaluative objections to BPH, i.e. objections that rely on 
one or more evaluative premises. Most of these take aim squarely at the evaluative thesis: 
Evaluative Thesis: The amount of welfare in a life (or life-segment) L, for its subject 
S, is determined by, and equal to, the sum of the magnitudes of all of S's pleasures 
during L minus the sum of the magnitudes of all of S's pains during L 
 
My defense against evaluative objections consists of three parts. 
 First, I rebut some arguments to the effect that things other than pleasure and pain 
have intrinsic prudential value. Here I make use of a defensive strategy I call the 
“undermining strategy”, and contrast my version of it with similar defenses given by 
other prudential hedonists. Second, I respond to the objection that the undermining 
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strategy, as employed in defense of BPH, is epistemically self-defeating. Third, I apply the 
undermining strategy to three evaluative arguments that, in one way or another, concern 
BPH’s descriptive theses: two against the calculation thesis, and one argument to the effect 
that if the phenomenological thesis is true, then the evaluative thesis is implausible. The 
latter argument claims that BPH fails to meet a (purported) constraint on theories of 
welfare that is sometimes called the “resonance constraint”; I conclude the chapter with a 
positive evaluative argument against this constraint. 
 In chapter 4, I move on to the ambitious aim: to show that BPH is the best positive 
theory of welfare available. My case for this centers on a theoretical virtue, much 
discussed in the philosophy of science but rarely, if ever, in value theory: simplicity. The 
kind of simplicity I have in mind is a kind of syntactic simplicity, where the simpler of 
two theories is the one that makes fewer fundamental claims. After defining this notion, I 
show that, given some assumptions about the epistemic probabilities of these 
fundamental claims, a theory’s being simpler by this standard is, in a literal sense, more 
likely to be true. Finally, I argue that by this same standard, BPH is the simplest minimally 
viable theory of welfare.  
 Admittedly, I do not give any detailed defense of the assumptions that this 
argument relies on. Doing so would take us far afield from value theory into fundamental 
issues in epistemology and metaphysics. To the extent that this argument makes a 
significant contribution, then, it is not in solving any fundamental problems about 
theoretical simplicity or the epistemic value thereof; rather, it is in showing how an 
important question in value theory—that of how to decide between competing views of 
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welfare that have equal claims to fundamental appeal and resilience against standard 
objections—depends on whether, and how, we can make progress on deep questions in 





















2. Descriptive Objections 
 
Objections to basic prudential hedonism (BPH) come in two varieties: descriptive 
and evaluative. This chapter concerns the descriptive sort, which imply that BPH conflicts 
with non-evaluative facts about pleasure and pain. In effect, these objections reject one or 
both of BPH’s descriptive theses: 
Phenomenological Thesis: All pleasures are mental states that feel the same way in 
some respect, and it is this common feeling that makes them count as pleasures; 
the same is true of pains. 
 
Calculation Thesis: All hedonic states have magnitudes that are 
(a) Determined solely by their intensities and durations. 
(b) Quantifiable (in principle, using cardinal numbers). 
(c) Commensurable with all others of their type (pleasures magnitudes 
with one another and pain magnitudes with one another). 
 
Of course, I cannot address every extant argument against these theses. I can only assure 
the reader that I have chosen representative examples of the most prominent 
argumentative strategies against these theses that I have yet encountered.  
This chapter consists of five main parts. In §2.1, I set out two distinctions that are 
crucial to all that follows: between phenomenological and attitudinal theories of hedonic 
states, and between two sub-types of phenomenological theory that I call the “separate 
experience view” and the “hedonic tone view”. Then, before playing defense, I spend 
some time on offense in §2.2, where I present a positive argument for the 
phenomenological thesis. 
In §2.3, I respond to the most common sort of general challenge to the 
phenomenological thesis: that when we introspect, we do not detect any common 
phenomenal quality among various pleasures or among various pains. Here I argue that 
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objections of this kind rely on an unsupported claim about our introspective capacities, 
and are therefore unsuccessful. 
In §2.4, I respond to a general argument against the calculation thesis. This 
argument is similar to those considered in the previous section, and accordingly, my reply 
proceeds along similar lines. 
Finally, in §2.5, I address the question of whether we should adopt the separate 
experience view, the hedonic tone view, or remain agnostic between them. I argue for the 
last of these options: suspension of judgment as to which theory is correct. I survey 
representative arguments against each of these views, and explain why I think they fail 
and why their failure suggests that suspension of judgment is the appropriate stance. 
2.1 Phenomenological and Attitudinal Theories of Hedonic States 
Understanding the arguments of this chapter requires some background in the 
philosophy of hedonic states. This section is devoted to providing this background. 
Philosophical accounts of pleasure and pain fall mainly into two categories: 
phenomenological theories, which typically embrace the phenomenological thesis, and 
attitudinal theories, which do not. For the sake of clarity, I will explain the 
phenomenological/attitudinal distinction in terms of pleasure, with the understanding 
that these theories will say the same, mutatis mutandis, about pain. 
 Phenomenological theories of pleasure standardly hold that pleasures are unified 
by a common phenomenology (though see §2.2.2 below). On this sort of view, all 
pleasures, phenomenologically diverse though they may be, feel exactly the same way in 
some respect, and it is this common feeling that makes them all count as pleasures. 
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Some phenomenological theories claim that pleasure is a single feeling, separate 
from other qualia, such that it is at least logically possible for one to feel pleasure itself 
and nothing else (Bramble 2013). On this kind of theory, when one finds pleasure in (for 
example) a physical sensation, one’s experience contains the feeling of pleasure itself 
alongside that sensation, with the two qualia overlapping in consciousness. I will refer to 
these as “separate experience” theories.16 
Other phenomenological theories deny that pleasure can be experienced by itself, 
claiming instead that pleasure occurs when one or more of a subject’s qualia take on a 
positive “hedonic tone” (Broad 1930: pp. 229-230). Dimensionalist theories, which can be 
understood as a subset of hedonic tone theories, describe pleasure as a phenomenological 
dimension along which experiences vary, analogous to other qualitative dimensions such 
as loudness. Just as a single noise can sound more or less loud, any given qualia can be 
more or less pleasurable; and just as there can be no qualitative loudness without sound, 
there can be no pleasure without some qualia to occupy a place along the pleasure 
dimension (Kagan 1992, pp. 172-175; Moen 2013). 
Finally, some phenomenological theorists decline to take sides on the issue of 
whether pleasure can be felt in phenomenological isolation, preferring to simply assert 
that all pleasures feel alike in that they feel enjoyable (Crisp 2006: p. 109) or feel good 
(Smuts 2010). 
 
16 This name is inspired by Moen (2013), who refers to this sort of view as “split experience” theory. 
I have opted for the word “separate” rather than “split” to more clearly convey the idea that 




Attitudinal theories, by contrast, deny that there is phenomenological unity 
among pleasures. Instead, they claim that a subject’s pleasures are unified by a common 
pro-attitude that the subject holds toward (some of) their own states of consciousness. For 
example, an attitudinal theorist might hold that a state of consciousness counts as a 
pleasure if and only if the subject intrinsically desires for it to be happening while it is 
happening; that is, desires for it to be happening for its own sake, not merely for the sake 
of some further end. 
 Heathwood (2007) defends an attitudinal view of sensory pleasure. Extended to 
pleasure in general, his theory provides a useful example of the attitudinal approach to 
hedonic states: 
A feeling F, occurring at time t, is a pleasure at t iff the subject of F desires, 
intrinsically and de re, at t, of F, that it be occurring at t.17 
 
Candidates for the attitude that unifies pleasure as a category include not only desire (see 
also Alston 1967), but also liking (Katz 1986, Brax 2009) and a sui generis propositional 
attitude of being pleased (Feldman 2006). 
 With all this is mind, I will now argue that the phenomenological thesis is right, 
and therefore that all attitudinal theories of hedonic states are mistaken. But I will not be 
taking sides between the separate experience and hedonic tone views. For reasons that 
will become clear, I do not think that we are justified in preferring either of these theories 
over the other. 
 
17 This is adapted from Heathwood’s RSPD3, which reads: “A sensation S, occurring at time t, is a 
sensory pleasure at t iff the subject of S desires, intrinsically and de re, at t, of S, that it be occurring 
at t” (2007: p. 32). Heathwood endorses the idea that his view could be extended to non-sensory 
pleasures (p. 28). 
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2.2 An Argument for the Phenomenological Thesis 
2.2.1 The Argument 
Once again, the phenomenological thesis is this: 
Phenomenological Thesis: All pleasures are mental states that feel the same way in 
some respect, and it is this common feeling that makes them count as pleasures; 
the same is true of pains. 
 
My positive argument for this thesis involves an inference to the best explanation. The 
fact to be explained, which I will just call “the explanandum”, is this: 
Explanandum: We sometimes become aware, at least partly through 
phenomenology, that we are in a state of pleasure or pain. 
 
I will attempt to show that the best explanation of this fact presupposes that the 
phenomenological thesis is true. 
 Before I go on, four clarifications are in order. First, the word “we” in the above 
statement of the explanandum refers to we human beings. Second, the statement should 
be read as saying that we sometimes become aware that we are experiencing pleasure, 
and also that we sometimes become aware that we are experiencing pain—not just that 
we sometimes become aware of being in some kind of hedonic state. Third, as I use the 
term here, to be aware that X is to consciously know that X. So the statement asserts that 
we sometimes consciously know that we are in a state of pleasure or pain. Finally, to 
become aware of X “at least partly through phenomenology” is to become aware of X at 
least partly by having one or more mental states that, in themselves, affect what it is like 
to be you at the moment. More concisely (and colloquially), to become aware of X “at least 
partly through phenomenology” is to become aware of X at least partly by having feelings. 
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In summary, the explanandum says that in at least some cases, feeling things is 
part of the process by which you become aware of being in a state of pleasure or pain. It 
does not say that feeling things is always part of this process. Nor does it say that having 
a feeling is ever a necessary part of this process. Nor does it say that any specific feeling 
must be involved. It only says that some feeling is part of the process on some occasions. 
I believe that this explanandum is an obvious fact. But even so, I will say two more 
things on its behalf. 
In support of the point that we sometimes know that we are in a state of pleasure 
or pain, I will note that to deny this is to give up on theorizing about hedonic states 
altogether. If we do not ever know when we are in a state of pleasure or pain, then we 
have no way of telling whether our theories of pleasure and pain in any way match the 
phenomena they purport to be about. Hence this dissertation must presuppose that part 
of the explanandum, and indeed all the criticisms of BPH that I will discuss below must 
presuppose it as well. Consider also that to justify rejecting this part of the explanandum, 
we would need a rationally convincing argument implying (for example) that when a 
cognitively competent adult burns himself with a branding iron, attends to the subsequent 
feeling, and classifies it as painful, he does not actually know that he is in pain. I suspect 
that no such argument exists or is forthcoming. 
 In support of the point that knowledge of our hedonic states is at least sometimes 
conscious, and gained at least in part through phenomenology, I invite the reader to 
perform an experiment. Pinch yourself on the arm, increasing the pressure until you are 
aware of being in a state of mild pain. How did you become aware of when the pain 
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began? I would wager that you did so at least in part through phenomenology. During 
the experiment, you underwent changes in what it was like to be you at the moment—
you felt things—and this was at least part of how you became aware of the onset of a pain. 
This shows that awareness of pain does sometimes occur at least partly via 
phenomenology. 
Unfortunately, it’s generally easier to gradually induce pain in ourselves than 
pleasure. But if you can, try to repeat the experiment by giving yourself a gentle scalp 
massage, starting with pressure light enough as to be nearly imperceptible, and gradually 
applying more until it feels pleasant. If that does not work, feel free to substitute any 
suitable pleasure-inducing activity. In any case, I expect you will find that detecting the 
onset of pleasure involved feeling something. This shows that awareness of pleasure, too, 
sometimes occurs at least partly via phenomenology. 
If we suppose that the phenomenological thesis is true, these facts are easy to 
explain. We can become aware of our pleasures and pains through phenomenology 
because pleasures and pains are phenomenological states. Phenomenology provides the 
most direct path to awareness (conscious knowledge) of the properties that make our 
pleasures and pains what they are; the situation is analogous to using vision to become 
aware of visual qualia or hearing to become aware of auditory qualia. It’s simply the right 
tool for the job. 
 So, the phenomenological thesis explains the explanandum. But this is not enough. 
For the phenomenological thesis to provide single best explanation, there must be 
adequate reason to favor this explanation over the alternatives. I cannot do the whole job 
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of giving such reason here; demonstration of some virtues of the phenomenological 
thesis—its resilience to standard objections, and its simplicity compared to certain rivals—
will have to wait for later parts of the dissertation. But I will build a presumptive case for 
the phenomenological thesis by attempting to show that every non-phenomenological 
alternative is seriously flawed. I will also consider different sort of phenomenological 
view, and argue that it enjoys no distinct advantage over BPH’s phenomenological theiss. 
2.2.2 Non-Phenomenological Alternatives 
I begin with accounts of the explanandum that presuppose some attitudinal 
theories of hedonic states. The basic structure of my reasoning with respect to these 
theories will then carry over to all other non-phenomenological accounts. 
Recall that for attitudinal theorists, each token hedonic state involves both an 
attitude, such as a desire, and a state of affairs toward which that attitude is held, such as 
a feeling. For instance, a fairly crude attitudinal theory of pleasure might say that to have 
pleasure at t is to have some feeling F at t and to want to be feeling F at t. The question is 
how someone who holds this kind of view might account for the explanandum, which, 
again, is this: 
Explanandum: We sometimes become aware, at least partly through 
phenomenology, that we are in a state of pleasure or pain. 
 
It is not exactly clear what it would mean to become aware that one is in a state of pleasure 
or pain in the attitudinal sense. I do not think it needs to involve any explicit thought 
along the lines of “I want to be feeling what I am feeling now”. But neither is it enough 
for the relevant attitude to merely be present. The subject must come into some form of 
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mental contact with it, such that a state in which the attitude is present is subjectively 
distinguishable from a state in which it is absent. 
We know that we can come into contact with some of our mental states through 
phenomenology. But we should consider that there might be another way in the case of 
attitudes. Here an attitudinal theorist might point to a passage from Alston (1967). Writing 
in support of an attitudinal theory of pleasure, and anticipating an argument like the one 
I am giving now, Alston writes: 
[T]here are many things to which an individual has privileged access that cannot 
be regarded as immediately felt qualities, such as intentions, attitudes, and beliefs. 
If I intend to quit my job tomorrow, I know that I have this intention without 
having to do any investigation to find out; I know just by virtue of having the 
intention; I know this as immediately as I know that I am now aware of a reddish 
patch . . . Yet an intention is neither a felt quality nor a complex of felt qualities. 
Hence the epistemological status of pleasure is not a conclusive reason for 
construing it as a quality of experience . . . among the nonsensory quality items to 
which a person has privileged access are his likes, preferences, and wants. It seems 
reasonable to suppose that a person's knowledge that he would choose to have an 
experience just like his present one on the basis of its felt quality can be just as 
immediate as his knowledge that he is aware of a red patch. (p. 345) 
 
Taking inspiration from this, an attitudinal theorist could propose the following: when 
we become aware of our hedonic states, we come into contact with the phenomenal aspect 
of the state through its phenomenology, and with the requisite attitude through a kind of 
direct access unmediated by phenomenology.18 Call this the “direct access account”. On 
 
18 I am not certain that Alston means to propose that we can have privileged access to our attitudes, 
intentions, or beliefs in a manner entirely unmediated by phenomenology. I think this is a 
reasonable interpretation of the passage, but admittedly, Alston does not say it outright. This is 
why, in the main text, I merely say that an attitudinal theorist could propose this view, and point 
to Alston as inspiration. 
That said, here is why I think it is a reasonable interpretation of the passage. Alston 
contrasts privileged access to immediately felt qualities with privileged access to “intentions, 
attitudes, and beliefs”. He follows with an example of the latter: knowing that he intends to quit 
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this view, phenomenology is indeed doing part of the work in bringing about awareness 
of a hedonic state, so the explanandum is accounted for. 
 In other respects, however, the direct access account is not tenable. In the above 
quotation, Alston speaks of knowledge rather than awareness, and it may be possible to 
have the former without the latter. But I deny that we can be aware of mental states that 
do not affect us phenomenologically. 
I deny this on the following grounds. Recall that to be aware of X is to consciously 
know that X. So, to be aware that you have some attitude is not just to know that you have 
that attitude, but to consciously know that you have that attitude. And you cannot 
consciously know that X without having the fact that X consciously before your mind, i.e. 
before your mind in a way that makes a difference to what it is like to be you at that 
moment. This is just to say that conscious knowledge necessarily involves some 
phenomenology, namely the feeling of having the known proposition consciously before 
your mind. So, by definition, you can only become aware of something if it makes a 
difference in your phenomenological field (directly or indirectly). But the direct access 
 
his job tomorrow. And he contrasts this with knowledge that he is now aware of a reddish patch. 
From this, I infer that being aware of a reddish patch is meant to be an example of an immediately 
felt quality. Later, in the final sentence quoted above, Alston says that “[i]t seems reasonable to 
suppose that a person's knowledge that he would choose to have an experience just like his present 
one on the basis of its felt quality can be just as immediate as his knowledge that he is aware of a red 
patch” (emphasis mine). This is to say that knowledge of one of your attitudes can be just as 
immediate as knowledge of one of your immediately felt qualities. But if knowledge of one of your 
attitudes was necessarily mediated by phenomenology—that is, necessarily mediated by an 
immediately felt quality—then knowledge of an attitude could not be just as immediate as 
knowledge of an immediate felt quality. So Alston does appear to be proposing that we can have 
a kind of privileged access to our attitudes that is unmediated by phenomenology. 
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account implies that we can become aware of the onset of a pleasure or pain while 
undergoing no change whatsoever in what we are feeling. This is not coherent. 
So, for an attitudinal theory to account for the explanandum, it must posit that the 
relevant attitude has a phenomenology of its own (in it at least some cases). This would 
allow phenomenology to put us into contact with both of the mental states involved in the 
relevant cases of pleasure and pain: feelings, and attitudes held toward those feeling. 
Lin (2019) has proposed a theory of pleasure along these lines, which he calls the 
“hybrid theory”: 
Lin’s Hybrid Theory: There is a kind of favorable attitude, A, that is partly 
constituted by a certain phenomenology, P. An attitudinal pleasure is an 
experience consisting, at least in part, of your tokening A toward a state of affairs. 
A sensory pleasure is an attitudinal pleasure whose object is an obtaining state of 
affairs consisting of your presently experiencing a particular sensation. (p. 519)19 
 
On this view, every instance of pleasure involves a favorable attitude, and it always feels 
a certain way for the subject of the pleasure to have that attitude. Lin is noncommittal 
about what the relevant favorable attitude might be, but for illustration, let’s say it is the 
attitude of desire. In this case, the hybrid theory would assert that part of what it is to 
desire something is to experience a certain feeling. Consequently, on this view, in every 
 
19 Lin puts this view forth as “a way of reconciling or integrating attitudinal and phenomenological 
theories of pleasure”, such that “the main claims of both types of theory are true: pleasures are 
pleasures in virtue of how they feel, and pleasures are pleasures in virtue of how they are related 
to the favorable attitudes of the subjects who experience them” (p. 518). This integration of 
phenomenological and attitudinal aspects may be the source of the term “hybrid”. 
Lin is clear that the attitude A, which is partly constituted by the phenomenology P, is also 
partly constituted by some non-phenomenal aspects, saying that “to token this attitude toward a 
state of affairs is, among other things, to feel a certain way about that state of affairs” (p. 519, 
emphasis mine). He does not say why A could not be wholly constituted by P, that is, why the 
relevant attitude could not just be a kind of feeling. I briefly discuss this proposal below. 
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case of sensory pleasure there are at least two distinct phenomenologies: the 
phenomenology that is partially constitutive of desire, and the sensation at which the 
desire is directed. 
I believe this approach to hedonic states is mistaken. Since the distinction between 
attitudinal and sensory hedonic states is not relevant in this particular context, I will 
explain why I reject hybrid theories of pleasure and pain with reference to these two 
statements: 
Hybrid Theory of Pleasure: There is a kind of favorable attitude, FA, that is partly 
constituted by a certain phenomenology, P. A pleasure is an experience consisting, 
at least in part, of your tokening FA toward something you are currently feeling. 
 
Hybrid Theory of Pain: There is a kind of disfavorable attitude, DA, that is partly 
constituted by a certain phenomenology, P*. A pain is an experience consisting, at 
least in part, of your tokening DA toward something you are currently feeling. 
 
The problem is not that hybrid theories cannot account for the explanandum. On the 
contrary, these theories do account for the explanandum (with respect to pleasure and 
pain, respectively). On these views, the favorable and disfavorable attitudes (FA and DA), 
as well as the feelings at which they are directed, are at least partially constituted by their 
respective phenomenologies. So, phenomenal introspection should be enough to put us 
in touch with all of them in a manner sufficient for conscious awareness of the resulting 
pleasure or pain. 
 The weaknesses of hybrid theories lie elsewhere. To see how, consider the 
following pair of challenges. 
First, note that because the pro-attitude phenomenology P is only partly 
constitutive of the pro-attitude FA, and the disfavorable attitude phenomenology P* is 
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only partly constitutive of the disfavorable attitude DA, it must be logically possible for P 
to be present in the absence of FA and P* to be present in the absence of DA. In other 
words, it must be logically possible for you to feel as though you have the relevant 
favorable attitude toward what you are feeling without it actually being the case that you 
have this attitude, and so too for the relevant disfavorable attitude. 
So, a hybrid theory of pleasure must allow, as a matter of logical if not physical 
possibility, that when you take yourself to be feeling pleasure from your self-administered 
scalp massage (or other pleasure-inducing activity), you might not actually be having any 
pleasure at all—even though your experience in that moment is phenomenologically 
indistinguishable from pleasure, right down to the feeling of having a favorable attitude 
toward the massaging sensation (or other seemingly pleasurable sensation). Similarly, a 
hybrid theory of pain must allow, for example, that when you take yourself to be feeling 
pain from your self-administered pinch, you might not actually be in pain at all—even 
though your experience in that moment is phenomenologically indistinguishable from 
pain, right down to the feeling of having a disfavorable attitude toward the pinching 
sensation. 
By the same token, the hybrid theory of pleasure must allow, as a matter of logical 
if not physical possibility, that you could have a fantastic orgasm, feel everything you 
would be feeling if you were in a state of tremendous physical pleasure—including the 
feeling of having a strongly favorable attitude toward your current bodily sensations—
and yet not be in a state of pleasure at all. Similarly, the hybrid theory of pain must allow 
that, as a matter of logical if not physical possibility, you could shatter one of your legs in 
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a car accident, feel everything you would be feeling if you were in terrible agony—
including the feeling of having a strongly disfavorable attitude toward the intense 
sensations emanating from your injured limb—and yet not be in any pain at all. In both 
cases, this would be possible because FA and DA are each only partly constituted by their 
respective phenomenologies (P and P*); it must therefore be at least logically possible to 
experience these phenomenologies in the absence of whatever else is required for 
tokening the corresponding attitude. I submit that these implications are implausible 
enough that we should reject the hybrid approach. (If you do not agree, then this challenge 
will not convince you.) 
The second challenge begins with the observation that, in order to avoid an infinite 
regress, P (the phenomenology that is partly constitutive of FA) must not be pleasurable 
in itself, and P* (the phenomenology that is partly constitutive of DA) must not be painful 
in itself. On the hybrid view of pleasure, P could only be a pleasure if it were an experience 
consisting (at least in part) of the subject tokening FA toward something he is feeling, 
where that token of FA is itself partly constituted by a pleasant phenomenology, and so 
on ad infinitum. So a hybrid theory of pleasure must hold that P, by itself, is hedonically 
neutral. Similarly, on the hybrid view of pain, P* could only be painful if it were an 
experience consisting (at least in part) of the subject tokening DA toward something he is 
feeling, where that token of DA is itself partly constituted by a painful phenomenology, 
and so on ad infinitum. So a hybrid theory of pain must hold that P*, by itself, is hedonically 
neutral. But this has an implausible implication when it comes to our explanandum. 
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 To see what I mean, recall our earlier experiment with arm-pinching. When you 
performed this experiment, you experienced a transition between awareness of a non-
painful feeling (the pinching feeling before it became painful) and awareness of a pain 
(the pinching feeling after it became painful). The hybrid theory of pain suggests that you 
were able to do this, via phenomenology, because you were able to come into the right 
sort of conscious contact with both (a) a pinching sensation in your arm and (b) P*, the 
phenomenology partly constitutive of the disfavorable attitude directed at the pinching 
sensation. Both of these parts, sensation and attitude, were necessary for pain to occur; on 
the hybrid theory (and indeed any attitudinal theory) of pain, you could have felt the exact 
same sensation without being in pain at all. Pain began with the arrival of the disfavorable 
attitude, and your awareness of your pain became possible when you began feeling P*. 
And as we’ve seen, P* must be hedonically neutral in itself. So the hybrid theory implies 
that what distinguished pain from non-pain for you, introspectively speaking, was the 
onset of a hedonically neutral feeling. 
 I submit that this does not track with what we observe, introspectively, when we 
perform the arm-pinching experiment. We do not become aware of pain by noticing that 
an extra, hedonically neutral phenomenology has appeared alongside the pinch. This just 
does not describe what it is like for a sensation to start hurting. (If you disagree with this 
judgment, then this line of argument will not persuade you.) 
 If you had success with giving yourself a pleasant scalp massage, or were 
otherwise able to induce pleasure in yourself in a manner roughly equivalent gradually 
inducing pain via arm-pinch, then we can run the same sort of argument for pleasure. 
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When you performed this experiment—let’s say you did give yourself a scalp 
massage—you experienced a transition between awareness of a non-painful feeling (the 
massaging feeling in the brief moment before it became pleasurable) and awareness of a 
pleasure (the massaging feeling after it became pleasurable). The hybrid theory of 
pleasure suggests that you were able to do this, because you were able to come into the 
right sort of conscious contact with both (a) a massaging sensation on your scalp and (b) 
P, the phenomenology partly constitutive of the favorable attitude directed at the 
massaging sensation. Both of these parts, sensation and attitude, were necessary for 
pleasure to occur; on the hybrid theory (and indeed any attitudinal theory) of pleasure, 
you could have felt the exact same sensation without experiencing any pleasure at all. 
Pleasure began with the arrival of the favorable attitude, and your awareness of your 
pleasure became possible when you began feeling P. And as we’ve seen, P must be 
hedonically neutral in itself. So the hybrid theory implies that what distinguished 
pleasure from non-pleasure for you, introspectively speaking, was the onset of a 
hedonically neutral feeling. 
 I submit that this does not track with what we observe, introspectively, when we 
perform the scalp-massaging (or other pleasure-inducing) experiment. We do not become 
aware of pleasure by noticing that an extra, hedonically neutral phenomenology has 
appeared alongside the massaging sensation. This just does not describe what it is like for 
a sensation to start feeling pleasant. I submit that these implications are implausible 
enough that we should reject the hybrid approach. (And again, if you disagree with this 
judgment, then this line of argument will not persuade you.) 
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 These challenges exploit basic features of hybrid theories of hedonic states: their 
claim that each hedonic state requires both a phenomenology and an attitude directed at 
that phenomenology, and their claim that the attitude is itself partly constituted by a 
distinct phenomenology of its own. Every hybrid theory of hedonic states will make 
claims of these kinds, as they form the attitudinal and phenomenological components of 
the titular hybrid, respectively. So, versions of my two challenges will apply, mutatis 
mutandis, to any hybrid theory of hedonic states, not just ones I have used for illustration 
here. 
They will also apply to theories on which the relevant attitude does not necessarily 
have any distinct phenomenology, but is accompanied by a tell-tale phenomenology often 
enough that the latter is a reliable indicator of the former. Call these sorts of attitudinal 
theories of hedonic states “coincidence theories”: 
Coincidence Theory of Pleasure: There is a favorable attitude, FA, that is reliably 
accompanied by a certain phenomenology, P. A pleasure is an experience 
consisting, at least in part, of your tokening FA toward something you are 
currently feeling; this will usually, though not necessarily, coincide with feeling P. 
 
Coincidence Theory of Pain: There is a disfavorable attitude, DA, that is reliably 
accompanied by a certain phenomenology, P*. A pain is an experience consisting, 
at least in part, of your tokening DA toward something you are currently feeling; 
this will usually, though not necessarily, coincide with feeling P*. 
 
Like the hybrid theories of pleasure and pain considered earlier, coincidence theories 
must allow that you could feel P and P* in the absence of FA and DA. This gives us the 
same implausible implications as before: all the feelings of orgasm, including pro-attitude 
phenomenology P, without pleasure, and all the feelings of a shattered leg, including 
disfavorable attitude phenomenology P*, without pain. Moreover, coincidence theories 
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must hold, on pain of infinite regress, that FA is not necessarily pleasurable and DA is not 
necessarily painful. This commits coincidence theories to the notion that, in our arm-
pinching and scalp-massaging experiments, we become aware of the onset of hedonic 
state upon the arrival of an additional, hedonically neutral feeling. Thus we should reject 
coincidence theories for much the same reasons that we should reject hybrid theories. 
 There is one last sort of theory left to consider: views on which the relevant attitude 
is not just partly, but wholly constituted by some phenomenology. Call these “fusion 
theories”: 
Fusion Theory of Pleasure: There is a kind of favorable attitude, FA, that is wholly 
constituted by a certain phenomenology, P. A pleasure is an experience consisting, 
at least in part, of your tokening FA toward something you are currently feeling. 
 
Fusion Theory of Pain: There is a kind of disfavorable attitude, DA, that is wholly 
constituted by a certain phenomenology, P*. A pain is an experience consisting, at 
least in part, of your tokening DA toward something you are currently feeling. 
 
Notice that if one accepts a fusion theory of hedonic states, then one accepts the 
phenomenological thesis: that all pleasures are mental states that feel the same way in 
some respect, and it is this common feeling that makes them count as pleasures (with the 
same being true, mutatis mutandis, of pains). So fusion theories have no problem 
accounting for the explanandum, and they escape the objections I have pressed against 
hybrid and coincidence theories. But this is because they are consistent with my thesis. 
And for that very reason, they invite the same objections against phenomenological 
theories that I will be addressing below. Moreover, they face the additional problem of 
how to make sense of the idea that a wholly phenomenological state could be tokened 
toward states of affairs. (Can phenomenologies have propositional contents?) So while I 
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will allow that fusion theories are attitudinal theories of a sort, and I will not argue against 
them here, I do regard them as weakly motivated. 
I conclude that there is no plausible way to account for the explanandum that is 
consistent with an attitudinal theory of hedonic states, except perhaps by adopting a view 
on which the relevant attitudes just are phenomenologies. But that’s not all. We can extend 
my challenges to hybrid and coincidence theories to any other sort of non-
phenomenological view of hedonic states. Any theory on which hedonic states are partly 
defined by something non-phenomenal will face the same fundamental problems.  
Call this non-phenomenal prerequisite for the occurrence of a hedonic state “NP”. 
(To illustrate: on a desire-based theory of pleasure, where desire is taken to be at least 
partly constituted by a behavioral disposition, NP would be that disposition.) In order to 
account for our explanandum, NP will have to have, on at least some occasions, a distinct, 
introspectible phenomenology; otherwise, it will not be the sort of thing we could become 
aware of. It will follow that it is logically possible for this phenomenology to be present 
in the absence of NP, and therefore also possible to have something that feels exactly like 
an extremely intense hedonic state—right down to the phenomenology associated with 
NP—without being one. Moreover, the distinct phenomenology of NP will have to be 
hedonically neutral in itself, on pain of infinite regress (just as we saw with P and P* 
above). It will follow that our pleasures and pains become phenomenally introspectible 
only with the presence of an extra, hedonically neutral phenomenology. These results will 
be just as implausible no matter what NP is taken to be. 
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2.2.3 Phenomenological Alternatives 
If what I have said so far is correct, then we should reject non-phenomenological 
accounts of hedonic states. It follows that we should think of pleasures and pains as 
feelings that do not gain their status as pleasures or pains from their relations to non-
phenomenal properties (such as attitudes). But it does not follow that we should embrace 
the phenomenological thesis. There remains an alternative phenomenological approach, 
on which all pleasures and pains are feelings, but neither pleasures nor pains all feel alike 
in some single defining respect. 
 This alternative needs some account of what unifies pleasure and pain as 
categories, if it is neither a relation to the subject’s attitudes (since this is a 
phenomenological theory) nor a single phenomenal property (since this approach rejects 
the phenomenological thesis of BPH).20 For this, I can see only one remaining option: posit 
that pleasures and pains are each unified as categories by similarities among their various 
phenomenal properties. For example, to borrow Wittgenstein’s (1953: p. 66) famous 
phrases, pleasures and pains could be unified by “family resemblances” defined by “a 
complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing”. In this case, the 
resemblances would be phenomenological. The idea would be that no two pleasures or 
two pains need share a single defining phenomenal property, but would share a “family 
resemblance” in the way they feel. 
 
20 See Goldstein (1985) for criticism of purportedly pluralistic theories of hedonic states that fail to 
provide a coherent account of what unifies pleasure and pain as categories. 
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Call this view, on which pleasures and pains are unified as categories by 
phenomenal similarities rather than single phenomenal properties, the “disunified 
phenomenological thesis” (DPT). Assuming the DPT is true, we could account for the 
explanandum in the following way. We could propose that, as we grow up, we notice 
phenomenal resemblances among various feelings, and at least partly on that basis, form 
our concepts of pleasure and pain. Subsequently, we become aware that certain of our 
occurrent feelings are pleasures or pains by introspecting and detecting the phenomenal 
properties that mark them as such. This could happen without the categories of pleasure 
or pain being defined by any single phenomenological property that all category members 
share. 
 I reject the DPT on the grounds that it is more complicated than the 
phenomenological thesis without having any distinct advantages. I will attempt to show 
that it is more complicated, in an epistemically relevant sense, at §4.2.2. As for distinct 
advantages, I can think of two facts that a proponent might claim the DPT can better 
explain than the phenomenological thesis: the fact that there are cases in which people 
judge that two pleasures do not feel alike in any way (and so too for pains), and the fact 
that we are sometimes uncertain as to whether a given feeling of ours is a pleasure, a pain, 
or neither.21 
I will address the question of whether, and how, we can account for judgments of 
phenomenal disunity about hedonic states without giving up the phenomenological 
 
21 Thanks to David Wong (personal communication) for calling this second point to my attention. 
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thesis in §2.3. As for cases in which we are uncertain whether a given feeling is a pleasure, 
a pain, or neither, we can account for these in a manner consistent with the 
phenomenological thesis by proposing that these are cases of phenomenal complexity, in 
which the subject’s phenomenological field contains (a) both pleasure and pain in roughly 
equal measure, (b) mild pleasure or pain alongside other phenomenal properties of 
roughly equal or greater intensity, such that the hedonic states are difficult to 
introspectively discern, (c) phenomenal properties that are typically accompanied by 
pleasure or pain, but are not in this case, or (d) some perplexing combination of the above. 
This is speculative, of course, but it is enough to show that the phenomenological thesis 
is compatible with there being cases in which we don’t know quite know how to 
categorize what we are feeling. 
 This concludes my positive argument for the phenomenological thesis. I will now 
defend this thesis from some counterarguments. 
2.3 General Arguments Against the Phenomenological Thesis 
Once again, the phenomenological thesis is this: 
Phenomenological Thesis: All pleasures are mental states that feel the same way in 
some respect, and it is this common feeling that makes them count as pleasures; 
the same is true of pains. 
 
In short, the thesis claims that both pleasures and pains are phenomenally unified. 
Many philosophers deny this, and all that I have found deny it in a similar way: 
by claiming that introspection tells against it. To impress upon the reader how common 




First, here is Sidgwick (1981: p. 127) on pleasure: 
[W]hen I reflect on the notion of pleasure—using the term in the comprehensive 
sense I have adopted, to include the most refined and subtle intellectual and 
emotional gratifications, no less than the coarser and more definite sensual 
enjoyments—the only common quality that I can find in the feelings so designated 
seems to be that relation to desire and volition expressed by the general term 
“desirable”. I propose therefore to define Pleasure—when we are considering its 
“strict value” for the purposes of quantitative comparison—as a feeling which, 
when experienced by intelligent beings, is at least implicitly apprehended as 
desirable, or—in cases of comparison—preferable. 
 
Here is Alston (1967: p. 344), also reflecting broadly on pleasure: 
 
Nevertheless, on further probing, the thesis that pleasure is a quality that can 
attach to any state of consciousness is not very plausible phenomenologically. 
When we reflect on a wide variety of cases of getting pleasure . . . we are unable 
to isolate a felt quality which they all share, in the way in which we can easily 
isolate a quality of redness which a number of different visual sensations share . . 
. On the contrary, enjoying playing tennis feels very different from getting 
satisfaction out of seeing an enemy in distress, and both feel very different from 
the sense of well-being one has when, in good health, one arises carefree from a 
good night's sleep. 
 
And Sobel (2002: p. 241): 
 
The first objection to quantitative hedonism is that there is no single sensation that 
is common to all our different experiences of intrinsic value. The pleasures of 
walking barefoot through the grass arm in arm with your love have so little 
phenomenologically in common with the pleasures of winning a tense tennis 
match or eating a good burger or working through a challenging philosophical 
problem that we do not understand the instruction to maximize the sensation that 
these different activities share. 
 
 . . . Many have introspected in vain searching for this alleged experiential 
commonality among the full array of human pleasures. 
 
Feldman (1997: pp. 83-84) comments on the narrower topic of sensory pleasure: 
One thing to notice about sensory pleasure is its apparent heterogeneity. The man 
on the beach enjoys some pleasurable smells as well as some pleasurable feelings 
of warmth. Each of these sensations is pleasant, pleasurable, 'pleasure-giving'. 
Some would find nothing odd in saying that each of these sensations 'is a pleasure'. 
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Nevertheless, from the strictly phenomenological perspective, they seem to have 
very little in common. One is an olfactory sensation - it is the smell of fresh, salty 
air. The other is an all-over bodily feeling of warmth. Aside from the fact that they 
are experienced simultaneously and by the same person in the example, they seem 
to be utterly unlike. 
 
In order to see the heterogeneity of sensory pleasures even more clearly, consider 
the pleasurable sensations you get when you eat delicious, salty peanuts and drink 
sparkling, cold beer. The taste of the peanuts is a pleasure. The taste of the beer is 
a pleasure. Yet, unless your taste sensations are profoundly unlike mine, the caste 
of the peanuts has little in common with the taste of the beer. Indeed, it is 
reasonable to suppose that we who love to eat peanuts while we drink beet love 
this, at least in part, because of the remarkable contrast between the two leading 
sensations involved. (The phenomenological contrast between the taste of cold 
beer and the feelings of warmth enjoyed while sunbathing is even more striking - 
yet each of these may be a sensory pleasure.) 
 
On pain, meanwhile, here is Korsgaard (1992: pp. 147-148): 
[I]f the painfulness of pain rested in the character of sensations . . . our belief that 
physical pain has something in common with grief, rage and disappointment 
would be inexplicable. For that matter, what physical pains have in common with 
each other would be inexplicable, for the sensations are of many different kinds. 
What do nausea, migraine, menstrual cramps, pinpricks and pinches have in 
common, that makes us call them all pains? (Don’t say they’re all horrible; that’s 
just repeating yourself.) 22 
 
Finally, Parfit (1984: p. 493) denies phenomenal unity to pleasure and pain both (emphasis 
in original): 
Narrow Hedonists assume, falsely, that pleasures and pains are two distinctive 
kinds of experience. Compare the experience of satisfying an intense thirst or lust, 
listening to music, solving an intellectual problem, reading a tragedy, and 
 
22 In the Feldman, Alston, Sobel, and Parfit passages, the invitation to reflect on one’s pleasures is 
more or less explicit. Sidgwick reports his own reflections, but it’s reasonable to infer an invitation 
to the reader to reflect similarly. On the surface, Korsgaard might appear to be doing something 
else, namely asserting that the phenomenal unity of pain would render some fact inexplicable. But 
the (alleged) fact here just is that pains are phenomenally heterogeneous. Korsgaard’s only support 
for this claim comes from listing examples of pains. I interpret this too as an appeal to introspection, 
with Korsgaard implicitly inviting the reader to reflect on their experiences of grief, rage, nausea, 




knowing that one’s child is happy. These various experiences do not contain any 
distinctive common quality. 
 
What pains and pleasures have in common are their relations to our desires. On 
the use of 'pain' which has rational and moral significance, all pains are when 
experienced unwanted, and a pain is worse or greater the more it is unwanted. 
Similarly, all pleasures are when experienced wanted, and they are better or 
greater the more they are wanted. 
 
The argumentation in these passages is not very explicit. But each of them at least hints at 
a straightforward argument with the following structure: 
P1. If not all [pleasures/pains] share a distinctive phenomenal quality, then 
[pleasures/pains] are not phenomenally unified. 
 
P2. Not all [pleasures/pains] share a distinctive phenomenal quality. 
 
C. [Pleasures/pains] are not phenomenally unified. 
 
In each case, P2 is supported by appeal to phenomenal introspection. (P1 is true by 
definition.) Each philosopher invites the reader to reflect on various pleasures or pains 
and attempt to discern in them a common phenomenal quality. Presumably, the idea is 
that the reader will find no such quality, which is evidence of there being no such quality. 
This strategy of supporting P2 by appeal to phenomenal introspection rests on two 
assumptions. The first assumption is that the reader will make the expected introspective 
judgments. How often this is true I cannot say, so I will grant for the sake of argument 
that virtually everyone does so (though I myself do not). 
The second assumption is that we are justified in taking phenomenal 
introspection—which, in this context, I take to encompass both introspection of present 
feelings and recollection of past feelings—to be a sufficiently reliable way of determining 
whether different hedonic states share a distinctive phenomenal quality. By “sufficiently 
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reliable”, I mean reliable enough to make our beliefs about which hedonic states share 
distinctive phenomenal qualities at least prima facie justified. In what follows I will use the 
term “reliable” as shorthand for reliability in this sense. 
In other words, for this way of refuting the phenomenological thesis to work, we 
must be justified in believing that we have what I will call “qualitative insight”: 
Qualitative Insight: A subject has qualitative insight—is qualitatively insightful—
iff they can use phenomenal introspection to reliably determine whether or not 
various hedonic states share a distinctive phenomenal quality. 
 
If we are qualitatively insightful, and we cannot detect any distinctive phenomenal 
quality among pleasures or among pains, then the phenomenological thesis is false. It is 
important, then, to assess what reasons we have to accept the claim that we have 
qualitative insight. But, despite this claim being neither self-evident nor uncontroversial, 
I have yet to find an argument for it, in the work of the above-quoted philosophers or any 
others. In the absence of such an argument, the sort of strategy employed by Sidgwick et 
al above cannot refute the phenomenological thesis. 
In the interest of charity, I will consider two rationales for accepting the claim of 
qualitative insight—the sorts of rationales a philosopher might regard as too obvious to 
be worth mentioning—and try to show that each is mistaken. The rationales are these: that 
only by assuming qualitative insight can we account for our introspective judgments 
about (the lack of) phenomenal unity among hedonic states; and that the claim of 
qualitative insight is the default position about our ability to introspect pleasures and 
pains, such that the burden is on its opponents to give reasons against it. 
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First, the matter of accounting for our introspective judgments. Again, I have 
assumed for the sake of argument that these judgments cut against the phenomenological 
thesis. On this assumption, they would include, for example, judgments to the effect that 
a pleasurable taste of peanuts and a pleasurable taste of beer share no single phenomenal 
quality that marks them both as pleasures, and that the feeling of nausea and the feeling 
of grief share no single phenomenal quality that marks them both as pains. One rationale 
for accepting the claim of qualitative insight might be that without that claim, we can’t 
explain why we would make these judgments. If that were the case, it would give us 
compelling reason to believe that we are qualitatively insightful, which would then 
underwrite the crucial premise (P2) of introspective arguments against the 
phenomenological thesis. 
But there are other ways, consistent with the phenomenological thesis, of 
explaining why we would make these judgments. I will provide two such accounts: one 
for the separate experience view of hedonic states, and one for the hedonic tone view (each 
introduced in §2.1 above). 
The separate experience view of hedonic states proposes that pleasure and pain 
are each a distinctive kind of feeling—the feeling of pleasure itself and the feeling of pain 
itself—which could, in principle, be felt in isolation from anything else. This would mean 
that each occurrent hedonic state is just an instance of one of these feelings. On this view, 
it is not so much that pleasure and pain have distinct phenomenal qualities. Rather, they 
simply are phenomenal states, defined by their distinct phenomenal qualities. 
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Now, if it were common to actually feel a hedonic state in phenomenal isolation—
which the separate experience theory allows is logically possible—then it might well be 
easy to introspect the distinct phenomenal qualities of pleasure and pain. So this view 
should stipulate that, as a matter of contingent physical fact, pleasures and pains are 
virtually always felt alongside other qualia. So, for example, when you feel pleasure from 
tasting something delicious, the pleasure overlaps in consciousness with the various 
flavor qualia; and when you feel pain from stubbing your toe, the pain overlaps in 
consciousness with the stinging and throbbing sensations that seem to be emanating from 
your foot. This forecloses one way in which the separate experience view might be 
thought to predict that we would judge pleasures and/or pains to be phenomenally 
unified. 
This stipulation also allows the separate experience view to account for the 
impression that pleasures and pains are phenomenally heterogeneous. The theory denies 
that pleasures and pains are heterogeneous themselves, but can affirm the heterogeneity 
of the other qualia with which hedonic states overlap in consciousness. A proponent of 
the separate experience view need not deny that taste of peanuts is different from the taste 
of beer, or that the feeling of nausea different from the feeling of grief, and indeed, he can 
point to the heterogeneity of non-hedonic qualia to explain why would make the mistake 
of judging that there are pleasures and pains that do not feel at all alike. 
  A proponent of the separate experience view should also propose that, as Bramble 
(2013: p. 210) puts it, hedonic states “occupy” or “permeate” the other qualia with which 
they overlap, in such a way that introspection cannot cleanly separate the phenomenal 
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contributions of these states from those of the other qualia being experienced. If 
introspection could suss out pleasure and pain in this way, then we would be qualitatively 
insightful, and our introspective judgments would give decisive evidence against the 
separate experience theory. So, on pain of self-defeat, the theory must stipulate that 
pleasure and pain intertwine themselves with other qualia so as to evade this kind of 
introspective detection (without, of course, rendering us unable to distinguish pleasures 
from non-pleasures and pains from non-pains). 
This claim also allows the separate experience theorist to account for the 
impression that a single sort of experience—that of a flavor, for example—can, for a single 
person, be pleasant on one occasion and unpleasant on another. If pleasure and pain 
permeate the other qualia with which they overlap, then these are cases in which some 
qualia are accompanied (and phenomenologically permeated) by the feeling of pleasure 
itself on one occasion and the feeling of pain itself on the other. 
Thus we can assume the separate experience view of hedonic states, account for 
judgments of phenomenal disunity among pleasures and among pains, and not run afoul 
of common sense. This is done by proposing that the feelings of pleasure and pain are, in 
practice, always felt at the same time as other qualia, which they permeate in a way that 
stymies qualitative insight. 
We can account for our introspective judgments on the hedonic tone view of 
pleasure and pain as well. This view also affirms the phenomenological thesis, but denies 
that pleasure and pain can be felt in isolation from other qualia. It proposes instead that 
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hedonic states occur when (and only when) some among a subject’s occurrent qualia take 
on a pleasurable or painful tone. 
The hedonic tone view allows that peanuts can taste very different from beer, even 
when both tastes are pleasures; nausea can feel very different from grief, even as both 
states are pains; and so on. It also allows that some qualia can, for a single subject, have a 
pleasurable tone on one occasion and a painful one on another. This is compatible with 
these states being unified, as pleasures and pains respectively, by these hedonic tones. 
And it may be the case that, when we use introspection to compare pairs of pleasures or 
pairs of pains, the hedonic tone that the members of each pair share eludes us—especially 
when we compare states that, beyond their common hedonic tone, are otherwise 
qualitatively disparate. Thus the hedonic tone account can also square phenomenal unity 
with introspective judgments to the contrary. 
Of course, there are many further questions we could ask about these views. But 
the point is just to show that without giving up the phenomenological thesis, we can, in 
more than one way, explain why we would make introspective judgments like those that 
Sidgwick et al appeal to. This shows that the first rationale for believing that we are 
qualitatively insightful fails. 
The second rationale for the claim of qualitative insight presents this claim as the 
default position about our ability to introspect pleasures and pains, such that the burden 
is on its opponents to give reasons against it. One might propose this second rationale on 
the grounds that we must grant prima facia epistemic credibility to our introspective 
capacities in order to ward off skepticism about introspective knowledge. Perhaps this is 
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true. But I believe that my positive argument for the phenomenological thesis does give 
us reason to reject the claim of qualitative insight. If I’m right about this, then it would not 
matter if belief in qualitative insight were the default position, because I have already 
shouldered the burden of giving reasons against it. And there is nothing skeptical about 
declining to believe that some capacity is reliable when you have positive reason to believe 
that it isn’t. 
I conclude that introspective arguments against the phenomenological thesis like 
those given (or suggested) by Sidgwick, Alston, Sobel, Feldman, Korsgaard, and Parfit do 
not give us any reason to reject the phenomenological thesis. To refute this thesis directly, 
opponents need arguments that don’t rely on the claim that we are qualitatively 
insightful. I have yet to encounter any such arguments. 
2.4 A General Argument Against the Calculation Thesis 
Now on to a general argument against the calculation thesis: 
Calculation Thesis: All pleasures have magnitudes that are quantifiable (in 
principle, using cardinal numbers) and fully commensurable; the same is true of 
pains. 
 
The calculation thesis tells us that there is total quantitative continuity (hereafter simply 
“continuity”) among the magnitudes of pleasures, and so too for pains. This is to say that 
for any given hedonic state, there is a quantifiable fact of the matter as to how large its 
magnitude is, and for any two pleasures or two pains, there is an exact numerical ratio 
between their magnitudes. (In other words, for any two token pleasures A and B, there is 
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a cardinal number n such that A contains exactly n times as much pleasure as B.23) An 
argument against the calculation thesis, then, must seek to show that there is quantitative 
discontinuity (hereafter simply “discontinuity”) among hedonic states, i.e. that there are 
cases in which two pleasures or two pains lack a precise numerical ratio between their 
magnitudes. 
Having already addressed arguments against the phenomenological thesis, we 
need not consider arguments that infer discontinuity from phenomenal disunity. We must 
also avoid mistaking arguments for the practical impossibility of calculating the 
numerical ratios between hedonic magnitudes for arguments against the calculation 
thesis, which claims only that such calculations are logically possible. And given that this 
chapter concerns descriptive objections to BPH, it is not the place to discuss arguments 
for discontinuity that depend on evaluative premises (we will see two such arguments in 
chapter 3). 
I have yet to find an argument in the literature that meets these conditions. 
Feldman (2004: pp. 45-49) points to a passage from Brentano (2009: pp. 30-31) as possibly 
giving an argument of this kind, but I believe he is mistaken.24 Here is the passage 
(emphasis mine): 
There are some who hold, in opposition to what experience makes evident to us, 
that pleasure is the only thing good in itself, that pleasure is the good. If this view 
were true, then, as Bentham urged, it would have the following advantage: since 
all goods would be homogeneous, we would be able to compare them 
quantitatively and thus determine their relative values… 
 
23 I owe this formulation to Feldman (2004: p. 41). 
24 In fairness, Feldman (2006: p. 47) says that he is “not entirely sure” about this interpretation. One 
of Feldman’s doctoral students, Klocksiem (2009: p. 134), interprets Brentano as rejecting the 




But only a moment’s reflection is needed to shatter such illusory hopes. Is it really 
possible to find out whether one pleasure is twice as great as another? Gauss, who certainly 
knew something about measurement, has denied that this is possible. A foot is divisible 
into twelve inches; but an intense joy is not divisible in the same sense into twelve 
less intensive joys. Consider how ridiculous it would be if someone said that the 
amount of pleasure he has in smoking a good cigar is such that, if it were 
multiplied by 127, or say by 1,077, it would be precisely equal to the amount of 
pleasure he has in listening to a symphony of Beethoven or in viewing one of 
Raphael’s madonnas! This is enough, I think, to suggest the further difficulties 
involved in trying to compare the intensity of pleasure with that of pain. 
 
The italicized section, which Feldman omits, makes clear that Brentano was pointing out 
our practical inability to measure hedonic magnitudes, not arguing for the non-existence 
of such magnitudes. 
Still, given the rarity of general arguments against the calculation thesis, it worth 
considering how Brentano’s remarks might be put to use in such an argument. Feldman 
suggests that they could be taken as an argument for the claim that pleasure magnitudes 
are incomparable in size, not only practically but in principle. Reconstructed as an 
argument against the calculation thesis, that argument would look something like this: 
P1. If there is a pair of token pleasures, A and B, for which there is no number n such 
that A contains exactly n times as much pleasure as B, then the calculation thesis is 
false. 
 
P2. There is a pair of token pleasures, A and B, for which there is no number n such 
that A contains exactly n times as much pleasure as B. 
 
C. The calculation thesis is false. 
This argument is similar to the arguments against the phenomenological thesis discussed 
earlier. It is so similar, in fact, that we can re-use the defensive strategy from §2.3 with 
only minor alterations. 
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As with the arguments discussed in §2.3, this argument is valid, P1 is true by 
definition, and the support for P2 comes from a comparison between pleasures, such as 
Brentano’s comparison between the pleasure from smoking a cigar and the pleasure from 
listening to a symphony or looking at a painting. The idea would be that the absurdity of 
proposing any particular number for n here is evidence that there really is no such n. This 
could only seem absurd to us if we thought carefully about the comparison, which would 
require that we recall our own experiences with the sorts of pleasures being compared, or 
others that seem sufficiently similar. This is to say that, like the arguments in §2.3, this 
argument relies on appeal to phenomenal introspection. 
As before, the strategy of supporting P2 by appeal to phenomenal introspection 
rests on two assumptions. 
The first assumption is that the reader will make the expected introspective 
judgments. I accepted this assumption with respect to the arguments in the previous 
section, but I am reluctant to do the same here. I doubt that many people would have clear 
intuitions about the existence of precise numerical ratios between the intensities of any 
two token pleasures. What Brentano points out is that it would be absurd to declare a 
specific number, such as 127, as the exact ratio between the intensities of the pleasures 
gained from two experiences that are highly qualitatively distinct. But judging this to be 
absurd is not the same as judging that there is no such number identifiable even in 
principle. For the sake of argument, I will accept the assumption all the same—but only 
for comparisons between pleasant experiences that are highly qualitatively distinct (like 
the one Brentano suggests). 
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The second assumption is that we are justified in taking phenomenal introspection 
to be a reliable way of determining whether, for the pair of token experiences in question, 
there is a number n such that one contains exactly n times as much pleasure as the other. 
In other words, for this way of refuting the phenomenological thesis to work, we must be 
justified in believing that we have what I will call “quantitative insight”: 
Quantitative Insight: A subject has quantitative insight—is quantitatively 
insightful—iff they can use phenomenal introspection to reliably determine 
whether, for any token pleasures A and B, there is a number n such that A contains 
exactly n times as much pleasure as B. 
 
I know of no argument for this claim. And in the absence of such an argument, this sort 
of approach will not refute the calculation thesis. 
Moreover, the comparisons most likely to elicit judgments in support of P2 would 
involve pleasant experiences that are in many respects phenomenologically unalike, as in 
the case of listening to a symphony and smoking a cigar. We can explain these judgments 
in a manner consistent with the calculation thesis being true, on both the separate 
experience and hedonic tone views of hedonic states, in the same way that we accounted 
for judgments that cut against the phenomenological thesis. On each view, we can explain 
the error by pointing out that the experiences being compared involve highly distinct 
qualia (e.g. the sound of violins and the taste of cigar smoke), and proposing that 
pleasure—conceived of as a separate experience or a hedonic tone—permeates these in 
consciousness in a way that stymies quantitative insight. 
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2.5 Separate Experience or Hedonic Tone? 
Up to this point, I have not taken sides between the separate experience view and 
the hedonic tone view. Each of these theories embraces the phenomenological thesis, and 
each withstands the introspective arguments discussed in §2.3 above. But we might 
wonder whether one is preferable to the other. So, in this section, I will consider some 
representative objections to each view. In doing so, I will attempt to show that we should 
not favor the separate experience view over the hedonic tone view or vice versa. Instead, 
we should accept the phenomenological thesis while suspending judgment as to which 
sub-theory of this type is correct. 
2.5.1 Idiosyncrasy Objections 
The separate experience view holds that both pleasure and pain are feelings that 
can, in principle (though perhaps not in practice) be felt in isolation from other qualia. 
Some philosophers object to this view on the grounds that if it were true, hedonic states 
would be so unlike other feelings as to strain credulity. For example, here is Alston (1967: 
p. 342): 
It would seem that any sensation, if it becomes sufficiently acute, will tend to 
monopolize consciousness and interfere with concentration on anything else. On 
the [separate experience] view under consideration, the more pleasure we get out 
of, say, playing the piano, the more intense the sensation of pleasure would 
become, the more our attention would be taken up with the sensation of pleasure, 
and the harder it would become to concentrate on the playing. But the reverse is 
the case. The more pleasure we get out of doing something, the easier it is to 
concentrate on it. 
 
The objection here is that if pleasure is a separate kind of feeling (or sensation, as Alston 
puts it), it would stand alone among feelings in not becoming more distracting as it 
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becomes more intense. Stranger still, it would seem to be the one feeling that has the 
opposite effect. 
 In a similar vein, Sobel (2002: p. 242) says this: 
[T]he sensations that we are familiar with can be either pleasant or unpleasant, 
agreeable or disagreeable, depending on the agent and the context. If we 
understand pleasure to be a particular flavor of sensation, then it would seem that 
the hedonist must claim that there is a flavor of sensation that will always benefit 
each one of us, regardless of our tastes. This seems radically at odds with our 
experience with flavors of sensations that we are confident are sensations. 
 
Sobel objects that, if pleasure is a separate feeling (or sensation, as he also puts it), and 
prudential hedonism is true, then pleasure would stand apart as the only “flavor of 
sensation” that benefits everyone regardless of their tastes. 
 Alston and Sobel appear to share a suspicion of idiosyncrasy. The idea seems to 
be that, all else being equal, a theory should assign as few unique properties to pleasure 
as possible. Pleasure (and pain) must have some unique properties to be distinct from 
other mental states. On the separate experience view, these would be phenomenal 
properties. But both Alston and Sobel point out ways in which the separate experience 
view threatens to burden hedonic states with further idiosyncrasies. 
I am willing to agree that if the separate experience view is correct, then pleasure 
is idiosyncratic in the way Alston suggests; that if both the separate experience view and 
prudential hedonism are true, then pleasure is idiosyncratic in the way Sobel suggests; 
and that a theory of hedonic states should assign as few unique properties to pleasure 
(and pain) as possible, all else being equal. The question is whether all else is indeed equal. 
At this point, we are considering whether to adopt the separate experience view or the 
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hedonic tone view; in this context, then, charges of idiosyncrasy against the separate 
experience view will only stick if the same (or equivalent) charges cannot be made, with 
equal justice, against the hedonic tone view. 
But the same, or equivalent, idiosyncrasy objections could in fact be leveled 
against the hedonic tone view. The hedonic tone view claims that pleasure and pain 
cannot be felt separately from other qualia, but rather occur when some qualia take on a 
positive or negative hedonic tone, respectively. With respect to idiosyncrasy objections, 
this approach faces a dilemma. If there are no other phenomenal states that can occur only 
as qualities of other qualia—if there is no precedent for the kind of mental state that the 
hedonic tone view claims pleasure and pain to be—then clearly hedonic states would be 
idiosyncratic in this respect. But if there are other such phenomenal states, then Alston’s 
and Sobel’s objections might apply just as well to the hedonic tone view as the separate 
experience view. 
 Consider the question of precedent. As mentioned in §2.1 above, proponents of 
the hedonic tone view sometimes describe pleasure and pain as qualitative dimensions 
along which experiences vary. In this vein, Kagan (1992, p. 172) famously proposed 
(though did not fully endorse) an analogy with the loudness of sounds: 
As an analogy, consider the loudness of auditory experiences—that is, sounds. It 
is obvious that loudness or volume is not a kind of sound. And it seems plausible 
to insist that loudness is not a single kind of component of auditory experiences. 
Rather, volume is a dimension along which sounds can vary. It is an aspect of 
sounds, with regard to which they can be ranked. Recognition of the qualitative 
differences between the sounds of a symphony, rain falling, and a bird chirping, 
does nothing at all to call into question our ability to identify a single dimension—




Similarly, then, pleasure might well be a distinct dimension of mental states, with 
regard to which they can be ranked as well. Recognition of the qualitative 
differences between the experiences of hiking, listening to music, and reading 
philosophy, need not call into question our ability to identify a single dimension—
pleasure—along which they vary in magnitude. 
 
In this way, Kagan locates a precedent for hedonic tone (conceived of in dimensional 
terms). Arpaly & Schroeder (2013: pp. 122-123), meanwhile, find precedent for a single 
continuous dimension of pleasure and pain in the qualitative dimension of warmth and 
cold. 
But Bramble (2013: p. 209), a proponent of the separate experience view, objects 
that the loudness analogy is inapt. He points out that when an auditory experiences 
reaches the zero point on loudness dimension, it ceases to exist; but the same is not true 
of experiences on the pleasure dimension, which can continue even as their pleasantness 
is reduced to nothing. The same could perhaps be said against the analogy with warmth 
and cold: there may be no sensation which feels neither warm nor cold to any degree. 
(This is more dubious than the claim that there is no sound without some degree of 
loudness, but let’s suppose that it’s true.) So even if we agree that loudness, warmth, and 
cold provide precedent for the notion of a dimension along which experiences vary, 
hedonic tone will still be unique among qualitative dimensions in some way other than 
how the experiences on it feel. One might even claim that this idiosyncrasy is enough to 
mark the hedonic tone dimension as altogether sui generis among mental phenomena.  
On the other hand, suppose we find Bramble’s objection unconvincing, and regard 
the dimensions of loudness, warmth, and/or cold as adequate enough precedents for the 
dimensions of pleasure and pain. Then we are faced with the fact that versions of Alston’s 
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and Sobel’s objections apply just as well to the hedonic tone view as to the separate 
experience view. Sobel would surely object that, if prudential hedonism is true, then 
experiences along the pleasure dimension would stand alone as the only experiences 
which benefit us regardless of our tastes. And Alston would surely point out that the 
higher up on the loudness, warmth, or cold dimension an experience is, the more it tends 
to monopolize attention, and yet this is not so for experiences on the pleasure dimension. 
Hence the dilemma: the only way to save the hedonic tone view from Alston’s and Sobel’s 
objections is to make pleasure and pain so sui generis that they become vulnerable to an 
idiosyncrasy objection of another sort. 
I conclude that even if we agree that a theory of hedonic states should assign as 
few unique properties to pleasure (and pain) as possible, all else being equal, this does not 
give us a reason to favor the separate experience view over the hedonic tone view or vice 
versa. 
2.5.2 Epistemic Objections 
Another objection to the separate experience view is that paints an implausible 
picture of when, and how, we know what is bringing us pleasure. For example, here is 
Kenny (2003: p. 90): 
[I]f pleasure were a sensation its connection with what produced it would be a 
causal one. It would thus be only as a result of induction that we could say on any 
given occasion what we were enjoying. It would be possible to make exactly the 
same mistakes about what was giving one pleasure as it is possible to make about 
what has given one a stomachache. If, say, one had enjoyed listening to the first 
performance of a new overture, it would be a mere hypothesis that what one had 
enjoyed was listening to the overture and not, say, sitting in row G of the dress 
circle. This hypothesis would need to be verified in accordance with Mill’s canons: 
68 
 
one should listen to the overture again, sitting in row F of the stalls, and introspect 
carefully to see if the same sensation occurred. 
 
Feldman (1997: p. 342), who refers here to the separate experience view as the “Moorean” 
view, elaborates on Kenny’s argument: 
Another difficulty is epistemic. Suppose I am drinking beer and eating peanuts 
more or less simultaneously. Suppose each of the tastes is pleasurable. Suppose, 
however, that the taste of the peanuts is more pleasurable than the taste of the beer. 
According to the Moorean view, here's what's happening. I am experiencing the 
taste of beer and the taste of peanuts. Each taste sensation is causing the feeling of 
pleasure itself. However, the taste of the peanuts is causing a more intense feeling 
of pleasure itself than is the taste of the beer. 
 
If the Moorean view were true, I would face a certain slight difficulty when I tried 
to determine which taste is the greater pleasure. For, according to this view, I 
would be having four simultaneous relevant sensory experiences: the taste of the 
peanuts, the taste of the beer, and two feelings of pleasure itself, one more 
intensely than the other. While it would be reasonable for us to assume that the 
feelings of pleasure were being caused by the tastes, I might have to engage in 
some causal experimentation in order to determine which taste was causing which 
feeling of pleasure itself. Perhaps I would put aside the beer and munch on 
peanuts alone for a while. I could then check to see which feeling of pleasure 
persists. Then I might put aside the peanuts for a while, and take my beer straight. 
Once again, I could check to see which feeling of pleasure persists. With luck, I 
might be able to determine which taste sensation was the greater sensory pleasure. 
 
The objection is that if pleasure were a separate experience—the feeling of pleasure 
itself—then in cases where we are having multiple experiences at once, some more 
pleasant than others, we would need to carry out some trial-and-error experimentation to 
determine which of these experiences are the more pleasant ones. But (the objection 
claims) this is not what happens. Alston (1967: p. 342) puts the point succinctly: “A person 
knows immediately which of the various things he is aware of at the moment he is taking 
pleasure in, and the sensation theory can give no account of this discrimination.” 
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 I think this objection is mistaken. Kenny and Feldman are right to think that on the 
most plausible version of the separate experience view, the feeling of pleasure itself would 
be caused by the experiences we call pleasant or pleasurable. And they are right to point 
out that this implies a need for some trial-and-error reasoning to determine which of 
multiple overlapping experiences is the more pleasant one. The mistake is to suppose that 
this trial-and-error reasoning must take place consciously and deliberately, or involve 
anything as elaborate as listening to an overture again from a different row. 
A proponent of the separate experience view could propose the following picture 
instead. First, the amount of pleasure that we feel from an experience, all else being equal, 
increases with our attention to that experience, and decreases when we direct our 
attention elsewhere. Second, when we have multiple overlapping conscious experiences, 
our attention tends to shift between them. For example, if we are listening to an overture 
from row G, our attention will tend to move from one aspect of the music to another, and 
perhaps in some moments will settle on the feeling of the seat underneath us, or the 
quality of our view of the orchestra. If we are eating peanuts and drinking beer, our 
attention will most likely shift from one flavor or texture to another, the peanuts being 
more salient when we bite into them, the beer more salient when it first hits the tongue. 
As this happens, we may detect some fluctuation in the amount of pleasure we feel. If 
there is a clear enough pattern in these fluctuations—say, a consistent burst of pleasure at 
the crunch of peanuts, or a consistent decrease in pleasure when we notice how poor the 
view is from row G—we will make an inference about which of our experiences is 
bringing us more pleasure and which less. (If two of our experiences are so blended in 
70 
 
consciousness that we cannot fix our attention more on one than the other, then 
presumably we would not make a judgment about which is more pleasurable.) All of this 
could happen without the sort of effortful experimentation that Kenny and Feldman seem 
to think would be required. Indeed, in normal cases it could happen so easily that we 
would be tempted to say, with Alston, that it happens immediately. 
Admittedly, this is just more speculation on behalf of the separate experience view. 
But it is coherent, and neither Kenny nor Feldman gives us any reason to deny that this is 
how we typically know which of our overlapping experiences is more pleasant. I conclude 
that this sort of objection gives us no reason to reject the separate experience view. 
Crisp (2006: pp. 104-105), meanwhile, poses an epistemic challenge to the hedonic 
tone view. The challenge concerns how we can distinguish between a component of 
experiences and an experiential dimension: 
How is the distinction between components of experiences and dimensions of 
variation meant to work? Take the sound of a tinkling bell, and the sound of a 
honking horn. The components of each are, respectively, tinkling and honking. 
Volume, Kagan suggests, is not a ‘kind’ of sound. So a loud tinkling is the same 
sound as a soft tinkling, whereas a loud honk is a different sound from a loud 
tinkling. 
 
It is questionable, however, whether this distinction captures anything of great 
metaphysical significance. We would indeed be inclined to say that the soft 
tinkling is the same sound as the loud tinkling. But that is because we usually focus 
on aspects of how things sound other than how loud they are. In fact loud sounds 
do form a kind. I might ask you to group sounds together according to their 
volume, and you would then categorize the loud tinkling with the loud honk, and 
the soft tinkling with the soft honk. As Kagan himself goes on to say, ‘it seems. . . 
that there is a sense in which a specific volume is indeed an ingredient of a given 
sound’. Drawing distinctions between components, dimensions of variation, and 




If there is no genuine distinction between components of experience and dimensions of 
variation, and if this distinction is crucial for the hedonic tone view, then this is a serious 
challenge. As to the first question, I have no opinion. But as to the second, I think the 
answer is clear: it is not crucial for the hedonic view that there be a clean distinction 
between experiential dimensions and components of experiences. For a proponent of the 
hedonic tone view, what matters is that there be some precedent for the idea of a 
phenomenal property that varies continuously in magnitude and cannot be felt in 
isolation from other qualia. This is the point of the analogies with loudness, warmth, and 
cold. Whether there is a non-arbitrary way of dividing experiential dimensions from 
components is irrelevant (though perhaps continuous variation in magnitude could be the 
distinguishing criterion). Therefore, this objection does not give us any reason to favor the 
separate experience view over the hedonic tone view. 
In light of the failure of these objections—and the fact that I have yet to find any 
better—I conclude that we should embrace the phenomenological thesis, but suspend 










3. Evaluative Objections 
This chapter concerns evaluative objections to BPH, i.e. arguments against BPH 
that rely on one or more evaluative premises. As one would expect, most of these 
objections directly target BPH’s evaluative thesis: 
Evaluative Thesis: The amount of welfare in a life (or life-segment) L, for its subject 
S, is determined by, and equal to, the sum of the magnitudes of all of S's pleasures 
during L minus the sum of the magnitudes of all of S's pains during L. 
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. 
In §3.1, I address arguments for the claim that, contrary to the evaluative thesis, 
things other than pleasure and pain have intrinsic prudential value. In the process, I will 
develop and apply a general strategy for responding to evaluative objections against BPH, 
which I call “the undermining strategy”. 
In §3.2, I respond to the charge that the undermining strategy is epistemically self-
defeating. 
Finally, in §3.3, I rebut three evaluative objections that are not solely directed at 
the evaluative thesis. The first two are evaluative arguments against the calculation thesis. 
The third concerns both the evaluative thesis and the phenomenological thesis. The latter 
says that if the phenomenological thesis is true, then the evaluative thesis presents an 
implausibly alienating account of prudential value (and so BPH, which embraces both 
theses, is implausible as well). I will respond to all of these at least in part by applying the 
undermining strategy developed in §3.1 and defended in §3.2. For the second, I will also 




3.1 Prudential Insight and the Undermining Strategy 
3.1.1 Life Comparisons and the Strong Insight Hypothesis 
Every form of prudential hedonism holds that only pleasures and pains have 
intrinsic prudential value. This claim has attracted many counterarguments, each 
attempting to establish that some things other than pleasure and pain can affect our 
welfare in themselves. In this section, I will develop a general strategy for rebutting these 
arguments, which will then provide a blueprint for my rebuttals to evaluative objections 
of other kinds. 
The most compelling of these arguments employ a kind of thought experiment 
that I will call a “life comparison”. Life comparisons present the reader with a third-person 
comparison between two hypothetical lives, designed to elicit intuitions to the effect that 
one of the compared lives contains something of intrinsic prudential value (positive or 
negative) that the other lacks. 
Life comparisons are often used by “objective list” theorists of welfare, who hold 
that there are multiple objective sources of intrinsic prudential value. Fletcher (2013: pp. 
218-219) describes the method: 
We should imagine two people with identical bundles of identical goods and then 
imagine some addition of some purported extra intrinsic welfare contributor or 
detractor. If we find it plausible to think that their welfare is thereby made 
unequal, this is evidence that we should expand the list to include this item. 
 
Hooker (2015: pp. 23-24) puts this method into action, with autonomy as the candidate 
intrinsic prudential good: 
We imagine two possible lives for someone as similar as possible except that one 
contains more autonomy and the other less. Then we ask which of these two 
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possible lives is more beneficial to the person who lives it. The autonomous life seems 
better . . . Since we have imagined that the two lives are as equal as possible in 
terms of the other elements of welfare, the best explanation of the superiority of 
the more autonomous life in this comparison is that autonomy is an element of 
welfare [i.e. has positive intrinsic prudential value]. 
 
From this and other identically structured life comparisons, Hooker concludes that not 
only autonomy, but also friendship, significant achievement, and important knowledge 
have intrinsic positive prudential value. Of course, if any of these conclusions are right, 
then the evaluative thesis is false. So this sort of life comparison presents one sort of 
evaluative objection to BPH. 
Some other life comparisons, meanwhile, are used in arguments against specific 
theories of welfare. Dorsey (2011: 189) describes this method as a way of refuting 
prudential hedonism: 
Imagine two lives that are precisely equal in pleasure. Imagine now, however, that 
the first life contains a greater degree of x than the second. Use x to mean whatever 
the purported non-pleasure good might be. For instance, let x be achieved goals. 
Intuitive judgment of two lives, identical in terms of pleasure, appears to lend 
weight to the suggestion that the successful life, rather than the unsuccessful life, 
is of greater welfare value. 
 
Fletcher (2016: pp. 15-16) employs this same method with his variation on Nozick’s (1974: 
pp. 42-45) experience machine scenario: 
Trudy lives in New York. When not carrying on her groundbreaking research into 
stem cell treatment, she enjoys running marathons, working for a local charity, 
skiing, socialising with friends and spending time with her life and partner and 
her children. She also somehow finds time to pen highly successful, critically 
acclaimed novels. She enjoys great physical health and springs out of bed every 
morning full of joy and excitement.  
 
Now meet Flora. When Flora was born she was attached to a machine that 
produces sensory stimulation that gives her very rich, vivid, and life-like 
experiences. She has the pleasurable experience of carrying on groundbreaking 
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research into stem cell treatment, of running marathons, of working for a local 
charity, skiing, socialising with friends and spending time with her life partner 
and their children. She also has the experience of writing highly successful and 
critically acclaimed novels. She is kept physically healthy by the machine and she 
also has the experience of springing out of bed every morning full of joy and 
excitement. 
 
Let us stipulate that Trudy and Flora have lives of identical length and that their 
hedonic levels are identical at every moment of these lives . . . Whatever level of 
well-being one thinks is plausible for Trudy, it seems highly counterintuitive that 
Flora has that level of well-being also. 
 
The counterintuitive claim in question is exactly the judgment that BPH endorses in this 
case. Trudy and Flora’s lives are experientially identical, which makes them hedonically 
identical according to the phenomenological thesis; this, in turn, makes them equal in the 
amounts of pleasure and pain they contain according to the calculation thesis; and this, 
finally, makes them equal in welfare according to the evaluative thesis. 
Lin (2016: p. 321) gives a similar version of the experience machine scenario 
(emphasis in original): 
Consider two lives, A and B, that are experientially identical and thus identical 
with respect to the qualitative features, durations, and temporal distribution of the 
pleasures and pains they contain. The subject of A (call him Adam) spends his life 
in the real world, whereas the subject of B (call him Bill) is plugged into an 
experience machine for his entire life. A is a good life of the sort available to 
citizens of Western countries. Let us stipulate that at no point does Bill interact 
with, or receive any care from, other human beings: thus, the experience machine 
runs entirely on its own, without any human intervention. Indeed, at no point after 
Bill’s birth is any person even aware of his existence. (His mother died during 
childbirth, she alone was aware of the pregnancy, and a robot plugged him into 




Do A and B contain the same total amount of welfare? I believe that many would 
join me in having the comparison intuition: A is at least somewhat higher in total 
welfare than B. 25 
 
Like Fletcher, Lin stipulates that the compared lives (A and B) are experientially identical. 
So once again, the compared lives are hedonically identical according to the 
phenomenological thesis; which, in turn, makes them equal in the amounts of pleasure 
and pain they contain according to the calculation thesis; and this, finally, makes them 
equal in welfare according to the evaluative thesis. Hence BPH cannot accommodate Lin’s 
“comparison intuition”. 
Finally, Velleman (1991: pp. 49-50) gives a similarly structured life comparison 
against additive theories of welfare, of which BPH is one: 
Consider two different lives that you might have. One life begins in the depths but 
takes an upward trend: a childhood of deprivation, a troubled youth, struggles 
and setbacks in early adulthood, followed finally by success and satisfaction in 
middle age and a peaceful retirement. Another life begins at the heights but slides 
downhill: a blissful childhood and youth, precocious triumphs and rewards in 
early adulthood, followed by a midlife strewn with disasters that lead to misery in 
old age. Surely we can imagine two such lives as containing equal sums of 
momentary well-being. Your retirement is as blessed in one life as your childhood 
is in the other; your nonage is as blighted in one life as your dotage is in the other 
. . . To most people, I think, the former story would seem like a better life story—
not, of course, in the sense that it makes for a better story in the telling or the 
hearing, but rather in the sense that it is the story of a better life. (Velleman 1991: 
49-50.) 
 
Here, Velleman stipulates that the two lives contain an equal “sum of momentary well-
being”. He takes no specific position as to what precisely goes into this sum. The point is 
to show that, in addition to momentary well-being, a life’s overall shape or trajectory 
 
25 Other philosophers who have discussed a life comparison version of the experience machine 
include Crisp (2006: pp. 117-119), Hawkins (2016: pp. 361-363), and Pummer (2017: pp. 276-277). 
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makes an intrinsic contribution to its prudential value. The proffered evidence for this is 
that the story of the life with an upward-trending trajectory “would seem like a better life 
story” to most people than that of the life downward-trending life. If BPH is true, then 
this seeming must be mistaken, as according to the evaluative thesis, the amount of 
welfare in a life and a life’s sum of momentary well-being are one and the same. 
 Each of these passages contains an argument—what we may call a “life 
comparison argument”—that relies on an appeal to the reader’s intrinsic prudential 
intuition. This claim is central to all that follows in this section, so I will now explain just 
what I mean by intrinsic prudential intuition and how these arguments rely on appeal 
thereto. 
Following Climenhaga (2015), I take it that S has an intuition that P just in case S 
feels inclined to believe that P, and S does not take that inclination to be the direct result 
of sense perception, testimony, memory, or inference. I further take it that one can have 
an intuition that P whether or not one already believes that P. I do not claim that this is 
the single true meaning of “intuition”, or that this is what philosophers always do, or 
should, mean when they use the term. I do claim that the objections I discuss in this 
chapter appeal to intuitions in this sense. 
 As I use the phrase, intrinsic prudential intuitions are intuitions about what has 
intrinsic prudential value. These include intuitions of the form “X has (lacks) intrinsic 
prudential value” and “X is good (bad) for a person in itself”, as well as intuitions with 
contents of the form “A is prudentially better than B”, where (given how A and B are 
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spelled out) this proposition either entails or is best explained by A being higher in 
intrinsic prudential value than B. 
When I say that a philosopher appeals to intrinsic prudential intuition, I mean that 
they appeal to the fact that we have certain intrinsic prudential intuitions. I take it that for 
these philosophers, the mental event of having a certain intuition, at least for some people 
under some conditions, is evidence for the truth of the intuition’s propositional content. 
The alternative would be to interpret them as asserting the propositional contents 
themselves. But if that were the case, these philosophers would not be giving arguments 
at all, but rather illustrations of points already arrived at. That interpretation is too 
uncharitable. 
When I say that the arguments against BPH discussed in this chapter rely on 
appeal to intrinsic prudential intuition, I mean that in each argument, there is a premise 
for which this kind of appeal is the only support given. For example, consider the 
arguments given above by Hooker (two lives as identical as possible except with respect 
to achievement), Fletcher (the experience machine scenario featuring Trudy and Flora), 
Lin (the experience machine scenario featuring Adam and Bill), and Velleman (the 
upward- and downward-trending lives). Each one can be understood as having the 
following structure: 
 P1. If Life A is higher in welfare than Life B, then Theory X is false. 
 P2. Life A is higher in welfare than Life B. 
 C. Theory X is false. 
 
For any of the above life comparisons, we could fill in the blanks (substituting BPH for 
Theory X, since that is what we are concerned with here). For example: 
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P1. If Trudy’s life is higher in welfare than Flora’s life, then BPH is false. 
P2. Trudy’s life is higher in welfare than Flora’s life. 
C. BPH is false. 
 
This is a logically valid argument structure, and in every case, P1 will be true by definition. 
So the contentious premise will always be P2. The question, then, is what reason we are 
given to believe P2 is true. 
Returning to the passages quoted above, we find Hooker saying that “the 
autonomous life seems better”, Fletcher saying that “it seems highly counterintuitive” that 
Trudy’s and Flora’s lives would be equal in welfare, Lin referencing the “comparison 
intuition” that “A is at least somewhat higher in total welfare than B”, and Velleman 
speculating that to most, the upward-trending life would seem like the story of a better 
life when compared to the downward-trending one. I interpret all of these assertions as 
appeals to intrinsic prudential intuition; that is, as appeals to a felt inclination on the part 
of the reader to believe the relevant proposition, where that inclination does not strike the 
reader as being the result of sense perception, memory, or inference, but rather as a sort 
of spontaneous intellectual response to the question being posed. And, crucially, these 
philosophers offer no other support for P2 (the reader will have to trust that I am not 
conveniently omitting anything). Hence my claim that these arguments rely on appeal to 
intrinsic prudential intuition. 
 For these arguments to succeed, given their reliance on appeal to intrinsic 
prudential intuition, two things must be true. First, people must actually have the 
intuitions in question. And second, the fact of people having these intuitions must give us 
sufficient reason to accept P2. I will not dispute the former. I don’t know how widely 
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shared these intuitions are, and resting my defense on this question would turn it into an 
empirical project that I am not qualified to carry out. So, in what follows, I will just grant 
for the sake of argument that people generally have whatever intuitions are most 
convenient for my opponents. But I will dispute the second claim. Even if everyone had 
these intuitions, and we knew this to be the case, that would not give us adequate reason 
to accept P2. Or so I will now argue. 
Though they do not say so explicitly, Hooker, Fletcher, Lin, and Velleman all 
suggest that the intuitions they appeal to give us evidence for their arguments’ respective 
versions of P2. In other words, they suggest that our intrinsic prudential intuitions, at least 
about the given life comparisons, give us evidence for the truth of their contents. But these 
intuitions provide such evidence only if they reliably track the truth about intrinsic 
prudential value—reliably enough, that is, to make beliefs in their contents at least prima 
facie justified. (In what follows I will use the term “reliable” as shorthand for reliability in 
this sense.) 
So, for these arguments to succeed, we must be justified in believing that our 
prudential intuitions are reliable. In other words, we must be justified in believing that 
we have what I will call “strong prudential insight”: 
Strong Prudential Insight: A subject has strong prudential insight iff their intrinsic 
prudential intuitions reliably track the truth about what has (or lacks) intrinsic 
prudential value. 
 
In summary: for the above evaluative objections to BPH (and others structured similarly) 
to succeed, we must be justified in accepting each argument’s version of P2. For this, it 
must be legitimate to appeal to intrinsic prudential intuitions as evidence for the truth of 
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their contents. This, in turn, requires that we be justified in accepting an explanation (at a 
certain level) of why we have the specific intrinsic prudential intuitions that we do: that 
we have them because we have strong prudential insight.26 
Call this explanation the “strong insight hypothesis”. Now, I take this to be an 
uncontroversial fact about hypotheses: given two competing hypotheses about the same 
phenomena, and no decisive reason to favor one over the other, then we rationally ought 
to suspend judgment between them. So, to be justified in accepting the strong insight 
hypothesis (rather than suspending judgment about the relationship between our intrinsic 
prudential intuitions and the truth), we must have all-things-considered reason to accept 
it over incompatible alternative accounts of the intuitions in question. If there is such an 
alternative, and we do not have all-things-considered reason to reject it, then the mere 
availability of the alternative undermines our justification for believing that we have 
strong prudential insight. 
This, then, will be my overarching strategy for rebutting evaluative objections to 
BPH: give an alternative, pro-hedonist hypothesis about our intrinsic prudential 
intuitions, and show that we are not justified in rejecting it in favor of the strong insight 
hypothesis. In what follows I will refer to this as “the undermining strategy”.27 
 
26 I am taking internalism about epistemic justification for granted here. But the philosophers who 
appeal to evaluative intuition appear to assume some form of internalism as well. I am merely 
following their lead. 
27 Attentive readers will notice the similarity of this strategy to the one deployed in §2.3 and §2.4. 
The latter could just as well be called an “undermining strategy”, but for ease of exposition, I use 
that phrase in this chapter only. 
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3.1.2 The Undermining Strategy 
The basic strategy I have just proposed is well-known. Every prudential hedonist 
that I am aware of employs some version of it. Sobel (2002: p. 244), an opponent of 
prudential hedonism in all forms, describes it well: 
When a theory clashes this directly with central intuitions, the theory can regain 
plausibility by either (1) clarifying our intuition such that we come to see that 
when we properly understand the intuition, we see that it is not actually 
incompatible with the theory, or (2) explaining away the intuition by telling a story 
that undermines the credibility of the intuition… 
 
The quantitative hedonist who conceives of pleasure as a sensation could adopt 
the second strategy of attempting to undermine our faith in the intuitions that run 
counter to the theory by telling a convincing story about the genesis of such 
intuitions that would explain why we have them while revealing them to be 
misleading in the cases in which they run counter to hedonism . . . Briefly the story 
that the quantitative hedonist would try to make convincing is that even our 
intuitions that run counter to hedonism can be explained by the truth of hedonism. 
 
This is indeed the sort of approach I will pursue with my alternative hypothesis. But while 
past defenders of hedonism have most often used this sort of strategy to fend off 
evaluative objections one-by-one,28 I will attempt to distinguish myself by giving a single 
pro-hedonist hypothesis that handles all evaluative objections sharing the basic structure 
of those given in the previous section, and that provides a foundation for responding to 
virtually any other objection relying on evaluative premises. 
 As Sobel says, the idea is to show that the intrinsic prudential intuitions that run 
counter to hedonism—such as the intuitions that Hooker et al seek to elicit with the life 
 
28 See for example Kawall (1999), Silverstein (2000), Baber (2008), Hewitt (2010), Feldman (2011), 
Barber (2011), and Weijers (2014) on the experience machine, and Feldman’s (2006: pp. 108-131) 
and Crisp’s (2006: pp. 111-125) piecemeal approaches to evaluative objections. 
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comparisons quoted above—can be (convincingly) explained by the truth of hedonism. 
So my hypothesis must assume the truth of BPH, and accomplish two further goals: 
predict our anti-hedonist intrinsic prudential intuitions, and avoid having any 
implausible implications. Here is what I propose: 
The Pro-Hedonist Hypothesis: BPH is true, and we tend to correctly assign positive 
intrinsic prudential value to pleasure. But we also tend to mistakenly assign 
positive intrinsic prudential value to other things, just in case they meet these three 
conditions: 
 
(a) We observe them to be consistently conducive to net pleasure for 
people in general. 
(b) They are not categorically instrumental. 
(c) They are not activities that are usually done for some external end. 
 
Our intrinsic prudential intuitions are the products of tacit inferences from 
features of the given scenarios plus these prior assignments of intrinsic value. 
(Mutatis mutandis for pain and negative intrinsic prudential value.)29 
 
This hypothesis suggests that we have a tendency to form beliefs, consciously or 
unconsciously, about what in the world is intrinsically harmful or beneficial to us, and 
that in doing so we begin (correctly) with pleasure and pain. Then, over a period of 
exposure to consistent correlations between hedonic states and the various non-hedonic 
things that we encounter in life, we begin to (incorrectly) assign intrinsic value to some of 
the things we observe to be consistently conducive to hedonic states. But only some. As 
we go, we filter out various candidate beliefs about intrinsic prudential value in a 
systematic way, arriving at plausible general principles that can receive widespread 
 
29 With the use of the phrase “net pleasure”, I do not mean to commit BPH to the view that pleasure 
and pain are commensurable opposites at the descriptive (non-evaluative) level. That said, the pro-
hedonist hypothesis does require that people in general share a sense that something can bring on 
more pleasure than pain or vice versa. 
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assent across social contexts. And all this takes place more or less unconsciously, resulting 
in beliefs that are recalcitrant to revision even when we recognize the hedonic correlations 
that led to them in the first place. 
Importantly, the pro-hedonist hypothesis does not predict that we will assign 
intrinsic prudential value to just anything that we observe to be consistently correlated 
with pleasure or pain for just anyone. Rather, it suggests that we assign such value only 
to things that we observe to be thusly correlated for people in general. Hence, for example, 
it does not predict that we will assign positive intrinsic prudential value to our own 
personal sources of pleasure when we know that our tastes are not widely shared. I 
consistently take great pleasure in listening to rather abrasive music; the pro-hedonist 
hypothesis does not predict that I will therefore come to believe that such music is good 
for people in itself. 
Furthermore, the pro-hedonist hypothesis says that we assign positive intrinsic 
prudential value only to things that are not categorically instrumental, i.e. not defined 
wholly or partially by their instrumental properties. Hence it does not predict that we will 
assign such value to things like food, which is by definition a means to bodily sustenance; 
medicine, which is by definition a means to physical health; and money, which is by 
definition a means to acquire goods and services. 
Finally, the pro-hedonist hypothesis says that we refrain from assigning positive 
intrinsic prudential value to activities that are usually done for some external end. The 
activities of eating, drinking, bathing, sex, and masturbation are almost universally 
associated with net pleasure, but the pro-hedonist hypothesis does not predict that we 
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will assign positive intrinsic prudential value to such activities, because we generally 
engage in them with some extrinsic goal in mind: nourishment in the case of food, 
cleanliness in the case of bathing, and net pleasure for all of the above. 
In short, my hypothesis proposes that we tend to assign positive intrinsic 
prudential value to things that we strongly associate with net pleasure, provided that 
these things do not wear their instrumental natures on their sleeves, so to speak. This 
leaves things that are familiar enough to have strong hedonic associations, but abstract 
enough not to be obviously instrumental: things like autonomy, love, friendship, 
significant achievement, important knowledge, and positive life-trajectory. The same is 
true, mutatis mutandis, for pain and negative intrinsic prudential value: here the pro-
hedonist hypothesis rules out the likes of debt and dental surgery as things to which we 
would assign intrinsic negative value, but leave things like ignorance, helplessness, and 
negative life-trajectory. 
One might object that it is implausible for the pro-hedonist hypothesis to say that 
people in general have all these beliefs about intrinsic prudential value. I grant that this 
claim is speculative, and could perhaps be empirically disconfirmed. But I do not think it 
is implausible on its face. Here is why. 
To begin with, beliefs about what is good and bad for people strike me as fairly 
ordinary, as does the general distinction between something’s having value in itself and 
something’s being valuable as a means to something else. And that is all the conceptual 
apparatus one needs to have beliefs about intrinsic prudential value. Moreover, I believe 
people in general are sufficiently acquainted with the likes of pleasure, autonomy, love, 
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friendship, achievement, knowledge, pain, ignorance, helplessness, and a person’s life 
getting better or worse for them over time to have beliefs about such things. 
But most importantly, recall that I am assuming, for the sake of argument, that 
people have whatever intrinsic prudential intuitions are most convenient for BPH’s 
opponents. Presumably, the most convenient situation for my opponents would be one in 
which people in general have (or would have) anti-BPH intrinsic prudential intuitions 
about the relevant life comparisons. Now, for people to have these intuitions, and for these 
intuitions to be epistemically credible, people would need to be able to understand the 
cases being described and the basis on which they are to be compared. Someone could not 
have a credible intuition to the effect that Trudy’s life is higher in welfare than Flora’s 
without understanding the concept of personal welfare. And it stands to reason that a 
person who has such understanding would also have some beliefs about what sorts of 
things are good or bad for people. 
Hence an assumption on which life comparison arguments rest becomes more 
dubious the more we resist the idea that people in general might have beliefs about 
intrinsic prudential value of the sort that the pro-hedonist hypothesis imputes to them. 
Anti-hedonists question this aspect of the pro-hedonist hypothesis at their own risk. 
Earlier I set two goals for the pro-hedonist hypothesis. The first was to account for 
our anti-hedonist intrinsic prudential intuitions. Let’s see how the hypothesis fares with 
the intuitions elicited by the life comparisons quoted earlier. 
Hooker proposes a comparison between two lives that are as identical as possible, 
except that one contains more achievement. This (we assume) elicits the intuition that the 
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life with more achievement is higher in welfare. The pro-hedonist hypothesis accounts for 
this because, as noted, it predicts that we will assign intrinsic positive prudential value to 
achievement. 
Fletcher and Lin each offer a life comparison version of the experience machine 
scenario, in which two people live lives that are experientially identical, one in the real 
world and the other in a simulation. These (we assume) elicit the intuition that the life 
spent in the real world is higher in welfare than the life spent hooked to the experience 
machine. The pro-hedonist hypothesis accounts for this as well. As noted, it predicts that 
we will assign positive intrinsic prudential value to things that the non-machine life has 
and the machine life lacks, such as friendship, autonomy, and significant achievement. It 
also predicts that we will assign negative intrinsic prudential value to things that the 
machine life has more of than the non-machine life, such as ignorance and helplessness 
(the person hooked to the machine being fundamentally ignorant about the circumstances 
of their lives, and completely dependent on the machine to carry on providing a facsimile 
of the real world). 
Finally, Velleman compares two lives that have equal amounts of momentary 
well-being, but opposite welfare trajectories. This (we assume) elicits the intuition that the 
upward-trending life is higher in welfare than the downward-trending one. The pro-
hedonist hypothesis accounts for this because, as noted, it predicts that we will assign 
positive intrinsic prudential value to an upward life-trajectory, and negative intrinsic 
prudential value to a downward life-trajectory. 
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Evidently, then, the intuitions elicited by these anti-hedonist life comparisons can 
be explained by the truth of BPH. For an anti-hedonist to give an argument that succeeds 
where these have failed, they will have to offer a comparison between two lives that differ 
with respect to some candidate intrinsic good that is not consistently conducive to net 
pleasure for people in general, or with respect to some candidate intrinsic bad that is not 
consistently conducive to net pain for people in general, or with respect to something that 
is categorically instrumental, or with respect to an activity usually done for the sake of an 
external end. And it will have to be the case that most people still find it intuitive that one 
of the compared lives is higher in welfare than the other. I cannot prove that there are no 
such comparisons, but I have not found any in the literature, and I am confident that none 
are forthcoming. 
The second goal was for the pro-hedonist hypothesis to avoid implausible 
implications. I cannot prove that it has no such implications. I can, however, show that it 
avoids some implausible implications that befall the most prominent (and, to my 
knowledge, only) previous attempt at a wide-ranging psychological hypothesis in defense 
of prudential hedonism: that of Mill (2001:  pp. 36-38). 
In the passage I have in mind, Mill wants to show that hedonistic utilitarianism—
i.e. utilitarianism founded on a hedonist theory of welfare—is not refuted by people 
having intrinsic desires for things other than pleasure. In typical hedonist fashion, he 
proposes that that these desires are best explained by the truth of hedonism. Mill’s idea is 
that we come to desire these other things—he names virtue, money, power, and fame as 
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examples—only after, and precisely because, we have found them to be consistently 
conducive to pleasure. For instance, he says this about virtue (Mill 2001: p. 38): 
Virtue, according to the utilitarian conception, is a good of this description. There 
was no original desire of it, or motive to it, save its conduciveness to pleasure, and 
especially to protection from pain. But through the association thus formed it may 
be felt a good in itself, and desired as such with as great intensity as any other 
good . . .  
 
…Those who desire virtue for its own sake desire it either because the 
consciousness of it is a pleasure, or because the consciousness of being without it 
is a pain, or for both reasons united; as in truth the pleasure and pain seldom exist 
separately, but almost always together—the same person feeling pleasure in the 
degree of virtue attained, and pain in not having attained more. If one of these 
gave him no pleasure, and the other no pain, he would not love or desire virtue, 
or would desire it only for the other benefits which it might produce to himself or 
to persons whom he cared for.30 
 
Mill is accounting for desires here, not intuitions. But we can turn these remarks into an 
account of anti-hedonist intrinsic prudential intuitions just by adding the premise that the 
intuitions reflect our intrinsic desires (see Silverstein 2000: pp. 293-298). This account—
call it the “Millian hypothesis”—does just as well as my own at explaining anti-hedonist 
intrinsic prudential intuitions like those elicited by the life comparisons discussed above.  
However, the Millian hypothesis makes many other, much less plausible 
predictions about what intrinsic prudential intuitions we are likely to have. As noted 
earlier, Mill cites money, power, and fame as things that are sometimes desired for their 
own sake. He touts this as a fact that his hypothesis can explain. But if we repurpose Mill’s 
proposal as a hypothesis about intrinsic prudential intuitions, and not just intrinsic 
 
30 Similar accounts of the relationship between hedonic states and intrinsic desires were later 
proposed by Brandt (1979: pp. 95-98) and Railton (1989: pp. 167-171). 
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desires, then the hypothesis predicts that at least some of us will have intuitions to the 
effect that money, power, and fame have positive prudential value in themselves. Indeed, 
in the case of money, it predicts that virtually all of us would do so, money being 
consistently conducive to net pleasure for nearly everyone. 
To see why this is a problem, consider another life comparison. Imagine two lives, 
one belonging to subject X and the other to subject Y, that are as identical as possible 
except that X has more money at every point in his life than Y does at the corresponding 
point in his life. Because the lives are otherwise as identical as possible, we must suppose 
that X’s greater wealth does not produce an advantage for him in net pleasure or any other 
candidate prudential good. Given these stipulations, the Millian hypothesis predicts that 
most of us would have the intuition that X’s life, the wealthier life, is higher in welfare. I 
would confidently predict otherwise. 
This is not the only implausible implication of the Millian hypothesis. It generates 
similar predictions about every other thing that is consistently conducive to net pleasure 
for people in general, such as food, water, bathing, sex, and so on. Indeed, it predicts that, 
for any object O that is sufficiently conducive to net pleasure for you, and two hypothetical 
lives that are as similar as possible except that one contains more of O, you will have the 
intuition that the life with more of O is higher in welfare (provided that you understand 
and contemplate the comparison). And nothing in the Millian hypothesis precludes O 
from being something idiosyncratic. For example, if listening to the Beatles’ Abbey Road is 
sufficiently conducive to net pleasure for me, then on the Millian hypothesis, I will have 
the intuition that a life—any life, not just my own—with more time spent listening to 
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Abbey Road will be higher in welfare, all else being equal. The Millian hypothesis allows 
that these sorts of idiosyncratic prudential intuitions could be ubiquitous. But again, I 
would confidently predict that most people do not have such intuitions. 
My pro-hedonist hypothesis avoids all of these implications. Condition (a) says 
that we only tend to assign intrinsic positive prudential value to things that we observe 
to be conducive to net pleasure for people in general (mutatis mutandis for negative 
intrinsic prudential value and net pain); this rules out idiosyncratic intrinsic prudential 
intuitions as a common phenomenon. Conditions (b) and (c), meanwhile, rule out 
widespread assignments of intrinsic prudential value to things like money and food, by 
means already noted above.  
So, while I cannot show that my hypothesis has no implausible implications, I can 
(and do) claim that it is an improvement on this score over the Millian hypothesis. 
Granted, this claim is based on speculation about what intrinsic prudential intuitions 
people are likely to have. Fortunately, the Millian hypothesis is itself compatible with 
BPH. If I am wrong, and people’s intuitions are in line with what the Millian hypothesis 
predicts, this poses no problem for my larger project. 
Let’s review. I have given several examples of evaluative objections prudential 
hedonism, and shown that each makes an appeal to intrinsic prudential intuition. I have 
further shown that the success of this appeal, and therefore the success of these objections 
(and all others sharing an equivalent structure), depends on our being justified in 
accepting the strong insight hypothesis. We are justified in accepting this hypothesis only 
if there is no other account, incompatible with strong prudential insight and compatible 
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with BPH, that does equally well at accounting for our intrinsic prudential intuitions. But 
there is such an account: the one provided by my pro-hedonist hypothesis. I conclude that 
we are not justified in accepting the strong insight hypothesis—not by these arguments, 
anyway—and therefore that these evaluative objections to BPH, and all others sharing an 
equivalent structure, fail.31 
 
31 There is at least one sort of objection to BPH’s evaluative thesis to which the pro-
hedonist hypothesis does not apply. It is suggested by the following passage from 
Mayerfeld (see also Hurka 2011: pp. 55-58): 
 
Suppose some drug became available that gave people a joy as intense as the pain 
averted by anesthesia, and suppose that there were no drawbacks in the 
consumption of this drug. It seems quite clear to me that the provision of this drug 
would be less important than the administration of anesthesia . . . The moral 
badness of the suffering overshadows the moral goodness of the happiness. 
(Mayerfeld 1992: p. 133). 
 
We can adapt this example to concern prudential rather than moral value. For this, we 
should ask whether it is better for a person, prudentially speaking, to receive anesthesia 
before an operation that would otherwise be very painful (supposing that the anesthesia 
will reduce your pain during the operation to zero), or to go through the procedure 
without anesthesia and then be given a drug that safely provides an amount of pleasure 
equal in magnitude to pain just endured (and that erases your memories of both the 
procedure and the subsequent drug-induced pleasure). 
 This scenario puts us in much the same position as the life comparisons discussed 
above. BPH’s evaluative thesis has it that neither option in this case better for you than 
the other. But suppose that people in general have the intuition that the anesthesia route 
is prudentially preferable. If we are justified in supposing that these intuitions are rooted 
in a sort of prudential insight—this time into the amounts of intrinsic prudential value 
that various things contribute, relative to one another—then they will give us reason to 
reject BPH. But we are justified in supposing this only if there is no other account of these 
intuitions, incompatible with our having this kind of prudential insight and compatible 
with BPH, that does equally well at accounting for the intuitions in question. 
 The pro-hedonist hypothesis issues no prediction about how we will weigh the 
intrinsic prudential contributions of pleasure and pain, so it is of no use here. But we can 




3.2 Is the Undermining Strategy Self-Defeating? 
 The undermining strategy invites the charge that it is self-defeating, on the 
grounds that a lightly altered version of it could be used against BPH itself. For this, an 
opponent would only need to show that the case for BPH also relies on appeal to some 
intrinsic prudential intuitions, and then give an account of those intuitions that 
undermines their claim to being the product of prudential insight. Suppose, for example, 
that the case for BPH relied on contemplating a comparison between two lives that are 
identical except that one contains more pleasure. In that case, even if everyone had the 
intuition that the pleasurable life is higher in welfare, the anti-hedonist could simply 
respond with their own undermining hypothesis. 
 
BPH is true, but we tend to mistakenly assign greater prudential weight, unit-for-
unit, to pain than to pleasure. This is due to the confluence of various contingent 
psychological facts, such as: that we are generally capable of both more intense and 
longer-lasting episodes of pain than of pleasure (try to recall a physical pleasure as intense 
and long-lasting as the pain from a broken bone, or a period of general physical pleasure 
as intense or long-lasting as the general physical unease felt during a bout with the flu, or 
an emotional pleasure as intense and long-lasting as the emotional pain from heartbreak 
or the loss of a loved one); and that pain-inducing experiences are generally less subject 
to diminishing hedonic returns than pleasure-inducing ones (for example, a prolonged 
massage will tend to lose its pleasantness much more quickly than any form of physical 
torture will cease to be painful). 
This leads us to be generally more averse to the prospect of a painful experience 
than we are attracted to the prospect of a pleasurable one, which, in turn, leads to the 
unconscious formation of false beliefs to the effect that pain is more bad for us than 
pleasure is good. Our intuitions about cases like the one adapted from Mayerfeld are the 
products of unconscious inference from these preexisting beliefs. 
This is just another hypothesis. But it is coherent, consistent with BPH, and 
accounts for the intuitions in question, so it suffices to undermine arguments like the one 
derived from Mayerfeld above. 
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 For instance, a desire theorist could account for pro-hedonist life comparison 
intuitions by proposing that only satisfactions of intrinsic desires have positive prudential 
value in themselves, and that we take the more pleasurable life in this comparison to be 
higher in welfare only because we so often have intrinsic desires for pleasure. On this 
account, we mistakenly assign intrinsic prudential value to pleasure because of its repeat 
association with the real source of welfare, intrinsic desire-satisfaction. In light of this 
alternative, we would not be justified in accepting that our intrinsic prudential intuitions 
about this comparison is the product of prudential insight. 
 This criticism misses the mark, because the case for BPH does not rely on any 
appeal to intrinsic prudential intuition. The only appeal to prudential intuition that I make 
on behalf of BPH in this dissertation comes in chapter 1, where I propose that it paints a 
recognizable picture of a life that is good for its subject under normal material and 
psychological circumstances. There, I claimed that BPH assigns intrinsic prudential value 
to things that it is prima facie plausible to think have an impact on our welfare, and that it 
vindicates the commonsense idea that it is generally to a person’s benefit to have mutually 
rewarding relationships, success at worthwhile activities, strong moral character, and 
freedom from sickness, injury, and subjugation by others. I was attempting to elicit 
prudential intuitions from the reader with this, but these need not be intuitions about 
what has intrinsic prudential value. They need only be intuitions to the effect that 
pleasure, pain, mutually rewarding relationships, success at worthwhile activities, strong 
moral character, and freedom from sickness, injury, and subjugation by others have 
instrumental prudential value under normal life circumstances. 
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 In other words, at the outset of my case for BPH, we need only agree that the things 
listed here are closely tied to the real sources of intrinsic prudential value, whatever those 
may be. If the reader is willing to grant this, then no further appeal to prudential intuition, 
intrinsic or otherwise, is strictly necessary. My strategy from there is to argue that BPH 
survives various descriptive and evaluative objections, and finally, is preferable to its 
rivals because it is simpler (see chapter 4). 
 Critics are unlikely to be satisfied by this response. They will surely reply: even if 
you don’t appeal to intrinsic prudential intuition at any point, another version of the 
undermining strategy can be used against the prudential intuitions you do appeal to—
namely those underlying your claims about what counts as a recognizable picture of a life 
that is good for its subject under normal material and psychological circumstances. 
 This version of the self-defeat charge is more difficult to rebut. As I said earlier, 
the undermining strategy rests on a general principle about hypotheses: that given two 
competing hypotheses about the same phenomena, and no decisive reason to favor one 
over the other, we rationally ought to suspend judgment between them. If that’s right, 
then the fact that I don’t rely on appeal to intrinsic prudential intuition is irrelevant. All a 
critic would need to undermine the case for BPH is a plausible alternative hypothesis 
about the prudential intuitions I do appeal to, on which those intuitions lack any 
epistemically substantive connection to the truth about welfare. For example, they could 
offer a skeptical hypothesis on which no positive theory of welfare is correct, and our 
prudential intuitions are just byproducts of desires (for friendship, achievement, and so 
on) which are themselves byproducts of evolution. They would not even need to endorse 
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this hypothesis; the point would just be that something precisely analogous to my own 
undermining strategy can be used against me. 
 To resist this line of attack, I need a principled basis for the idea that my opponents’ 
appeals to intrinsic prudential intuition can be undermined in the manner I proposed, 
while my own appeals to (not necessarily intrinsic) prudential intuition cannot. 
Fortunately, I have a principle in mind for this. It is the principle of phenomenal 
conservatism: 
Phenomenal Conservatism (PC): If it seems to S that p, then, in absence of defeaters, 
S thereby has some degree of justification for believing that p. (Huemer 2007: p. 
30.) 
 
At first glance, this principle appears to be most congenial to my opponents. If PC is right, 
and the intrinsic prudential intuitions that anti-hedonists appeal to are seemings in the 
relevant sense, then (in the absence of defeaters) we are justified in accepting their anti-
hedonist conclusions. The burden of proof would then be on me to supply defeaters—that 
is, positive reasons to believe that those intuitions are false—or admit defeat myself. 
 This appearance dissolves when we consider what it must mean for it to “seem” 
to S that p. According to Huemer (2001: p. 9), the author of this principle, the seemings 
referred to by PC are conscious, propositional mental states. So, when it seems to S that p, 
S is in a conscious mental state with propositional content p. But that’s not all. On 
Huemer’s view, seemings are also non-belief, non-inferential states. So, when it seems to 
S that p, S’s seeming that p is not a conscious instance of a preexisting belief that p, nor is 
it the product of S inferring p from any other proposition. 
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 Without these latter stipulations, PC would grant prima facie justification to 
everything one happens to consciously believe, and to every conscious belief that one 
infers from preexisting beliefs. One could accept a version of PC without these restrictions, 
and if any anti-hedonists are so inclined, then they will not be convinced by what remains 
of my defense of the undermining strategy. But I think this would make for an overly 
permissive epistemic principle. So, in what follows, I will adopt Huemer’s understanding 
of “it seems to S that p”. 
 Now notice that, on the pro-hedonist hypothesis, our anti-hedonist intrinsic 
prudential intuitions are not seemings in the relevant sense, nor are they based on such 
seemings. Instead, they are the products of tacit inferences from preexisting beliefs about 
what is intrinsically good for us. These beliefs, meanwhile, are not grounded in seemings 
with the corresponding propositional contents. According to the pro-hedonist hypothesis, 
the only intrinsic prudential intuitions that could count as seemings in the relevant sense 
are those that favor prudential hedonism. In other words, on my hypothesis, it never 
seems to us (in the relevant sense) that anything other than pleasure is good for us in itself, 
or that anything other than pain is bad for us in itself. All other intrinsic prudential 
intuitions are either conscious instances of unconsciously-formed beliefs, or the products 
of inference from such beliefs, and are therefore not the kinds of mental states to which 
PC grants prima facie justification. 
 What about the prudential intuitions underlying my claims in chapter 1 about 
pictures of lives that good for their subjects? If PC and the pro-hedonist hypothesis are 
both right, can these intuitions provide even initial justification for taking BPH seriously? 
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 I believe so. On the view I am sketching, seemings confer prima facie justification 
on the beliefs that pleasure and pain have prudential value. As long as this justification 
can extend to other propositions via valid inference, we can become justified in believing 
that the other items mentioned in my sketch of a life that is good for its subject—mutually 
rewarding relationships, success at worthwhile activities, and so on—are at least 
instrumentally prudentially valuable under normal life circumstances. We would only 
need to recognize the ways that these things are typically correlated with pleasure and 
pain, and infer accordingly. And it is consistent with both PC and the pro-hedonist 
hypothesis to suppose that this is what is happening (subconsciously) when we find that 
some theory paints a recognizable picture of a life that is good for its subject under normal 
material and psychological circumstances. 
 Admittedly, my line of reasoning has become somewhat convoluted here. So let’s 
review once more. I have argued that evaluative objections to BPH rely on appeal to 
intrinsic prudential intuition, and I have given a pro-hedonist hypothesis to undermine 
these objections. My hypothetical critics claim that this approach is self-defeating, because 
the case for BPH must also rely on appeal to intrinsic prudential intuition, and so an 
analogous strategy could be used against it. I reply that the case for BPH does not rely on 
intrinsic prudential intuition. However, I admit that it relies on appeal to prudential 
intuition of a sort. For my overarching argument in this dissertation to get off the ground, 
the reader must share certain intuitions about what counts as a recognizable picture of a 
life that is good for its subject under normal material and psychological circumstances. 
The hypothetical critic responds that an analogous version of my undermining strategy 
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could be used against these intuitions. To rebut this charge of self-defeat, I need a 
principled basis for the claim that the undermining strategy works against my opponents’ 
appeals to intuition, but not my own. For this, I propose PC. If both PC and the pro-
hedonist hypothesis are right, then my appeals to prudential intuition are ultimately 
based in the seemings that confer prima facie justification, while those of my opponents are 
not. 
 I expect that critics—perhaps somewhat exasperated at this point—will reply that 
I have given no positive reason to believe that either PC or the pro-hedonist hypothesis 
are true. This is correct. I have only floated them as possibilities. But the mere fact that this 
combination is available to the basic prudential hedonist, and is not clearly implausible, 
means that opponents must do more than give arguments relying on appeal to intrinsic 
prudential intuition. They need to give us some reason, independent of these intuitions, 
to believe that we have strong prudential insight. One way to do this would be to find a 
direct route to the truth about what has prudential value in itself that circumvents appeal 
to intuition altogether. Alternatively, critics could find some implausible implication of 
the pro-hedonist hypothesis that has escaped my notice, or give an argument against PC. 
In any case, the project of showing that things other than hedonic states have intrinsic 
prudential value will be more complicated than many have thought. 
3.3 More Evaluative Objections 
In §3.1, I developed the undermining strategy in the context of arguments to the 
effect that some things other than hedonic states have intrinsic prudential value. I will 
now apply versions of this strategy to other sorts of evaluative objections. In §3.3.1, I will 
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discuss two evaluative objections to the calculation thesis. And in §3.3.2, I will discuss an 
objection that concerns both the evaluative thesis and the phenomenological thesis. In this 
last section, in addition to applying a version of the undermining strategy, I will respond 
with an evaluative objection of my own. 
3.3.1 Evaluative Arguments Against the Calculation Thesis 
 Roger Crisp, a fellow prudential hedonist, rejects the calculation thesis: 
Calculation Thesis: All pleasures have magnitudes that are quantifiable (in 
principle, using cardinal numbers) and fully commensurable; the same is true of 
pains. 
 
He claims that there are discontinuities in the hedonic calculus, in the form of quality 
distinctions among pleasures. These quality distinctions are such that for two pleasures 
of disparate quality, X and Y, any amount of lower-quality pleasure X will never contain 
as much pleasure as higher-quality pleasure Y. Crisp argues for this on evaluative 
grounds, using the following thought experiment: 
Haydn and the Oyster. You are a soul in heaven waiting to be allocated a life on 
Earth. It is late Friday afternoon, and you watch anxiously as the supply of 
available lives dwindles. When your turn comes, the angel in charge offers you a 
choice between two lives, that of the composer Joseph Haydn and that of an oyster. 
Besides composing some wonderful music and influencing the evolution of the 
symphony, Haydn will meet with success and honour in his own lifetime, be 
cheerful and popular, travel, and gain much enjoyment from field sports. The 
oyster's life is far less exciting. Though this is rather a sophisticated oyster, its life 
will consist only of mild sensual pleasure, rather like that experienced by humans 
when floating very drunk in a warm bath. When you request the life of Haydn, 
the angel sighs, ‘I'll never get rid of this oyster life. It's been hanging around for 
ages. Look, I'll offer you a special deal. Haydn will die at the age of seventy-seven. 
But I'll make the oyster life as long as you like’. (Crisp 2006: p. 112) 
 
The idea here is that no matter how long the oyster life lasts, it will never be as high in 
welfare as the life of Haydn. This poses a threat to prudential hedonism, because a long 
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enough oyster life will have to contain more pleasure than Haydn’s life. Unless, that is, 
we posit quality distinctions among pleasures. Then we can accept that Haydn’s life is 
higher in welfare than the oyster’s, no matter how long the latter lasts, while affirming 
that this is so precisely because Haydn’s life is higher in total pleasure. After all, if Haydn’s 
life contains higher-quality pleasures (from achievement, success, relationships, and so 
on), then no amount of mild sensual pleasure will ever be able to match it, let alone exceed 
it. But if there are such quality distinctions among pleasures, then not all pleasure 
magnitudes are commensurable with one another, which means the calculation thesis is 
false, and so BPH is false. 
 This argument is similar to the ones discussed in §3.1, in that it presents a 
comparison between two hypothetical lives that are described so as to elicit an intuition 
to the effect that one life has something of intrinsic prudential value that the other lacks. 
In this case, however, that thing is not something that is present in one life and wholly 
absent from the other; instead, it is something that exists at a certain level of quality in one 
life and not the other. Both lives contains lots of pleasure, but Haydn’s life has pleasures 
of higher quality. 
 Despite this difference, Crisp’s argument can be rebutted in much the same way 
as the objections discussed in §3.1. It shares the same basic structure as those arguments: 
P1. If Life A is higher in welfare than Life B, then Theory X is false. 
 P2. Life A is higher in welfare than Life B. 
 C. Theory X is false. 
 





P1. If Haydn’s life is higher in welfare than the oyster life, then BPH is false. 
 P2. Haydn’s life is higher in welfare than the oyster life. 
 C. BPH is false. 
 
Once again, the crucial premise is P2. And P2 is being supported by nothing but an appeal 
to intrinsic prudential intuition. Hence it relies on the assumption of strong prudential 
insight. All we need to undermine it is a plausible alternative hypothesis that is 
compatible with BPH. 
Can the pro-hedonist hypothesis do the job? If we stipulate that the two lives are 
equal in net pleasure, then yes: the pro-hedonist hypothesis predicts the intuition that 
Haydn’s life is higher in welfare than the oyster’s. This is because the former contains the 
likes of achievement and (presumably) friendship—things strongly correlated with net 
pleasure for people in general that are neither activities usually done for some external 
end nor instrumental by definition—which the oyster life lacks completely. 
However, this case is not quite so simple. Crisp adds the wrinkle that the oyster’s 
life may last long enough to be indefinitely higher in net pleasure than Haydn’s. The pro-
hedonist hypothesis, as given earlier, makes no firm prediction about comparisons 
structured this way, because it tells us nothing about how we will weigh different 
purported sources of intrinsic prudential value, such as achievement and pleasure, 
against one another. But we can handle this with just a bit more psychological speculation. 
Here’s one way that might go. Crisp describes the oyster life as consisting of an 
indefinitely long period of “mild sensual pleasure, rather like that experienced by humans 
when floating very drunk in a warm bath.” It could be that, when we are subconsciously 
forming judgments about the amounts of welfare in compared lives, we apply a 
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“monotony threshold”, such that there is only so high in welfare a life can be when its 
pleasures are all taken in the same sort of object or experience. To exceed this level of 
welfare, the life must be more varied in its sources of pleasure. The psychological roots of 
this could reside in the fact that monotony is strongly correlated with unpleasant 
experience. After all, as pleasant as a drunken bath can be, there inevitably comes a time 
when you want to sober up and dry off. 
Again, this is only a psychological hypothesis. But it is consistent with BPH being 
true, accounts for the intuition in question, and has no implausible implications that I can 
see. If my assessment of it is right, then it establishes that we are not justified in accepting 
Crisp’s version of P2. So his argument fails, and the calculation thesis is safe. 
 Crisp’s example places the focus on allegedly higher-quality pleasures, such as 
those of achievement. Another approach to arguing for quality distinctions among 
pleasures is to argue for the qualitative inferiority of immoral pleasures. Feldman (2006: 
p. 39) helpfully provides a vivid example: 
Suppose some terrorist really hates children. Suppose he sets off a bomb at a 
playground, and then watches the news on TV. When he sees the suffering 
children choking and gasping and bleeding, and learns of the many injuries and 
deaths, this terrorist feels a thrill of pleasure. His pleasure is caused by the misery 
of his victims. 
 
Suppose the terrorist does this many times over, and each time is delighted by the 
fruits of his labor. Suppose at the same time that his life is not filled with 
counterbalancing pains. 
 
For the sake of precision, we should imagine this life in contrast with a life equal in net 
pleasure, with pleasures all taken in morally neutral activities. BPH implies that these 
lives would be equal in welfare. But we may find it intuitive that the terrorist’s life is lower 
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in welfare than its counterpart. At the same time, we may find it intuitive that the 
terrorist’s life is higher in welfare than a life with no pleasure, friendship, achievement, 
etc. at all, suggesting that immoral pleasures are not prudentially worthless. If these 
intuitions are correct, then calculating the amount of positive prudential value in a life is 
not simply a matter of adding up pleasure magnitudes, meaning that the calculation thesis 
is false, and so BPH is false. 
 Fortunately, the pro-hedonist hypothesis can account for these intuitions. 
Immorality is strongly correlated with net pain—via the pangs of conscience and social 
censure—for people in general (the occasional sadist or unrepentant murderer 
notwithstanding); hence the pro-hedonist hypothesis predicts that we will assign it 
negative intrinsic prudential value, albeit perhaps only subconsciously. This negative 
value partially offsets the positive value provided by the terrorist’s pleasure, which 
accounts for the intuition that the terrorist’s life is lower in welfare than one that is equal 
in net pleasure but morally sound. At the same time, it may be that the negative prudential 
value we assign to the terrorist’s immorality is lower than the positive prudential value 
that we assign to his pleasure (provided that the pleasure is stipulated to be sufficiently 
intense—and Feldman does describe the terrorist as thrilled and delighted). This would 
explain why we have the intuition that the terrorist’s life is better than a prudentially 
neutral one. 
 What if we allowed the terrorist’s life to be indefinitely long, as Crisp did with the 
oyster? BPH would then imply that the terrorist’s life is higher in welfare than its morally 
neutral counterpart. Once again, I would speculate that there is, in our minds, a monotony 
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threshold, such that there is only so good the terrorist’s life can be when his pleasures all 
come from schadenfreude.  
3.3.2 The Resonance Constraint 
In chapter 2, I argued for the phenomenological thesis: 
Phenomenological Thesis: All pleasures are mental states that feel the same way in 
some respect, and it is this common feeling that makes them count as pleasures; 
the same is true of pains. 
 
This thesis implies that feeling pleasure or pain is just a matter of tokening a certain 
phenomenal property. Contrary to the attitudinal theories of hedonic states canvassed in 
the previous chapter, the phenomenological thesis allows that you can be in a hedonic 
state without holding any attitude toward any part of your present state of consciousness. 
For example, it implies that you can feel pleasure without wanting to feel what you are 
feeling. Furthermore, the phenomenological thesis allows that you can have a 
disfavorable attitude toward an occurrent pleasure, or a favorable attitude toward an 
occurrent pain. It implies that you can feel pleasure, have no favorable attitude toward 
that pleasure, and strongly want that pleasure not to be occurring. You can also feel pain, 
have no disfavorable attitude toward that pain, and strongly want it to be occurring. And 
these desires can be intrinsic, i.e. directed entirely at how those particular hedonic states 
feel. 
 The evaluative thesis, meanwhile, says that all pleasures have intrinsic positive 
prudential value, and all pains have negative intrinsic prudential value. The conjunction 
of this and the phenomenological thesis implies that something can have intrinsic 
prudential value for you, positive or negative, irrespective of your attitudes toward it (if 
106 
 
indeed you have any). More specifically, it implies that each of your pleasures is 
intrinsically prudentially good for you even when you have no attitude, or an intrinsically 
disfavorable attitude, toward it; and that each of your pains is intrinsically prudentially 
bad for you even when you have no attitude, or an intrinsically favorable attitude, toward 
it. 
Moreover, the phenomenological and evaluative theses together imply that your 
attitudes, in themselves, make no difference to how a given hedonic state affects your 
welfare. According to BPH, two hedonic states of equal intensity and duration are of equal 
intrinsic prudential value, even if you strongly favor one and strongly disfavor the other. 
In short (and less formally), your pleasures are just as intrinsically good for you whether 
you like them or not, and your pains are just as intrinsically bad for you whether you like 
them or not. 
In this way, BPH runs afoul of what has been called the “resonance constraint” on 
theories of welfare (or theories of value more generally).32 There is disagreement about 
exactly how to formulate this constraint, but the basic idea is set out in an oft-cited passage 
from Railton (1986: p. 9): 
Is it true that all normative judgments must find an internal resonance in those to 
whom they are applied? While I do not find this thesis convincing as a claim about 
 
32 Dorsey (2011: p. 185) and Bramble (2016: p. 85) use the exact phrase “resonance constraint”. The 
use of the term “resonance” in this way appears to originate with Railton (1986: p. 9). In that same 
paper, Railton uses the phrase “internalist constraint” in much the way Dorsey and Bramble use 
“resonance constraint”. Rosati (1996: p. 303) also defends what she calls an “internalist constraint”; 
in this connection she cites the aforementioned Railton (1986) as well as Darwall (1983: pp. 54-55), 
from whom she borrows the phrase “existence internalism”, which is the view that “there is a 
necessary connection between motivation and normative status” (Rosati 1996: p. 297). See also 
Velleman (1998) and Hawkins (forthcoming). I prefer the language of resonance over that of 
internalism here because “internalism” is used for so many different things in philosophy. 
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all species of normative assessment, it does seem to me to capture an important 
feature of the concept of intrinsic value to say that what is intrinsically valuable 
for a person must have a connection with what he would find in some degree 
compelling or attractive, at least if he were rational and aware. It would be an 
intolerably alienated conception of someone’s good to imagine that it might fail in 
any such way to engage him. 
 
Railton proposes a that in order for something to be intrinsically good for you, it must 
have an “internal resonance” for you, meaning that it must be something you find 
compelling or attractive—if not under the actual circumstances, then at least under some 
ideal circumstances. If this is right, then it serves as a constraint on theories of welfare: if 
a theory allows that something can be intrinsically good for you without “resonating” for 
you in this way, then it gives “an intolerably alienated conception of someone’s good”, 
and is therefore to be rejected. 
Thus Railton provides one example of a “resonance constraint”. And it is a useful 
example, because although it is about as forgiving as such a constraint could be—it allows 
that something can be good for you even if you don’t find it compelling or attractive under 
any of your actual circumstance—BPH still fails to meet it. As long as “internal resonance” 
is understood to require some actual or counterfactual attitude, motivation, or indeed 
anything other than phenomenology, BPH will allow that something—namely, 
pleasure—can be intrinsically good for you without resonating. If there is a corresponding 
constraint on the negative side, to the effect that something can be intrinsically bad for 
you only if you find it non-compelling or unattractive (at least under some ideal 
circumstances), then BPH will fail to meet that as well. 
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The question, then, is what reason we have to accept the resonance constraint. It is 
not self-evident, or a logical truth, so we will need to see it applied to examples. The 
starkest sort of example would be a life comparison structured like those discussed in §3.1. 
For this, we could imagine two lives that are as identical as possible with respect to 
everything that might be intrinsically good for us (without necessarily being resonant in 
the relevant sense); pleasure, achievement, and friendship might be examples. Then, we 
could imagine that in one life all of these things are resonant, whereas in the other life, 
none of them are. We would then have a life comparison argument for the resonance 
constraint, with a familiar structure: 
P1. If the resonant life is higher in welfare than the non-resonant life, then theories 
that reject the resonance constraint (such as BPH) are false. 
 
 P2. The resonant life is higher in welfare than the non-resonant life. 
 
C. Theories that reject the resonance constraint (such as BPH) are false. 
 
I suspect that whether people have the intuition that the resonant life is higher in welfare 
than the non-resonant life will depend on what exactly resonance entails. Railton says that 
“what is intrinsically valuable for a person must have a connection with what he would 
find in some degree compelling or attractive, at least if he were rational and aware.” This 
leaves open the possibility that something can be resonant for you even if you don’t find 
it compelling or attractive under the actual circumstances in which you have it. In that 
case, the comparison could be between two people who find nothing in their lives 
compelling or attractive. The difference would be that one of them would find various 
things in his life compelling or attractive if he were rational and aware, whereas the other 
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would not. And yet the two lives would still be equal in pleasure, friendship, achievement, 
and so on. I find this sort of example difficult to imagine. Consequently, the claim that 
people in general would have the intuition that the resonant life is higher in welfare in 
this comparison strikes me as doubtful. 
On the other hand, suppose we imagine that the person living the resonant life 
actually does find their pleasures, achievements, friendships, etc. compelling and 
attractive. In that case, it strikes me as much more probable that people in general would 
have the intuition that the resonant life is higher in welfare. But then this is precisely what 
the pro-hedonist hypothesis would predict. This is because the resonant life will be higher 
in something that is strongly correlated with net pleasure for people in general, without 
being instrumental by definition or an activity usually done for some external end: 
satisfaction of intrinsic desires. In this case, then, the standard undermining strategy 
works. 
But suppose that some proponent of the resonance constraint utterly rejected the 
legitimacy of the undermining strategy. In that case, I would fight fire with fire, and give 
an intuition-based evaluative objection to the constraint itself. Here is that objection. 
Recall that resonance must involve some non-phenomenological element. 
Otherwise, there is not necessarily any conflict between the resonance constraint and BPH. 
Given the connection between phenomenology and awareness (see §2.2.1), it follows that 
it is at least logically possible for the experience of possessing a resonating good to be 
phenomenally identical to, and therefore subjectively indistinguishable from, the 
experience of possessing that same thing without resonance. 
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Before I explain why this is troublesome for the resonance constraint, here is an 
illustration. Suppose that one way for something to resonate for you is for you to have a 
favorable attitude toward it, for its own sake, while you have it. Further suppose that part 
of what it means to have a favorable attitude toward something for its own sake while 
you have it is to be disposed, under certain conditions, to act so as to keep it. A behavioral 
disposition is not a phenomenal property, of course, so this would mean that resonance is 
at least partly non-phenomenal. It follows that it is logically possible for you to have 
something in a resonant way at t1, and to have that same thing in a non-resonant way at t2, 
without there being any difference between your conscious experience at t1 and your 
conscious experience at t2. 
For example, suppose you experience the taste of root beer at both t1 and t2, but 
you only have a resonance-producing favorable attitude toward that taste at t1. It is 
nonetheless possible for your total conscious experience at t1 to be exactly the same as it is 
at t2. Perhaps your experience at t1 includes some phenomenology associated with the 
favorable attitude toward the taste of root beer; if so, then this too would be replicated at 
t2, even though at t2 the attitude is absent. Again, so long as having the favorable attitude 
in question is not simply a matter of tokening a certain phenomenal property, this will 
remain a logical possibility. The upshot is that you are having a resonating experience at 
t1—an experience that meets the resonance constraint, and is therefore a prima facie 
candidate for being intrinsically good for you—and a non-resonating experience at t2, and 
to you these feel absolutely identical. 
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If there is an equivalent to the resonance constraint on the negative side—it would 
certainly be a puzzling asymmetry if there weren’t—then the same point would apply, 
mutatis mutandis. Let’s call the corresponding phenomenon “anti-resonance”, and 
suppose that it involves having a disfavorable attitude toward something, for its own 
sake, while you have it. Now, for example, suppose you experience an intense pinching 
sensation at both t1 and t2, but you only have an anti-resonance-producing disfavorable 
attitude toward that sensation at t1. It is nonetheless possible for your total conscious 
experience at t2 to be exactly the same as it is at t1. Perhaps your experience at t1 includes 
some phenomenology associated with the disfavorable attitude toward the pinching 
sensation; if so, then this too is replicated at t2, even though the attitude is absent. The 
upshot is that you are having an anti-resonating experience at t1—an experience that meets 
the anti-resonance constraint, and is therefore a prima facie candidate for being intrinsically 
bad for you—and a non-anti-resonating experience at t2, but to you they feel absolutely 
identical. 
It follows that if the resonance constraint is right, then it is possible for you to have 
an experience that is subjectively identical to a euphoric, resonant pleasure, without that 
experience actually being resonant for you, and therefore without it actually being 
intrinsically good for you. It also follows that it is possible for you to have an experience 
that is subjectively identical to an agonizing, anti-resonant pain, without that experience 
actually being anti-resonant for you, and therefore without it actually being intrinsically 




You are in the hospital for an operation that will require you to be placed in a 
medically induced coma. Before the operation, you are told (correctly) that thanks 
to advances in brain-stimulation technology, you can now choose what, if 
anything, you would like to feel while on the operating table. You have three 
options, nicknamed “heaven”, “hell”, and “limbo”. 
 
On the “heaven” option, you will feel nothing but euphoric emotional pleasure, as 
if you are simply overjoyed to be alive. On the “hell” option, you will feel nothing 
but agonizing emotional pain. Finally, on the “limbo” option, you will have no 
qualitative experience whatsoever. 
 
All three options begin with a hedonically neutral procedure that renders you 
temporarily unable to form favorable or disfavorable attitudes. For the duration of 
the operation, you will have no desires, preferences, likes, or dislikes. This will 
have no effect on what, if anything, you feel. If you choose the heaven or hell 
options, you will still feel exactly as though you have favorable or disfavorable 
attitudes toward various aspects of your situation, respectively. 
 
Finally, upon completion of the operation, you will have no memory of whatever 
experiences you had (if any). 
 
The resonance and anti-resonance constraints together imply that, as far as your welfare 
is concerned, your choice among these three options would be objectively arbitrary. All 
three would have the same effect on the goodness of your life for you, which is to say no 
effect at all. Without the capacity to form attitudes, the pleasures of the heaven option 
could not resonate for you, and the pains of the hell option could not anti-resonate for 
you. This makes absolutely no difference to how they would feel—they would seem just 
as heavenly or hellish either way. But the effect of either option on your welfare would be 
nil, just as it would be if you chose limbo. 
Now, suppose that instead of being presented with these options yourself, a 
hospital employee, a stranger to you, is given the task of choosing among them on your 
behalf. You are never even informed that these options exist. If the resonance and anti-
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resonance constraints are right, then considerations of your welfare cannot give this 
employee any objective reason to choose one option over another. If there is any moral 
reason for this employee to choose the heaven option for you, or at least refrain from 
choosing the hell option, this reason cannot have anything to do with harming or 
benefitting you. Each option harms and benefits you exactly the same, which is not at all. 
It strikes me as intuitively obvious that there is a reason, grounded in your welfare, 
for you to choose heaven rather than hell or limbo in the first case, and for the employee 
to choose heaven rather than hell or limbo for you in the second. I expect that the reader 
will agree. If so, then we can agree that the resonance constraint leads to deeply 
counterintuitive conclusions about this scenario. (If the reader does not agree, then I don’t 
know what more to say.) 
This argument relies on appeal to intrinsic prudential intuition, and so is, in my 
estimation, vulnerable to a version of the undermining strategy. But if a proponent of the 
resonance constraint responded this way, they would be granting the legitimacy of this 
strategy, which could then be used against arguments for the resonance constraint itself. 
3.4 Conclusion 
I know of no evaluative objection to BPH that does not ultimately depend on our 
being justified in believing that we have strong prudential insight. But the claim of our 
having such insight is undermined by the availability, and plausibility, of the pro-
hedonist hypothesis. I conclude that all such objections leave BPH unscathed. 
 So far, then, I have argued that BPH is fundamentally appealing, and that it 
survives a battery of descriptive and evaluative objections that many have thought 
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decisive. In the following chapter, I will attempt to show that in addition to being 





















Thus far, my discussion of basic prudential hedonism (BPH) has been entirely 
defensive. In chapter 1, I proposed that BPH is one among several theories of welfare that 
paints a recognizable picture of a life that is good for its subject under normal material 
and psychological circumstances; in chapters 2 and 3, I argued that BPH survives various 
descriptive and evaluative objections. If these arguments have been successful, then I have 
fought opponents of BPH to a standstill. 
I would like to argue that BPH is not only defensible, but is in fact the best theory 
of welfare on offer. Unfortunately, the options for this are severely limited. Any positive 
argument for BPH based on appeal to prudential intuition would be vulnerable to the 
same sort of undermining strategy I used in defense of BPH in chapter 3. (This is why I 
do not regard my intuitive argument against the “resonance constraint” in §3.3.3 to be 
especially persuasive). And aside from unrestricted actualist desire theories (see §1.2.2), 
none of BPH’s rivals are logically inconsistent or otherwise incoherent in any way that I 
can discern. However, BPH does appear to have one distinct advantage over its main 
competitors: its simplicity. 
 I suspect that the apparent simplicity of prudential hedonism is a large part of 
what attracts the few adherents it has. This is certainly true in my case. Yet hedonists 
rarely cite simplicity as an advantage of their view explicitly. Moen (2016: p. 278, 
emphases mine) is an exception: 
…if the suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values are potentially explainable by 
appeal to just pleasure and pain . . . then—by appeal to Occam’s razor—we have at 
least a pro tanto reason to resist the introduction of any further intrinsic values and 
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disvalues. It is ontologically more costly to posit a plurality of intrinsic values and 
disvalues, so in case all values admit of explanation by reference to a single 
intrinsic value and a single intrinsic disvalue, we have reason to reject more 
complicated accounts. 
 
But that is all he says on the matter. Moen does not explain how theories of welfare that 
introduce non-hedonic intrinsic values are more complex, or ontologically costly, in a way 
that gives us reason to reject them. This is understandable. The philosophical literature on 
theoretical simplicity, which exists almost entirely outside of value theory, is large and 
vexing. Meanwhile, many readers may already share an intuitive sense of which theories 
of welfare are simpler and why this simplicity is desirable, making further discussion of 
these things both philosophically risky and rhetorically unnecessary. But given that, in 
my estimation, the positive case for accepting BPH as the best all-things-considered theory 
of welfare rests on its purported simplicity, closer examination of these points is in order. 
My exploration of this topic will not be very ambitious. I will not attempt to settle 
any fundamental philosophical questions about simplicity. What I will do is outline an 
argument for the claim that the simplicity of BPH gives us epistemic—not merely aesthetic 
or pragmatic—reason to accept it. The reason I propose is that where all else is 
epistemically equal, simpler theories are more likely to be true. This argument relies on 
some contentious assumptions, full defense of which would take us beyond the scope of 
this dissertation. I will note these assumptions when they appear, and try to explain why 
I find them reasonable. My main contribution here will be to provide a clearer sense of 
what must be true for this sort of argument to work, especially in defense of a theory of 
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welfare; and thereby to highlight the points that stand most in need of further support for 
this approach to be made wholly convincing. 
 The structure of the chapter is as follows. In §4.1, I propose a specific criterion of 
simplicity, and explain how—with the help of some auxiliary assumptions—a theory 
being simpler by this standard gives us an epistemic reason to accept it, all else being 
epistemically equal. In §4.2, I argue that BPH is simpler than its rivals by this standard, 
and therefore—given the assumptions discussed in the previous section—is more likely 
to be true. Finally, in §4.3, I address some challenges to the position sketched in the 
previous sections. 
4.1 Syntactic Simplicity and Epistemic Probability 
4.1.1 A Syntactic Criterion of Theoretical Simplicity 
It is infamously difficult to explain what makes one theory simpler than another, 
and why, all else being equal, simplicity is good. As Sober (2001: pp. 14-15) points out, 
seeking simplicity is always matter of minimizing the number of something; but what is 
being minimized in the name of simplicity can differ from one philosopher or context to 
another. There are, at minimum, two senses in which one theory may be simpler than 
another: an ontological sense, in which the simpler theory posits the existence of fewer 
entities, causes, or properties; and a syntactic sense, in which the simpler theory 
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minimizes the number of fundamental propositions it contains.33 The criterion of 
simplicity I propose is a syntactic one: 
Simplicity: One theory, T1, is simpler than another, T2, if and only if T1 contains 
fewer fundamental claims than T2, where a claim is fundamental iff it is: 
(a) A non-vacuously quantified first-order proposition containing no 
singular terms. 
(b) Not logically equivalent to a conjunction of non-vacuously quantified 
first-order propositions containing no singular terms. 
(c) Not entailed by other propositions within the theory. 
 
Fundamental claims, by this definition, are claims like “all pleasures have positive 
intrinsic prudential value” and “all frustrations of informed desires have negative 
intrinsic prudential value”. 
Non-fundamental claims would include propositions to the effect that some token 
thing, such as a particular pleasure, has positive intrinsic prudential value. Such 
propositions would be unquantified, and contain at least one singular term referring to 
the token pleasure. If these non-quantified propositions were fundamental, then every 
theory would contain an infinite number of fundamental claims. It may be that one infinite 
set of fundamental claims can be smaller in size than another infinite set, by dint of some 
mathematical facts beyond my comprehension, but I suggest we avoid this complication 
altogether by counting only quantified claims as fundamental. 
Notably, claims such as “all and only pleasures have positive intrinsic prudential 
value” are also non-fundamental. This is because claims of this form are universally 
 
33 To my knowledge, the main exponent of the syntactic approach to simplicity has been Nelson 
Goodman, though his view is that to assess a theory’s simplicity is to assess the structure of its 
system of primitive predicates. For a relatively accessible introduction see Goodman (1958). 
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quantified biconditionals, which are logically equivalent to conjunctions of universally 
quantified conditionals. Let P stand for the predicate “is a pleasure”, and V stand for the 
predicate “has positive intrinsic prudential value”. The proposition “all and only 
pleasures have positive intrinsic prudential value” can be written as follows: 
(∀x)(Px≡Vx) 
This is one non-vacuously quantified first-order proposition. But it is a biconditional, and 
is therefore logically equivalent to a conjunction: 
(∀x)(Px⸧Vx) & (∀x)(Vx⸧Px) 
Condition (b) in the above definition effectively demands that the biconditional be 
expressed as a conjunction, while (a) demands that each conjunct be counted as a separate 
fundamental claim (as the conjunction itself is not a quantified proposition). 
This is important, because without these demands, a theory that assigns intrinsic 
prudential value to fewer things would not ipso facto be any simpler than a theory that 
assigns such value to more. As we have just seen, it takes two fundamental claims to 
express the idea that exactly one type of thing, pleasure, has positive intrinsic prudential 
value. What about a theory that assigns such value to two types of things—pleasure and 
autonomy? Let A stand for the predicate “is an instance of autonomy”. Without condition 
(b), we could express this part of the theory in just two fundamental claims also: 
(∀x)[(Px v Ax) ⸧Vx], (∀x)[Vx⸧(Px v Ax)] 
But notice that (∀x)[(Px v Ax) ⸧Vx] is also equivalent to a conjunction of two non-
vacuously quantified first-order propositions: 
(∀x)(Px⸧Vx) & (∀x)(Ax⸧Vx) 
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Hence the criterion of simplicity I have proposed vindicates the notion that assigning 
intrinsic prudential value to more things makes a theory of welfare more complex. 
 Condition (c), meanwhile, excludes redundant claims by removing propositions 
that are entailed by others in the same theory. This ensures that nothing gets double-
counted. It also forecloses a way in which every theory could be expressed as an infinite 
number of fundamental claims. For notice that if we begin with some proposition meeting 
conditions (a) and (b), such as: 
(∀x)(Px⸧Vx) 
We can then infer another proposition meeting conditions (a) and (b), such as: 
(∀y)[(∀x)(Px⸧Vx) v By] 
From which we could then infer another proposition meeting conditions (a) and (b), such 
as: 
(∀z){(∀y)[(∀x)(Px⸧Vx) v By]} v Cz} 
And so on ad infinitum. As we’ve seen, the first of these propositions (under a certain 
interpretation) is one of BPH’s fundamental claims. Without condition (c), the choice of 
whether to count the latter two propositions as fundamental claims of BPH would be 
arbitrary, and so on for further propositions derived in the same way. With condition (c), 
we block this infinite regress before it begins. 
 I do not mean to suggest that mine is the single correct criterion of theoretical 
simplicity; only that it describes a property of sets of propositions that it is intuitive to 
regard as theoretical simplicity of a sort. Nothing substantive hangs on the use of the 
particular term “simplicity” (or related terms like “simple”, “complex”, or 
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“complicated”). Any reader who objects that “simplicity” in the context of philosophical 
theories (or theories generally) properly refers to something else may simply regard my 
use of the term as a bit of technical shorthand, replaceable by any other term they would 
prefer. 
 Why do I adopt a syntactic criterion of simplicity rather than an ontological one—
particularly in light of Moen’s emphasis on the “ontological cost” of non-hedonist welfare 
theories? The main reason is that, while it is intuitive that such theories are more complex, 
it is unclear whether theories that introduce non-hedonic intrinsic values really do thereby 
impose an ontological cost. For illustration, compare prudential hedonism to a theory that 
assigns intrinsic positive prudential value to two things, pleasure and love. This theory 
shares with prudential hedonism a commitment to the existence of pleasure, but it also 
refers to something in the world—love, whatever sort of thing that is, ontologically 
speaking—that prudential hedonism does not. In that sense the pleasure-plus-love theory 
does have a larger and therefore less simple ontology. But prudential hedonists do not 
deny the existence of love; we just deny that it has intrinsic prudential value. So declining 
to refer to it in our theory of welfare doesn’t make for a simpler ontology overall. It does, 
however, make for a simpler theory of welfare in a syntactic sense, as the pleasure-plus-
love theory contains a proposition (the one asserting the intrinsic positive prudential 
value of love) that prudential hedonism does not. 
 For the remainder of this chapter, all references to simplicity will be understood 
in terms of the syntactic criterion given above. And shortly I will attempt to show that 
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BPH is simpler than its competitors by this very standard. But first, we need some idea of 
how a theory of welfare being simpler could give us epistemic reason to accept it. 
4.1.2 Epistemic Probability 
Briefly, here is what I have in mind. For any two theories of welfare, where the 
epistemic probabilities of their fundamental claims are equal across the board (both within 
and between the theories being compared), the one that contains fewer fundamental 
claims will have a higher epistemic probability overall. So, under these conditions, we 
have epistemic reason to prefer simpler theories.34 
When I refer to the epistemic probability of a theory or claim, I am talking about 
the kind of probability at issue when we say that a claim is more or less plausible, or 
reasonable to accept, or likely to be true. Epistemic probability, in this sense, is a measure 
of how justified one would be in believing a proposition. As I understand it, epistemic 
probability is measured relative to one’s evidence. This means that if two agents are 
contemplating accepting one and the same proposition, but each agent has different 
evidence at their disposal, the epistemic probability of that proposition may well be 
different for each of them. That said, in what follows, I will assume that we are working 
from the same body of evidence.35 
 
34 Swinburne (1997) defends a view of this general sort about scientific theories. 
35 Climenhaga (2020: p. 3214) helpfully defines epistemic probability as follows, where A is some 
proposition and B is some evidence (or purported evidence) for A: 
 
The epistemic probability of A given B—notated P(A|B)—is a relation between the 
propositions B and A. It is the degree to which B supports A, or makes A plausible. 
Entailment is a limiting case of this relationship; if B entails A, then P(A|B) = 1: It constrains 
rational degrees of belief, in that, if P(A|B) = n; then someone with B as their evidence 
ought to be confident in A to degree n. 
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If you know that some proposition is a logical truth, or recognize a proposition as 
self-evident, then the epistemic probability of that proposition for you is one. If you know 
that some proposition is a logical contradiction, or you recognize some proposition as self-
evidently false, then the epistemic probability of that proposition for you is zero. Every 
other proposition (or at least every proposition that you are in a position to understand) 
has an epistemic probability somewhere in between. 
I am proposing that for any two theories of welfare, the one that contains fewer 
fundamental claims will have a higher epistemic probability in this sense. This proposal 
depends on at least two potentially contentious assumptions: 
(1) The fundamental (non-conjunctive, non-entailing) propositions of theories of 
welfare have in-principle quantifiable epistemic probabilities. 
 
(2) For any two fundamental propositions in a theory of welfare, A and B, the 
epistemic probability of (A&B) is lower than the epistemic probability of either 
A or B taken individually.36 
 
I have nothing approaching a decisive argument for either of these. But I will give some 
further explanation of each. 
(1) says that the fundamental claims made in theories of welfare have epistemic 
probabilities in the sense just given. These would be claims like “all achievement has 
positive intrinsic prudential value” and “all pain has negative intrinsic prudential value”. 
 
Achinstein (2001: pp. 96-113) is the rare philosopher who defends the notion of epistemic 
probability in an objective sense. In his view, objective epistemic probability—or objective 
reasonableness of belief—undergirds subjective epistemic probability. I see no conflict between 
this understanding of epistemic probability and what I argue in this chapter; I omit mention of it 
in the main text because it is, so far as I can tell, a fringe view (not to say an unreasonable one). 
36 By the definition I have given here, fundamental claims are non-entailing, meaning that no 
fundamental claim logically entails any other. So we need not be concerned with situations in 
which A is a subset of B or vice versa. 
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If you believe it makes sense to say that one of these propositions is more likely to be true 
than the other, or that they are about equally probable, and you mean this as something 
other than a way of expressing your levels of confidence in their truth, then you are 
already working with a concept of epistemic probability as I understand it. Now, consider 
the following claims: 
i. Your pleasures are intrinsically good for you. 
ii. Remembering your past pleasures is intrinsically good for you. 
iii. Someone else remembering their past pleasures is intrinsically good for you. 
I regard (i) as more epistemically probable than (ii), and (ii) as more epistemically 
probable than (iii). I also think that the gap in epistemic probability between (ii) and (iii) 
is much larger than the gap in epistemic probability between (i) and (ii). 
Here is why. I doubt that remembering past pleasures is intrinsically good for me. 
But I do believe that at least some of my own private mental states can be intrinsically 
good for me, namely my pleasures. My memories of my pleasures are also private mental 
states of mine, their contents concern states I regard as intrinsically valuable for me, and 
they are often pleasant to have. So while I do not think they are good for me in themselves, 
they do at least have some prominent similarities with, and close relations to, states that I 
do think are good in this way. Another person’s memories of their pleasures, by contrast, 
are inaccessible to me, do not necessarily have anything to do with me, and, not being 
mine, cannot be pleasant for me to have. They therefore do not seem in any way like the 
sorts of things that could be intrinsically good for me. 
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For these reasons, I believe that there is a gap in epistemic probability between (i) 
and (ii), and another, larger gap in epistemic probability between (ii) and (iii). If this is 
right, then in at least some cases, disparities in epistemic probability come in sizes that 
cannot be captured on a merely ordinal scale. Some kind of in-principle, non-ordinal 
quantifiability is called for. This would not show that all fundamental welfare-theoretic 
propositions have in-principle quantifiable epistemic probabilities, but is a start, and will 
have to suffice for now. 
 Assumption (2) suggests that adding fundamental claims to a theory of welfare 
lowers its total epistemic probability, while removing them raises it. This is how other sets 
of probabilistic claims behave in cases where all are above zero and below one (just think 
of multiple flips of a coin or rolls of a die). The fundamental claims of welfare theories are 
not self-evident or logically true, nor are they internally contradictory, so they do indeed 
all have epistemic probabilities above zero and below one. What (2) proposes, then, is just 
that the epistemic probabilities of these claims interact with one another as probabilities 
standardly do. 
 I have proposed that for any two theories of welfare, where the epistemic 
probabilities of their fundamental claims are equal across the board (both within and 
between the theories being compared), the one that contains fewer fundamental claims 
will have a higher epistemic probability overall. Now, if epistemic probabilities interact 
with one another as probabilities standardly do, then this will not be the only situation in 
which the simpler of two welfare theories will have the higher epistemic probability. For 
instance, in any case in which the epistemic probability values of the fundamental claims 
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of one theory form a proper subset of the epistemic probability values of the fundamental 
claims of another theory, the former, simpler theory will have the higher epistemic 
probability overall.3738 
 So why do I focus on this one sort of case, in which the fundamental claims of the 
theories being compared have epistemic probabilities that are equal across the board? 
Because I believe that this a reasonable assessment of epistemic situation before us in this 
chapter. Indeed, the goal of this dissertation so far has in effect been to create this situation 
 
37 Here’s a toy example. Suppose we are comparing two theories, T1 and T2. T1 contains exactly 
three fundamental claims, with epistemic probability values of 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3. T2 contains exactly 
four fundamental claims, with epistemic probability values of 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, and n. The epistemic 
probability values of the fundamental claims of T1 form a proper subset of the epistemic probability 
values of the fundamental claims of T2: {0.1, 0.2, 0.3} ⊂ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, n}. In this case, as long as n < 1, 
the total epistemic probability of T1 will be greater than that of T2.. 
38 What about cases in which one theory’s fundamental claims are a proper subset of another 
theory’s fundamental claims? We might think that this is a relevant sort of case, since BPH’s 
fundamental claims may appear to be a proper subset of the fundamental claims contained in any 
objective list theory that assigns positive intrinsic prudential value to pleasure, negative intrinsic 
prudential value to pain, and positive or negative intrinsic prudential value to least one other thing 
besides. For example, we might think that BPH’s fundamental claims are, or at least could be, a 
proper subset of the fundamental claims contained in an objective list theory that assigned negative 
intrinsic prudential value to all and only pain, and positive intrinsic prudential value to all and 
only pleasure and autonomy. 
But this would be incorrect. Again, let P stand for the predicate “is a pleasure”, A stand for 
the predicate “is an instance of autonomy”, and V stand for the predicate “has positive intrinsic 
prudential value”, and consider just fundamental claims about positive intrinsic prudential value. 
BPH’s fundamental claims in this area are these: 
(∀x)(Px⸧Vx), (∀x)(Vx⸧Px) 
Whereas the pleasure-plus-autonomy theory’s fundamental claims in this area are: 
(∀x)(Px⸧Vx), (∀x)(Ax⸧Vx), (∀x)[Vx⸧(Px v Ax)] 
As we can see, BPH contains a fundamental claim that the pleasure-plus-autonomy theory lacks: 
(∀x)(Vx⸧Px), i.e. the claim that only pleasure has intrinsic prudential value. The latter theory’s 
version of this claim is (∀x)[Vx⸧(Px v Ax)], i.e. the claim that only pleasure and autonomy have 
intrinsic prudential value, which does not entail (∀x)(Vx⸧Px). So BPH’s fundamental claims are 




for the reader. To see how, let’s retrace the dialectic so far with the concept of epistemic 
probability in mind. 
I began in chapter 1 with some remarks on what is fundamentally appealing about 
prudential hedonism, desire theory, and objective list theory as approaches in the 
philosophy of welfare. I proposed, with reference to specific theories belonging to these 
categories, that each approach is fundamentally appealing it that it can offer a 
recognizable picture of a life that is good for its subject under normal material and 
psychological circumstances. Initially, then, there appear to be several theories of welfare 
making sharply distinct claims about what has intrinsic prudential value that nonetheless 
have equal prima facie credibility. So, to be justified in favoring or disfavoring any of these 
theories relative to others, we need arguments. 
In chapters 2 and 3, I discussed several arguments that purport to give us reason 
to reject BPH. If successful, these arguments would (in effect) lower the epistemic 
probability of BPH relative to its rivals. For example, the experience machine argument, 
if successful, would lower the total epistemic probability of BPH by lowering the 
epistemic probability of its claim that only pleasure has positive intrinsic prudential value 
(or the claim that only pain has negative intrinsic prudential value, or both). But I believe 
that I showed these arguments to be unsuccessful. If I’m right about this, then BPH’s 
epistemic probability has emerged unscathed. This would leave us, the outset of this 
chapter, in the same epistemic position as we were at the end of chapter 1: having no 
particular reason to favor BPH over any of its main competitors or vice versa. A reasonable 
way of assessing this situation, I think, is as one in which the fundamental claims of these 
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theories have equal epistemic probabilities across the board.39 (Note, however, that the 
claim of exact equality is not strictly necessary. All of what follows works just as well so 
long as the epistemic probabilities of BPH’s fundamental claims are not lower than those 
of its rivals.) 
 In summary: if we accept (1) and (2), and if I have been successful in this 
dissertation so far, then BPH being simpler than its rivals would give us an epistemic 
reason to accept it. This brings us to the challenge of showing that BPH is indeed the 
simpler view. 
4.2 The Simplicity of Basic Prudential Hedonism 
In this section I will make a prima facie case for the claim that BPH is simpler than 
rival objective list theories, desire theories, and alternative forms of prudential hedonism. 
I do not claim to be able to make a precise count of the fundamental claims in any theory 
of welfare. But this is not necessary. It will suffice to show that, however many 
fundamental claims BPH and its rivals make, each of those rivals must contain more such 
claims than BPH does. 
4.2.1 Minimal Viability Conditions for Theories of Welfare 
Before moving on, I should specify which theories I consider to be BPH’s rivals 
(for the purpose of simplicity comparisons). I have in mind theories of welfare that meet 
the following four “minimal viability conditions”: 
 
39 Granted, I cannot rule out that the reader is aware of a plausible anti-BPH argument that I have 
not rebutted, either directly or implicitly by way of casting doubt on assumptions of qualitative or 
prudential insight. For such a reader, the epistemic probability of BPH may be low relative to one 
or more of its rivals. All I can say is that I do not know of any such arguments myself. 
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 (Consistency) The theory is internally logically consistent. 
 
(Axiology) The theory contains a set of fundamental claims assigning positive 
intrinsic prudential value to one or more things, and another set of fundamental 
claim assigning negative intrinsic prudential value to one or more things. 
 
(Description) The theory provides some non-evaluative account of each type of 
thing it claims has intrinsic prudential value. 
 
(Comparison) The theory provides some in-principle account of how to determine, 
for any two lives, which (if any) is prudentially better for its subject.40 
 
The consistency condition removes theories of welfare that are internally inconsistent 
from the comparison class, such as unrestricted actualist desire theories (see §1.2.2). Hence 
I will only be comparing BPH to restricted versions of desire theory. 
 
40  It is rare for philosophers of welfare to explicitly state a set of conditions that they think a 
theory needs to meet to be plausible. The one exception I know of is Sumner (1996: pp.12-18), 
who says that a successful theory of well-being must be descriptively adequate, which in turn 
requires meeting at least four criteria. What follows are my brief summaries of these criteria, 
which I hope do justice to Sumner’s longer explanations: 
 
Fidelity: The theory should be faithful to our pretheoretical beliefs about well-being, 
adjusted for the centrality of those beliefs to our network of preanalytic convictions. 
 
Generality: The theory should provide truth conditions both for claims about a person's 
welfare level at a given time and for claims about changes in welfare, positive or 
negative. It should be able to do this for all kinds of people and for some non-human 
creatures, and for groups as well as individuals. 
 
Formality: A theory of well-being must not confuse the nature of well-being (unitary) 
with its sources (plural). It should be able to tell us, for any source of well-being, what 
makes it a source of well-being. 
 
Neutrality: The theory should not have built into it a bias toward any particular goods or 
way of life. 
 
These conditions are more stringent than the ones I propose in this chapter, which do not even 
require that theories assign value in a manner faithful to pre-theoretic beliefs about welfare. 
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 The axiology condition rules out as irrelevant theories that assign positive but not 
negative intrinsic prudential value, or vice versa. This condition is justified by the fact that 
theories violating this constraint are implausible regardless of their specific content. 
To see why, consider a theory that claims that all and only the satisfaction of actual, 
rational desires are intrinsically good, but does not say that the frustration of these desires, 
or anything else, is intrinsically bad. This theory might well be simpler than BPH. But it 
has the implausible implication that it is not possible for a person’s total welfare to become 
lower than it was at any previous point in time. On this view, we would rack up more and 
more welfare with each instance of rational desire-satisfaction, and no injury, failure, or 
humiliation could budge the tally in the opposite direction. Such things would make our 
lives worse for us only insofar as they caused us to accumulate rational desire-satisfactions 
more slowly. It would follow that no matter how strong your rational desire to avoid pain, 
a year of horrific torture could not have a more deleterious effect on the quality of your 
life for you than, say, a year spent in a desire-free coma. (If this does not strike the reader 
as implausible, then I do not know what to say.) 
Any theory of welfare that assigns positive intrinsic prudential value to something 
while denying that anything has negative prudential value in itself will face this sort of 
objection. And any theory of welfare that assigns negative intrinsic prudential value to 
something while denying that anything has positive prudential value in itself will face a 
similar sort of objection, as it will imply that it is not possible for a person’s life to get 
better for them than it was at any previous time, except perhaps by slowing the rate at 
which it gets worse. I conclude that for a theory of welfare to even minimally viable, it 
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must say that some things are good for us in themselves and that some things are bad for 
us in themselves. 
A theory must meet the description and comparison conditions, meanwhile, in 
order for it to present a recognizable picture of a life that is good for its subject under 
normal material and psychological circumstances. 
Without some non-evaluative account of the things to which the theory assigns 
intrinsic prudential value, it will not be at all clear what the theory is asserting. For 
example, if a theory claims that pleasure is intrinsically good, but takes no stance 
whatsoever on the non-evaluative nature of pleasure, then it will not be clear what the 
content of that theory is (if indeed it has any). Thus the description condition obliges 
prudential hedonists to say something about what pleasure and pain are, informed desire 
theorists to say something about what desire is and what it takes for a desire to be suitably 
informed, objective list theorists to give some non-evaluative description of each item on 
their lists, and so on. 
Moreover, without some account of how to determine which of a pair of lives is 
prudentially better for its subject, even a theory that meets the axiology and description 
conditions in a more or less reasonable way is not yet sure to be even remotely plausible.41 
Consider a version of prudential hedonism that meets the former two conditions just as 
 
41 I am not saying that for a theory to be minimally viable, it must issue a definite verdict about 
every suitably described life comparison (though BPH does do this). Nor am I saying that for a 
theory to be minimally viable it must reject the possibility that there will be cases in which there is 
no fact of the matter as to which of two lives is prudentially superior. I am saying that to be 
minimally viable, a theory cannot be silent on the matter; it must make one or more fundamental 
claims about which lives are better than which. 
132 
 
BPH does, i.e. with the evaluative and phenomenological theses. This theory would tell 
us that pleasure and pain are each distinct phenomenal properties, and that they have 
positive and negative intrinsic prudential value (respectively). But it would not tell us 
how these values combine to determine the quality of a person’s life for them. There are 
more or less plausible ways of answering this question, so until we have an answer to it, 
we cannot tell whether the theory paints a recognizable picture of a life that is good for its 
subject under normal material and psychological circumstances.42 
These conditions set a low bar for theories of welfare. They do not demand that 
the actual content of a theory be at all reasonable. But meeting them ensures that a theory 
is internally consistent, and is necessary for a theory to be initially plausible. The 
conditions also set a floor for how simple a minimally viable theory of welfare can be. 
However few fundamental claims a theory may contain, it must have enough to meet the 
axiology, description, and calculation theses. So, in the remainder of this section, I will be 
assessing the simplicity of BPH only against minimally viable objective list theories, desire 
theories, and alternative forms of prudential hedonism. 
4.2.2 Simplicity Comparisons 
I begin with objective list theories. These theories assign intrinsic, objective 
prudential value to multiple things. But, all else being equal, a theory of welfare is simpler 
to the extent that it assigns intrinsic prudential value to fewer things. BPH assigns such 
 
42 Here is an example of an implausible way of answering this question. A hedonist theory of 
welfare could say that the intrinsic prudential value is extremely slight compared to that of 
pleasure, such that the negative value of a year of horrific torture would be outweighed by the 
positive value of a brief mildly pleasant sensation. 
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value to only two things: pleasure on the positive side and pain on the negative. In every 
case that I know of, objective list theorists assign intrinsic prudential value to more than 
two things.43 These theories therefore contain more fundamental claims than BPH does. 
I do not know how to translate every one of a theory’s fundamental claims into 
first-order logic in order to make a precise count. But even my very modest formal logic 
skills suffice for demonstrating the above point. Consider a toy example. BPH is simpler 
than a theory that assigns intrinsic positive prudential value to both pleasure and 
autonomy. This is because assigning value to autonomy in addition to pleasure requires 
making at least one additional fundamental claim. Recall that BPH’s fundamental claims 
about positive intrinsic prudential value are just these two, where P is the predicate for 
pleasure and V the predicate for having intrinsic positive prudential value: 
(∀x)(Px⸧Vx), (∀x)(Vx⸧Px) 
The first of these claims says that all pleasures have intrinsic positive prudential value, 
while the second says that only pleasures have such value. 
Meanwhile, the pleasure-plus-autonomy theory must invoke an additional 
predicate for autonomy (A), making for at least these three fundamental claims about 
positive intrinsic prudential value: 
(∀x)(Px⸧Vx), (∀x)(Ax⸧Vx), (∀x)[Vx⸧(Px v Ax)] 
 
43 For example, Hurka (2011) says that pleasure, knowledge, achievement, virtue, and friendship 
are all intrinsically good for us; Fletcher (2013) proposes that the list of objective intrinsic 
prudential goods consists of pleasure, friendship, achievement, happiness, self-respect, and 
virtue; Hooker (2015) argues that the list consists of pleasure, friendship, significant achievement, 
important knowledge, and autonomy. 
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The first two claims here assign positive intrinsic prudential value to all pleasures and all 
instances of autonomy, while the third says that nothing other than pleasure and 
autonomy has such value. We can extrapolate from this example to any other objective 
list theory. 
I turn next to desire theory. As I noted earlier, a logically consistent version of 
desire theory must restrict the range of desires that can affect a person’s welfare. Such 
restrictions require the theory to make additional fundamental claims, in order to specify 
what properties the right sort of desire-objects will have or lack. For example, compare 
unrestricted actualist desire theory (setting its internal inconsistency aside for the 
moment) with a view on which only the satisfactions of actual, rational desires are good 
for us in themselves. However many fundamental claims the unrestricted desire theory 
contains, this restricted view will have to have at least one more, in order to restrict the 
set of intrinsically good desire-satisfactions to only the rational ones. 
Here is an illustration. Let D stand for the predicate “is an instance of actual desire-
satisfaction”, R stand for the predicate “is rational”, and V once again stand for “has 
positive intrinsic prudential value”. On this interpretation, unrestricted actualist desire 
theory makes these two fundamental claims about what is good for us in itself: 
(∀x)(Dx⸧Vx), (∀x)(Vx⸧Dx) 
The restricted view, however, makes these three fundamental claims about what is good 
for us in itself: 
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(∀x)[(Dx&Rx)⸧Vx), (∀x)(Vx⸧Dx), (∀x)(Vx⸧Rx)44 
Once again, we can extrapolate to other views of the same sort. So, while unrestricted 
actualist desire theory might be just as simple as BPH, all logically consistent versions of 
the view will be less so. 
The same basic points apply to ideal desire theories. These theories say that only 
the satisfactions and frustrations of desires the agent would have under ideal conditions, 
such as conditions of full information and rationality, have intrinsic prudential value. 
Such views must make additional claims ascribing the right properties to the ideal 
conditions. 
Finally, we should consider some alternative forms of prudential hedonism. 
Having already argued against attitudinal theories of hedonic states in chapter 2, I will 
not attempt to show that BPH is simpler than attitudinal versions of prudential hedonism. 
I will focus my attention on two sorts of deviation from BPH: restricting the range of 
intrinsically valuable hedonic states, and positing discontinuities in the hedonic calculus. 
Each of these deviations invariably introduces complexity. 
First, the restricted forms of prudential hedonism. Consider, for example, a 
hedonist view on which only morally innocent pleasures have positive intrinsic 
prudential value. The comparison between this view and BPH is analogous to the 
comparison between restricted and unrestricted versions of desire theory discussed 
above. The morally restricted version of prudential hedonism will have to contain one 
 
44 Note that the proposition (∀x)[Vx⸧(Dx&Rx)] entails the conjunction [(∀x)(Vx⸧Dx) & 
(∀x)(Vx⸧Rx)], and therefore cannot be a fundamental claim by the definition given in §4.1.1. 
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additional fundamental claim specifying that only pleasures with a certain property 
(moral innocence) are intrinsically good for us.45 We can extrapolate from this to any other 
theory that assigns intrinsic prudential value to only a subset of hedonic states. All such 
views will be less simple than BPH. 
Second, versions of prudential hedonism that posit discontinuities in the hedonic 
calculus. By now we are familiar with one such view: qualitative hedonism in the vein of 
Mill (2001) and Crisp (2006). Qualitative hedonism has it that there are quality distinctions 
among pleasures; Crisp, for example, holds that no amount of lower-quality pleasure can 
equal or exceed any amount of higher-quality pleasure in hedonic magnitude. Capturing 
this will require additional fundamental claims, at least one for each discontinuous level 
of hedonic quality. 
The same will be true for any other theory that posits discontinuity in the hedonic 
calculus, whether it is a version of prudential hedonism or not. For example, consider the 
“disunified phenomenological thesis” (DPT) discussed at §2.2.2. The DPT says that what 
makes a mental state a pleasure or a pain is the way that it feels (and not a relation to 
something else, like an attitude), but not all pleasures share a single phenomenal property, 
and neither do all pains. Instead, pleasure and pain are unified as categories by 
phenomenological similarities (perhaps on the model of Wittgensteinian family 
 
45 Let P stand for the predicate “is a pleasure”, M stand for the predicate “is morally innocent”, and 
V stand for the predicate “has positive intrinsic prudential value”. Prudential hedonism that 
restricts the range of intrinsically valuable pleasures to only the morally innocent ones will have to 
make the following three claims about what is good for us in itself, whereas, as we have seen, BPH 
makes only two in this regard: 




resemblances). This view implies that the hedonic calculus is discontinuous. If it were 
continuous, then there would have to be a single property shared among all pleasures that 
makes them count as pleasures (and another among all pains that makes them count as 
pains), which is precisely what the DPT denies. Hence the DPT is less simple than the 
phenomenological thesis, and any form of prudential hedonism built on the DPT will be 
less simple than BPH. 
The upshot is that BPH is simpler than minimally viable objective list theories, 
restricted forms of desire theory, and versions of prudential hedonism that restricts the 
range of intrinsically valuable hedonic states or posits discontinuity in the hedonic 
calculus. From this and the assumptions discussed in the previous section, it follows that 
BPH has a higher epistemic probability than these views. This gives us an epistemic 
reason to favor BPH over these competitors. I turn now to three challenges to this 
argument.  
4.3 Challenges 
4.3.1 The Problem of Selecting Predicates 
To determine whether one theory contains fewer fundamental claims than 
another, we first need to settle on a common set of predicates with which to express these 
theories. In other words, we need a common language of fundamental properties and 
relations. But different languages can produce different results: T1 may come out simpler 
than T2 with one set of predicates but not another. If there is no right way of choosing what 
language to use for the sake of measuring relative simplicity, then there is no fact of the 
matter as to which of two theories is really simpler. 
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Now consider the following scenario. Someone proposes an objective list theory 
of welfare on which only pleasure and autonomy have intrinsic positive prudential value, 
and they coin a new term, “plautonomy”, defined such that anything that is an instance 
of either pleasure or autonomy is an instance of plautonomy. He then assigns this term its 
own predicate (L). With this predicate in hand, the pleasure-plus-autonomy theory need 
not make any more fundamental claims than BPH. Its claims about positive intrinsic 
prudential value can be expressed as follows: 
(∀x)(Lx⸧Vx), (∀x)(Vx⸧Lx) 
With the plautonomy predicate in our language, BPH and the pleasure-plus-autonomy 
view make an equal number of fundamental claims about what has positive intrinsic 
prudential value. If this hypothetical philosopher proposes that only pain has negative 
intrinsic prudential value, the resulting theory would appear to be no more complex than 
BPH overall. So it seems that if I want to say that BPH is simpler than the pleasure-plus-
autonomy view, I need some principled basis for selecting a language without the 
plautonomy predicate. 
 One possibility would be to demand that the language chosen for the sake of a 
simplicity comparison contain only as many predicates as needed to express the two 
theories being compared, and no more. But this doesn’t solve the problem. In some cases, 
multiple languages will meet this demand, and still issue different verdicts about 
comparative simplicity. For example, we could express BPH’s claims about positive 
intrinsic prudential value without a predicate for pleasure, using only the predicates for 
autonomy (A) and plautonomy (L): 
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(∀x)[(Lx & ~Ax)⸧Vx], (∀x)(Vx⸧Lx), (∀x)(Vx⸧~Ax) 
In this language BPH could turn out to be less simple than the pleasure-and-autonomy 
theory. 
The only option seems to be to demand that the predicates of the language we use 
for simplicity comparisons correspond to the real fundamental properties and relations 
out there in the world—so-called “natural kinds”. But then, of course, we have the 
problem of how to figure out what these properties and relations are. 
Opponents could leverage this problem against BPH in one of at least three ways. 
First, they could claim that a proper account of the real fundamental properties and 
relations out there in the world would show that their preferred theory of welfare is just 
a simple as BPH (or even simpler). For instance, one could argue that it is the satisfactions 
and frustrations of rational desires that have intrinsic prudential value (positive and 
negative, respectively), and that each of these is a natural kind for which a single predicate 
would be appropriate. Second, they could argue that there are no natural kinds, so there 
is no fact of the matter as to whether one theory is simpler than another, at least according 
to the criterion I have proposed. Third, they could argue that we rationally ought to 
suspend judgment about the existence of natural kinds, and therefore we ought to 
suspend judgment about whether BPH is simpler than its rivals. 
I do not know how to determine whether there are natural kinds and what they 
might be, so I do not know how to answer any of these objections. I will note, however, 
that even if successful, such an objection would not give us reason to reject BPH. It would 
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only refute my case for accepting it over its major competitors, returning us to the 
stalemate with which this chapter began. 
4.3.2 Universal Quantifiers and Skepticism 
The notion of epistemic probability, as applied to theories (philosophical or 
otherwise), faces a troubling general objection. Any theory on any subject will include 
some universal claims. As we have seen, BPH contains the claim that all pleasures have 
intrinsic prudential value: 
(∀x)(Px⸧Vx) 
But notice that a universal claim like this one is logically equivalent to the conjunction of 
all its substitution instances: 
[(Pa⸧Va) & (Pb⸧Vb) & (Pc⸧Vc)…] 
And in principle, the number of substitution instances is infinite, since any object at all 
could be substituted for the variable “x”. The objection, then, is that all theories with 
universal claims in them—which is to say all theories—are in fact equivalent to an 
infinitely long set of propositions, and therefore all theories containing non-analytic 
universal propositions have epistemic probabilities that asymptotically approach zero. 
 This is not an objection that applies to theories of welfare in particular, let alone 
BPH specifically. It is a general objection to non-ordinal measures of epistemic probability. 
It points out that if the substitution instances of universal claims can have epistemic 
probabilities above zero and below one, then any universal claim that is neither a logical 
truth nor a contradiction will be vanishingly improbable. This presents a choice: give up 
on the idea of non-ordinal epistemic probability—that is, reject the idea that there is any 
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fact of the matter as to how much more justified one proposition is than another—or 
embrace the idea that when you assent to a non-formal theory, be it scientific or 
philosophical, you are assenting to a set of claims that is scarcely epistemically preferable 
to a necessary falsehood. I find both of these difficult to believe, which suggests to me that 
the objection itself is has gone wrong somewhere. But, I confess, I do not know how it is 
mistaken. I leave it to opponents of BPH to decide whether this challenge is one whose 
implications they themselves are prepared to accept. 
4.3.3 Is BPH Really Simpler? 
One might agree that BPH is the simplest minimally viable theory of welfare, on 
precisely the grounds I have suggested here, and yet doubt that it is the minimally viable 
theory of welfare that makes for the smallest set of welfare-related theoretical 
commitments. For it may be that defending BPH against the objections discussed in 
previous chapters requires so many additional claims that adopting the view comes with 
no advantage in simplicity overall.46 
Recall that in chapter 3, I contrasted two hypotheses about our intrinsic prudential 
intuitions: the strong insight hypothesis, which says that our intrinsic prudential 
intuitions reliably track the truth about what really has or lacks intrinsic prudential value, 




46 Thanks to Kobi Finestone for calling this objection to my attention. 
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The Pro-Hedonist Hypothesis: BPH is true, and we tend to correctly assign positive 
intrinsic prudential value to pleasure. But we also tend to mistakenly assign 
positive intrinsic prudential value to other things, just in case they meet these three 
conditions: 
 
(c) We observe them to be consistently conducive to net pleasure for 
people in general. 
(d) They are not categorically instrumental. 
(d) They are not activities that are usually done for some external end. 
 
Our intrinsic prudential intuitions are the products of tacit inferences from 
features of the given scenarios plus these prior assignments of intrinsic value. 
(Mutatis mutandis for pain and negative intrinsic prudential value.) 
 
The pro-hedonist hypothesis looks a lot more complicated than the strong insight 
hypothesis. The former is much more succinct: it just says that we have the intrinsic 
prudential intuitions that we do because we have some capacity for generating intrinsic 
prudential intuitions with reliably true contents. On the other hand, the pro-hedonist 
hypothesis goes on at comparatively great length, specifying the various conditions under 
which we will have intuitions of a pro- or anti-hedonist sort. If defending BPH against 
evaluative objections requires taking on the pro-hedonist hypothesis, or something like it, 
while opponents can stick with the claim of strong prudential insight, then BPH’s claim 
to greater simplicity would seem to evaporate. 
 This appearance would be misleading. Simplicity is only a ceteris paribus 
theoretical virtue: it becomes relevant only when all else is equal between the sets of claims 
being assessed. But not all is equal between the strong insight hypothesis and the pro-
hedonist hypothesis, because the latter is more informative: it offers an account of both 
accurate intrinsic prudential intuitions and erroneous ones. The strong insight hypothesis 
only tells about the former. 
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Now, if the strong insight hypothesis were revised to say that our intuitions track 
the truth about intrinsic prudential value without fail, then it would just as informative 
as, and simpler than, the pro-hedonist hypothesis. But this would be to say that all 
intrinsic prudential intuitions have true contents, which would imply that different 
people’s intrinsic prudential intuitions never contradict one another. This is not what we 
observe. Defectors from the intuitive consensus on cases like the experience machine may 
be rare, but they do exist. We therefore cannot assess the relative simplicity the total 
welfare-theoretic worldviews of basic prudential hedonists and their opponents until the 
strong insight hypothesis is bolstered by some account of cases in which people’s intrinsic 
prudential intuitions miss the mark.47 
I must add that though this objection is mistaken, it shows something important. 
I have tried to shield my defense of BPH from empirical disconfirmation as much as 
possible. This objection reveals a limit of this effort. Whether accepting and defending 
BPH really makes for a simpler welfare-related belief set depends in part on how simple 
the pro-hedonist hypothesis is relative to the equally plausible and informative 
hypotheses about our intrinsic prudential intuitions that are available to proponents of 
rival views. This, in turn, depends on what data these hypotheses need to account for, i.e. 
what intrinsic prudential intuitions people actually have, which is an empirical matter. I 
suspect that anti-hedonist accounts of our prudential intuitions need not be any simpler 
 
47 This approach would also encounter difficulties with intuitions that tell against non-hedonist 
theories of welfare in general. For example, see Pummer (2017). 
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than pro-hedonist ones, all else being equal; but in the absence of data, I can only 
speculate. 
4.4 Conclusion 
If the approach I have outlined in this chapter is right, then basic prudential 
hedonism is simpler than its competitors in a way that makes it more likely to be true. 
However, as we have seen, the argument depends on a number of questionable 
assumptions. It is open to opponents of BPH to exploit this. But doing so would come at 
the cost of taking on theoretical commitments far afield from the topic of well-being, 
concerning matters such as epistemic probability and the existence of natural kinds. 
Refuting the argument in this chapter, then, may require more philosophical breadth than 














The aim of this dissertation has been twofold: to show that basic prudential 
hedonism (BPH) is at least as defensible as other positive theories of welfare, and to show 
that it is in fact preferable to its competitors, such that it is the positive theory of welfare 
that we rationally ought to accept. 
In chapter 1, I showed that BPH was at least the equal of major desire satisfaction 
and objective list theories in its fundamental appeal. In chapter 2, I gave a positive 
argument for the phenomenological thesis, and defended BPH against a number of 
descriptive (non-evaluative) objections. There, I also gave a case for remaining neutral on 
the choice between separate experience and hedonic tone theories of hedonic states. Then, 
in chapter 3, I defended BPH against a number of objections based on one or more 
evaluative premises. These chapters represent my effort to show that BPH is at least as 
defensible as its competitors among positive theories of welfare. Of course, I do not claim 
to have addressed every extant descriptive or evaluative objection to BPH. But I believe 
that the approaches I outline in chapters 2 and 3, particularly concerning the assumptions 
of quantitative, qualitative, and prudential insight, should be applicable to many 
objections not explicitly addressed in these pages. 
My effort to meet the second, more ambitious aim—showing that BPH is the 
theory of welfare we rationally ought to accept—was confined to chapter 4. There, I 
outlined an argument to the effect that we rationally ought to accept BPH because, of all 
the minimally viable theories of welfare, it is the simplest (in a specific syntactic sense), 
and therefore the most likely to be true (in a specific epistemic sense). 
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But, as we have seen, the success of the argument outlined in chapter 4 is 
contingent on some contentious empirical, metaphysical, and epistemological 
assumptions, defense of which is beyond the scope of this work. Whether BPH really 
makes for the simplest worldview overall depends, in part, on what intuitions people 
really have about what has intrinsic prudential value. And whether my overarching 
approach of arguing for BPH on the grounds of its simplicity succeeds depends on 
controversial assumptions in fundamental philosophy. 
I see no way to avoid this. But there is a silver lining, which is that BPH’s 
opponents are in the same position. Far from being a settled matter of philosophical 
common sense, the case against basic prudential hedonism relies on a number of 
questionable assumptions—about hedonic insight, prudential insight, what intuitions we 
generally have, and perhaps ultimately about the fundamental logical constituents of 
theories of welfare. If there is one accomplishment I can claim for this dissertation, it is 
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